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**IN THIS ISSUE**

The Birth of the Moroccan  
Nation ..... **Marvine Howe**

The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946  
.... **Robert Rossow, Jr.**


Administration and Legal Develop-  
ment in Arabia: The Persian Gulf  
Principalities  
.... **Herbert J. Liebesny**

Economic Progress in an Encircled  
Land ..... **Peter G. Franck**

Current Developments • Chronology  
Documents • Book Reviews  
Bibliography

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Articles

### WINTER

The Birth of the Moroccan Nation.....	Marvine Howe.....	1
The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946.....	Robert Rossow, Jr.....	17
Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities.....	Herbert J. Liebesny.....	33
Economic Progress in an Encircled Land.....	Peter G. Franck.....	43

### SPRING

The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures.....	Bernard Lewis.....	125
The Arab League: A Reassessment.....	T. R. Little.....	138
Current Population Trends in Iraq.....	Doris G. Adams.....	151
Recent Agricultural Development and Bedouin Settlement in Syria.....	Adnan Mabbouk.....	167

### SUMMER

Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination, Part I.....	P. M. Holt.....	239
The Abolition of Confessional Jurisdiction in Egypt. The Non-Muslim Courts.....	George N. Sfeir.....	248
The Ethiopian Empire: Progress and Problems.....	William H. Lewis.....	257

### AUTUMN

The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors.....	M. M. Knight.....	355
Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination, Part II.....	P. M. Holt.....	368
The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956).....	Avedis K. Sanjian.....	379

## Developments of the Quarter

WINTER: Israel, Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact—Breakdown of Buraimi Arbitration— New Stage in Franco-Moroccan Relations.....	60
SPRING: Algeria—The Eastern Mediterranean—Intensification of Cyprus Dispute.....	177
SUMMER: Tunisia and Independence—The Secretary General's Missions—Cyprus Impasse —Iraqi Development—India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.....	269
AUTUMN: Arab Nationalism and the Crises.....	395

## Documents

WINTER: Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact (October 20, 1955)—Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact (October 27, 1955).....	77
SPRING: Ethiopia's Revised Constitution, <i>condensation by William Lewis</i> .....	194
SUMMER: The New Egyptian Constitution, <i>study by Curtis Jones</i> .....	300
AUTUMN: Program of Action of the Communist Party of Egypt.....	427

# Book Review Article

Egyptian Arabic Studies, by Richard S. Harrell

307

## Book Reviews

### WINTER

General	80
Fisher, ed.: Social Forces in the Middle East, reviewed by Afif I. Tannous	
Economic Development in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954, reviewed by Peter G. Franck	
Goitein: Jews and Arabs, reviewed by Walter J. Fischel	
Rondot: Les Chrétiens d'Orient, reviewed by Edward J. Jurji	
Baldwin, ed.: A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, reviewed by Robert W. Crawford	
Cordero: Relaciones Exteriores de España, reviewed by John D. Harbron	
Arab World	86
Gulick: Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village, reviewed by William D. Schorger	
Adamiyat: Bahrein Islands, reviewed by Majid Khadduri	
Armitage: The Desert and the Stars, reviewed by William Yale	
Ethiopia	90
Marein: The Ethiopian Empire, reviewed by William H. Lewis	
India and Pakistan	91
Marriott, ed.: Village India, reviewed by Richard D. Lambert	
Dube: Indian Village, reviewed by Richard D. Lambert	
Stratton: One Man's India, reviewed by Marvin H. Harper	
Stephens: Horned Moon, reviewed by James W. Spain	
Iran	94
Elwell-Sutton: Persian Oil, reviewed by Harvey P. Hall	
Israel	95
Rackman: Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948-51, reviewed by Paul L. Hanna	
Turkey	96
Benoist-Méchin: Le Loup et le Léopard: Mustapha Kémal, reviewed by Jean Deny	
Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books	98

### SPRING

General	200
Shwadrán: The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, reviewed by George Lenczowski	
Khadduri: War and Peace in the Law of Islam, reviewed by Sir Hamilton Gibb	
Middle East Economic Papers, reviewed by Francis Boardman	
Lazaron: Olive Trees in Storm, reviewed by Abraham Cronbach	
Arab World	203
Vidal: The Oasis of al-Hasa, reviewed by Harold Storm	
Atiyah: The Arabs, reviewed by Herbert Bodman	
Faris & Husayn: The Crescent in Crisis, reviewed by Myles Greene	
Ethiopia	206
Sandford: The Lion of Judah Hath Prevailed, reviewed by William Steene	
Israel	207
Frank, ed.: Sound the Great Trumpet, reviewed by Edwin Samuel	
North Africa	208
Stuart: The International City of Tangier, reviewed by Rom Landau	
Stevens: North African Powder Keg, reviewed by Roger Le Tourneau	
Bourguiba: La Tunisie et la France, reviewed by Alex Westfried	
Sudan	212
Arkell: A History of the Sudan, reviewed by Richard S. Starr	
Turkey	213
Lewis: Turkey, reviewed by Roderic Davison	
Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books	214

## SUMMER

General .....	313	
von Grunebaum, ed.: <i>Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization</i> , reviewed by Kenneth Cragg		
Hodgson: <i>The Order of Assassins</i> , reviewed by William Popper		IV
Franck & Teaf, eds.: <i>Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation</i> , reviewed by Harold B. Allen		
Arab World .....	318	
Samaan: <i>Value Reconstruction and Egyptian Education</i> , reviewed by Walter J. Skellie		T
Shabibi: <i>Mu'arrikh al-'Iraq Ibn al-Fuwati</i> , reviewed by Majid Khadduri		T
Phillips: <i>The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan</i> , reviewed by Charlotte Morehouse		A
Villard: <i>Libya: The New Arab Kingdom in North Africa</i> , reviewed by William Sands		
The Economic Development of Syria, reviewed by Albert Badre		
North Africa .....	324	E
Howe: <i>The Prince and I</i> , reviewed by Lorna Hahn		D
Turkey .....	325	
Cebesoy: <i>Milli Mucadele Hatiralari</i> (vol. 1); <i>Moskova Hatiralari</i> (vol. 2), reviewed by Dankwart Rustow		
Israel .....	327	D
Ottensouer: <i>The Palestine Pound and the Israel Pound</i> , reviewed by Raymond Mikesell		
Davis, ed.: <i>Israel: Its Role in Civilization</i> , reviewed by Isaac Franck		
Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books .....	330	B

## AUTUMN

General .....	438
Kedourie: <i>England and the Middle East</i> , reviewed by William Yale	
Anshen, ed.: <i>Mid-East, World Center</i> , reviewed by Harold W. Glidden	
Smith: <i>The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917</i> , reviewed by Roderic H. Davison	
Rosenthal: <i>Humor in Early Islam</i> , reviewed by Moshe Perlmann	
Guillaume: <i>The Life of Muhammad</i> , reviewed by Dwight M. Donaldson	
Winder & Ziadeh: <i>An Introduction to Modern Arabic</i> , reviewed by Arnold C. Satterthwait	
Arab World .....	444
Jackson: <i>Behind the Modern Sudan</i> , reviewed by Peter M. Holt	
Wingate: <i>Wingate of the Sudan</i> , reviewed by Muhammad Sabry	
Israel .....	446
Spiro: <i>Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia</i> , reviewed by Paul Lunt	
Turkey .....	447
Stark: <i>The Lycian Shore</i> , reviewed by William Spencer	
Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books .....	448

## *Bibliography of Periodical Literature*

WINTER .....	104
SPRING .....	217
SUMMER .....	334
AUTUMN .....	452

## *Readers' Commentary*

WINTER .....	122
SPRING .....	235
SUMMER .....	352
AUTUMN .....	470
INDEX TO VOLUME X .....	471

# THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 10

WINTER 1956

NUMBER 1

## Table of Contents

The Birth of the Moroccan Nation.....	Marvine Howe.....	1
The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946.....	Robert Rossow, Jr....	17
Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities.....	Herbert J. Liebesny..	33
Economic Progress in an Encircled Land.....	Peter G. Franck.....	43
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY.....		60
Israel, Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact—Breakdown of Buraimi Arbitration— New Stage in Franco-Moroccan Relations		
DOCUMENTS .....		77
Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact (October 20, 1955)		
Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact (October 27, 1955)		
BOOK REVIEWS .....		80
General .....		80
Fisher, ed.: Social Forces in the Middle East, reviewed by Afif I. Tannous		
Economic Development in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954, reviewed by Peter G. Franck		
Goitein: Jews and Arabs, reviewed by Walter J. Fischel		
Rondot: Les Chrétiens d'Orient, reviewed by Edward J. Jurji		
Baldwin, ed.: A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, reviewed by Robert W. Crawford		
Cordero: Relaciones Exteriores de España, reviewed by John D. Harbron		
Arab World .....		86
Gulick: Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village, reviewed by William D. Schorger		
Adamiyat: Bahrein Islands, reviewed by Majid Khadduri		
Armitage: The Desert and the Stars, reviewed by William Yale		
Ethiopia .....		90
Marein: The Ethiopian Empire, reviewed by William H. Lewis		
India and Pakistan.....		91
Marriott, ed.: Village India, reviewed by Richard D. Lambert		
Dube: Indian Village, reviewed by Richard D. Lambert		
Stratton: One Man's India, reviewed by Marvin H. Harper		
Stephens: Horned Moon, reviewed by James W. Spain		
Iran .....		94
Elwell-Sutton: Persian Oil, reviewed by Harvey P. Hall		
Israel .....		95
Rackman: Israel's Emerging Constitution, 1948-51, reviewed by Paul L. Hanna		
Turkey .....		96
Benoist-Méchin: Le Loup et le Léopard: Mustapha Kémal, reviewed by Jean Deny		
Recent Publications and Forthcoming Books .....		98
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE.....		104
List of Periodicals Reviewed.....		117
READERS' COMMENTARY.....		122
Cover Photo: The Kajakai dam in the Helmand valley, Afghanistan (see page 43)		

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# THE MIDDLE EAST *Journal*

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## THE BIRTH OF THE MOROCCAN NATION

*Marvine Howe*

**M**OROCCO TODAY has a new and vital national conscience. The symbol of the Moroccan nation is Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef (Mohammed V), exiled by the French government in August 1953 and restored to the Moroccan throne in November 1955. At the time of his removal, Sultan Ben Youssef had considerable influence, particularly in urban centers, but there were still large areas where the population was indifferent to the Sultan's destiny as the head of a new nation. What led to Mohammed V's downfall, and more important still, why has he become the pivot of a united and determined Morocco?

The accelerated birth of a Moroccan national spirit is largely due to France's failure to live up to the clauses of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. Contrary to the real meaning of a protectorate, the French government substituted direct rule for "control" of the Moroccan administration. Furthermore, it has proved incapable of preventing the rise of an autonomous French administration in the Protectorate whose policy is closely linked with the interests of powerful financial groups. For the past 25 years it has been clear that the French settlers in Morocco were not satisfied with their position as favored guests and wished to transform the Protectorate into an out-and-out colony under the guise of co-sovereignty. Their attempts to

◆ MARVINE HOWE has been a resident of Morocco since 1950 as reporter for Radio Maroc's American Program and regular contributor to the Arabic Program of the B.B.C. In December 1955 she went to Algeria as correspondent for Worldwide Press Service, Time Magazine, and the Columbia Broadcasting System. Miss Howe's book on Morocco, *The Prince and I*, was published by John Day in the fall of 1955.

alter the real meaning of a protectorate by progressively switching to direct administration were to all appearances successful until they committed the error of attacking the Sultan, "Commander of the Faithful."

The removal of Sultan Ben Youssef was explained as having been forced upon the administration by a Berber tribal insurrection against an Arab ruler and Arab nationalist parties. It was in reality just a continuation of the French colonialists' "Berber policy" aimed at weakening Moroccan national sentiments by dividing the country into two hostile camps: Berbers against Arabs. Ever since 1930, influential French circles had encouraged the administration to pass legislation tending to undermine the Sultan's authority in Berber zones. One of its earliest moves toward splitting Morocco in two was the Berber Dahir, a decree which substituted French authority for the Sultan's rule over almost three-fifths of the Moroccan population living in the so-called "Berber zones." Moroccan reaction against this threat to their state was so universal that after a few years Paris was forced to modify the decree.

Another aspect of this same "Berber policy" was the administration's support of powerful traditional leaders, such as leaders of the religious brotherhoods and certain pashas and caids, whom it could virtually nominate or remove at will. It was not difficult to stir up the hostility of these feudal chiefs against the Sultan and the nationalist parties who were seeking to reform the old traditional institutions. The colonialists' leading ally in their campaign for dual sovereignty was the man the French press labeled "Lord of the Berbers"—the Pasha of Marrakech, Thami el-Glaoui. The Glaoui and other powerful tribal leaders, willing to do anything to preserve their fortunes and privileges, were easily enlisted in the plot against a "too modern" Sultan and "too influential" nationalist parties. The so-called "Movement of Opposition" and "Reforms of Pashas and Caids" which finally succeeded in overthrowing the Sultan was simply a well-devised scheme organized by a few discontented tribal chiefs and powerful Frenchmen with the object of maintaining a status quo in Morocco which was extremely profitable to them.

#### *CRISES OF 1950-1953*

The coalition of high Protectorate authorities and Moroccan feudal lords first came to an open clash with the Sultan and his nationalist followers in 1950 when the former appealed to Paris for a revision of the Protectorate Treaty that would give Moroccans basic civil liberties. The Sultan's request had been refused, and so he decided to take the matter to the United Nations. The Sultan's persistent demands annoyed France's representative in Morocco, General Alphonse Juin, whose job it was to discourage Morocco's desire for independence and ease the country into the French Union. When Resident-General Juin realized that the Sultan systematically opposed all

French reforms which tended toward co-sovereignty, he decided that the best thing to do was to get rid of the Sultan and his nationalist supporters once and for all. The Glaoui was persuaded to break off relations with the Palace, and the French press obligingly carried the story from there, presenting the Glaoui as the defender of the Muslim religion against a Sultan who, they said, had allied himself with the "extremist" Istiqlal (Independence) Party.

Late in 1950 the authorities forced Moroccan nationalists out of the Government Council when they questioned the justice of the budget expenditures. They followed this action with an ultimatum to the Sultan to disavow the Istiqlal or face abdication or deposition. When Ben Youssef, backed by his Council of Viziers and Islamic theologians, refused to disavow the Istiqlal, General Juin broke off official relations with the Palace. This was the signal for a "spontaneous tribal movement" led by the Glaoui and his henchmen. Local French authorities and the press convinced the public and government in France that the Berber tribes would massacre the inhabitants of Fez and Rabat if the Sultan were not forced to give in to General Juin's demands. The Palace was surrounded with French troops, and at the last minute the Sultan signed the Protocol. This was a proclamation condemning the activity of "a certain party" and dismissing nationalists from different branches of the government as well as from the Imperial Cabinet.

This was a humiliating compromise for the Sultan and the nationalists, but it was not a lasting defeat. The Moroccan notables who had joined the Glaoui's tribal movement were quick to change their tune when they saw that the Sultan was to keep his throne. Furthermore, French and international opinion were not altogether pleased with the role General Juin had played in what was supposed to be "a Moroccan affair among Moroccans." The French government decided it would be wise to replace the intransigent General Juin by General Augustin Guillaume, known for his honesty and love of Morocco. This was a hard blow to the pride of General Juin. Even nomination as Commander in Chief of NATO's Central European forces could not erase his animosity toward the Moroccan Sultan and the nationalists, and he continued to play an active if somewhat more discreet part in Moroccan affairs.

General Guillaume came to Morocco in 1951 with good intentions for a "new deal." He wanted to get rid of some of the high government officials who were known to be influenced by their connections with private financial groups. Unfortunately, these men proved too powerful and there could be no general house cleaning. The gap between the Protectorate authorities and the Moroccan people continued to widen while the French government floundered about looking for a policy. This policy finally took shape after the Casablanca riots of December 1952. Moroccan laborers had gone on a solidarity strike to protest against the assassination of a Tunisian labor leader, Ferhat Hashed. When Moroccan laborers failed to report for work on this

day of mourning, they were arrested. Fighting broke out in the Casablanca slum areas and port, and the police were obliged to use their arms against the excited mobs, leaving hundreds of Moroccan dead.

The local press and authorities labeled the riots an Istiqlal-Communist plot aimed at the overthrow of the government. On this pretext, the Istiqlal and Communist parties were banned, thousands of nationalists arrested, and the Moroccan press was suppressed. Not until two and one half years later did the Casablanca Military Tribunal reveal that there had been no Istiqlal-Communist plot. Moroccan leaders were then released to face the gravest period in Morocco's modern history.

The final conspiracy against the Sultan was carefully worked out and might have succeeded if France had been able to follow up with a constructive program of reforms. Once again the Glaoui and his accomplices were brought to the front by high Protectorate officials, backed by Marshal Juin, members of the French government, and the Radical and Masonic press in France and Morocco. In May 1953, 270 pashas and caids were persuaded to sign a petition against the Sultan. Most of these dissident officials were afraid they might lose their lucrative positions should the Sultan and the nationalist parties come into power. There followed a fiery battle of petitions between the friends and enemies of the Sultan. The pashas of the main northern cities and the Doctors of Islamic Law in Fez issued proclamations declaring their loyalty to the Sultan and condemning the Glaoui's petition as treason. But the Sultan's friends were no match for the Pasha of Marrakech and his sponsors. According to the Protectorate Treaty, it was France's duty to defend the Sultan and his family against all dangers which might threaten. But no move was made to put down the Glaoui's revolt. Instead, when the Pasha visited Paris in June 1953, he was hailed as "a great Berber chief and loyal friend of France" by Marshal Juin during a reception at the Academie Française.

With such open support from the French Marshal, the Glaoui's declarations against the Sultan became louder and more violent. Upon his return to Morocco, the Pasha immediately launched a widespread propaganda campaign among the southern tribes. The administration's active cooperation in this movement against the Sultan was all too obvious. Under Protectorate law, Moroccans as a rule were not allowed to hold meetings, but the Glaoui was given every facility for his mass gatherings. Ties were so close between the mutineers and the authorities that the Glaoui was given a chief of state's welcome by the French Minister Plenipotentiary, acting for the Resident General. These honors paid to the Berber leader were all that certain Moroccan opportunists working for the administration needed to cast their lots with the Pasha of Marrakech.

Events moved quickly then, so quickly that France, preoccupied with a nationwide transport and communication strike and the threat of a cabinet



crisis, proved incapable once more of handling its far-flung officials. The Glaoui and his colleagues were allowed to carry on the show with the none too discreet encouragement of the authorities. At Moulay Idriss, holy Muslim city, the rebellious pashas and caids took a solemn oath to drive Mohammed ben Youssef off the Moroccan throne. Then the group, headed by the Glaoui, moved south to the Pasha's fief, where they presided over a tremendous rally of tribes on August 13.

To Paris and other international capitals, this gathering had all the earmarks of a massive revolt against the Sultan. Witnesses on the spot later reported that most of the tribesmen had been completely unaware of the reasons for the rally but had simply obeyed the orders of their local chiefs. And so it was that the tribes unwittingly proclaimed a new "Commander of Believers," Mohammed ben Arafa, a docile old gentleman without any political education.

In the meantime, the Sultan's palace in Rabat had been surrounded by French troops. The Resident General presented a protocol and set of decrees to the Sultan for signing. These papers legalized the practice of direct administration in the Protectorate. The last of the Sultan's legislative powers were to be taken away from him and turned over to a council made up of French and Moroccan representatives. This, then, was co-sovereignty, the dream of French colonials since 1912 and the nightmare of Moroccan nationalists. The Sultan had no other choice but to initial the Protocol.

Once the Protocol was initialed there was no further reason to get rid of the Sultan, but unfortunately France had little control over its willful representatives. A document published in the French press two years after the deposition shows that the final coup d'état was carried out by French rebels against the will of the French government. On August 14, 1953, six days before the coup, French Foreign Minister Bidault sent instructions to the Resident General in Rabat informing him that since the Sultan had accepted the conditions, there was no longer a valid pretext for his removal; therefore the French government had decided to oppose the movement "organized by the Glaoui and several caids."<sup>1</sup> But the officials who received M. Bidault's orders did not see fit to carry them out. The "movement" was permitted to continue. Meanwhile, the local press, controlled by the financial groups which were leading the campaign against the Sultan, painted a convincing picture of the country on the brink of a bloody civil war. On August 19, the French cabinet met in Paris and decided that the government would have to give in to the clique of colonialists and feudal lords. The following day, the Resident General gave the Sultan the choice of abdication or exile. When the Sultan refused to give up his throne, he and his family were forced out of the Palace at gunpoint and flown immediately to Corsica, later to be transferred to Madagascar. Nationalist leaders and friends of the Palace were

<sup>1</sup> Published in *L'Express* (Paris), July 1955.

arrested or exiled so as to prevent any demonstrations or action in favor of the helpless monarch.

### *REPRESSION, TERRORISM, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM*

A strange calm reigned in the Protectorate, which was now in effect a colony. There was little emotion shown either for or against Ben Youssef's successor, Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, who was immediately tagged "the Frenchmen's Sultan." The Moroccan people seemed to have accepted the change of sultans in a kind of dazed apathy. The lack of violent protests encouraged many Frenchmen to believe that Mohammed ben Youssef had in fact been the only obstacle to Franco-Moroccan understanding and that now Moroccans would agree to co-sovereignty. The French public looked forward optimistically to the application of the much talked about reforms, the justification for France's intervention in the Moroccan throne dispute.

To the disappointment of many, the only reforms which followed the Sultan's exile were those which deprived the Moroccan ruler of all of his legislative and executive powers, turning them over to a group of French and Moroccan officials in the Residency. The very nature of the forces which had triumphed over the Sultan and his liberal French and Moroccan supporters ruled out any important reforms. Even the penal codes agreed upon by Mohammed V before his exile were not put into effect. It was impossible to expect any deep-seated reform of the judicial system so long as the traditionalist pashas and caids remained in the driver's seat, because a real reform would only weaken their influence in the tribes and deprive them of their principal source of revenue. Nor could any social reform of consequence be forthcoming while the settlers and big financial groups were in power, since their wealth had been built on underpaid labor. It was only natural that when the time came to produce a reform program, those groups who had so loudly criticized Sultan Ben Youssef as the only stumbling block to Moroccan reforms, should turn about and caution the government against too drastic or hurried a reform plan.

The absence of an effective reform program was one of the major factors contributing to a general discontent with the regime which had deposed Ben Youssef. Those Moroccans who had swallowed the pretext that his removal was necessary to promote democratic reforms now saw that their condition was in no way improved and were ready to listen to nationalist propaganda in favor of the martyred exile.

A second error of French policy after the deposition, one which was influential in uniting the Moroccan people against the new regime, was a reinforcement of police repression. Thousands of ardent nationalists were imprisoned or put under house arrest and all who came into contact with them were suspect. Even lukewarm nationalists fell under suspicion and soon became convinced that they had suffered a great loss in the exile of Moham-



med ben Youssef. There was hardly a family in Morocco who was not mourning over its exiles, prisoners, or dead. The authorities had thought that if they removed the followers of Ben Youssef, the people would quickly forget him and accept the puppet Sultan Moulay Arafa; to this end much of Morocco's educated elite was gotten out of the way. But contrary to French expectations, the mass arrests and imprisonments only served to strengthen national unity around the exiled Sultan and his loyal partisans.

The suppression of Moroccan newspapers and the Istiqlal Party left the Moroccan people without any guides. Deprived of their leaders, spokesmen, and means of expression, they showed their opposition to the unpopular regime by the only means left to them: violence. This was the birth of terrorism—a spontaneous, desperate protest against the powers who had dared to attack Islam and Moroccan sovereignty by exiling Sultan Ben Youssef. For a long time the great majority of terrorist victims were obscure Moroccans—tobacconists, shopkeepers, teachers—known to be informers for the police. But terrorism began to attract worldwide attention when attacks were committed against the Sultan Ben Arafa, the Glaoui, Resident-General Guillaume, and other important French and Moroccan figures who opposed the nationalist movement and had been instrumental in the deposition of Sultan Ben Youssef.

Although the terrorist attacks continued without letup, the French authorities insisted that they were the work of a "handful of fanatics" directed by Moscow or Egypt. This story did not hold much water for neutral observers who could not help but be aware that terrorism had spread throughout the entire country. In spite of widespread arrests and condemnations, it flourished with the silent approval of the Moroccan population. For them this was a resistance movement and the so-called terrorists were heroes.

A third mistake the authorities committed was to allow the European population of Morocco to combat terrorism by taking the law into its own hands. None of its efforts were effective in abating terrorism; on the contrary, they only served to embitter the population more than ever. The danger of this counter-terrorism was all the greater because the European terrorists worked under the protection of corrupt elements among the police who often took part themselves in terrorist activities.

Counter-terrorism took on a variety of forms. During the early stages well-known Moroccan nationalists were kidnapped and held as hostages to discourage other nationalist sympathizers. I talked only recently to a Moroccan druggist from Fez who had mysteriously "disappeared." He had been imprisoned in a cellar for 145 days by members of the French police force.

Much of the European population approved the action of the counter-terrorists, who were quick to organize themselves into groups, such as the Committee of Vigilance and Action of Casablanca (C.O.V.A.C.). This organization published tracts in June 1954, on the eve of the arrival of Resi-

dent-General Guillaume's successor, M. Francis Lacoste. These were warnings to M. Lacoste that the C.O.V.A.C. was ready to use any means to prevent the fulfillment of the government's new and reportedly conciliatory policy. These tracts were followed by others urging Europeans and Moroccan "friends of France" to oppose any plan which advocated talks with the nationalists. Warnings were also sent to those Frenchmen who favored a policy of cooperation with Moroccan nationalists.

As the European terrorist gangs became better organized, they accomplished daring feats with no opposition from the forces of law and order. Moroccans were shot down in broad daylight by machine-gun crews who drove about Casablanca. Again little publicity was given to this kind of terrorism until the assassins struck down an important political figure. The French and other foreign public received a brutal jolt when Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, World War II hero and courageous owner of the liberal daily *Maroc Presse*, was killed by machine-gun fire in June 1955 in the heart of downtown Casablanca. The bullets were the same as those used by the Casablanca police. The murderer was never found.

Special police inspectors were sent from Paris to investigate the situation. When they reported that there was considerable fire behind the counter-terrorist smoke, the French government was faced with the disconcerting revelation that it had very little control over its representatives in the Protectorate, from ordinary policemen to high Residency officials. Premier Edgar Faure saw that drastic measures were necessary and that it would take a strong, courageous man to carry them out. Gilbert Grandval, French underground hero and highly esteemed Ambassador to the Saar, was chosen as Morocco's next Resident General.

Gilbert Grandval's job was to correct the errors in France's Protectorate policy which had caused so much blood to flow since August 1953. His plan was to set up a Moroccan government within the framework of the 1912 Treaty of Fez which would put an end to direct French administration and allow the Moroccans to take charge of their own affairs, with the French acting simply as counsellors. It did not take the new Resident General long to see that in order to carry out his plan he would have to overhaul the whole administrative and security systems, which had little by little come under the control of unauthorized groups and individuals. Grandval was also clear sighted enough to realize that France's negative policy since the dethronement of Sultan Ben Youssef had provided a fertile field for the growth of a very positive national force whose banner was the exiled Sultan himself.

#### RISE OF NATIONAL CONSCIENCE

In analyzing the rapid spread of a national conscience in Morocco, Commandant Henri Sartout, one of the few impartial editorialists in Morocco, has estimated that only some 200,000 Moroccans—those who had received an

education—had been deeply affected by the Sultan's removal in August 1953. Within a few months' time, this French expert told me, more than 2 million Moroccans came to feel outrageously humiliated by the exile of their Sultan. This remarkable communication of an idea can be accounted for by the fact that alert elements of the Moroccan population, recognizing the weakness of French policy in the Protectorate after the removal of the Sultan, were quick to take advantage of French hesitations. The principle moulders of Moroccan national opinion were the nationalist parties, largely the Istiqlal, which channeled and transformed the population's disperse sentiments of discontent into a single, driving attachment for the "martyr" Sultan. Unfortunately, however, this driving force, once set into motion, was difficult to control. As we have seen, the Moroccan people sought to satisfy their claims by violence when their leaders were either imprisoned or exiled. Crippled and working clandestinely, the Istiqlal party nevertheless continued to play an important role in the political education of the people. Its increased influence was evident during Gradval's regime in the summer of 1955, when nationalist leaders were set free to orient the people's protests along peaceful lines. In hardly any time, terrorism was cut in half. It is possible that further violence might have been avoided had France been able to protect its Resident General from the attacks of French settlers and financial lobbies and had it been able to produce immediately a healthy program of reforms, based on cooperation with Moroccan nationalists.

Closely allied to the struggle of the nationalist parties for the preservation and reassertion of Morocco's sovereignty has been Moroccan labor's fight for union rights. Denied the right to form their own unions, Moroccans were forced to join the Communist-dominated French Confederation Generale du Travail (C.G.T.). When they tried to break away from the French in 1952, Moroccan unionists suffered the same fate as the nationalist party militants and so had to face the odds of illegality and lack of leadership. When labor union leaders were released from prison in the autumn of 1954 they joined the political parties in their crusade of stirring the national conscience, particularly along social lines. The Moroccan Workers' Union was formed in the spring of 1955 but has had to operate under serious handicaps because France refused to recognize it in spite of its affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The Moroccan Workers' Union made an outstanding contribution to national solidarity when it organized a country-wide relief drive—probably the first of its kind in Morocco—to raise funds for the Moroccan victims of riots and police repression. The proceeds from this drive went to families whose wage earners had been arrested, disabled, or killed during the country's current troubled times. The response was overwhelming. In the first two days of the campaign about 6,740,000 francs were collected. Individual donations ranged from 100 fr. to 10,000 fr. Moroccans, not only Muslims

but also Jews, from every corner of the country contributed money and services to the National Aid Committee.

Strange as it may seem to the outsider, it was the Moroccan women, those traditionally veiled and secluded beings, who were most active in this kind of social work. Women who have taken almost no part in public life are rapidly becoming one of the leading forces behind the development of Morocco's national conscience. The Moroccan women, even more than the men, suffered a cruel blow when Mohammed ben Youssef was deposed, for the Sultan had always defended and urged the advancement of Moroccan women and had given his own daughters a Western education as an example. For his female subjects, the Sultan became the symbol of emancipation from a veiled and ignorant past. These women became the most ardent patriots when their "emancipator" was attacked. In the past two and a half years, women have participated prominently in every nationalist demonstration, loudly crying out for the return of their Sultan. During the Fez riots of August 1954, women tore off their veils inside the mosques to show their protests against the puppet Sultan Moulay Arafa. When demonstrations were held at Meknes in the summer of 1955, a young girl rode about the city on a white horse urging the population to show its loyalty to the Sultan and Resident-General Grandval. Women donated their jewels to nationalist funds; young girls spent their free time going from house to house collecting money for the victims of police repression. They regularly took newspapers and cigarettes to nationalists in prison.

High French officials and much of the French press tried to put a halt to or minimize the influence of the former Sultan in the months that immediately followed his dethronement. They banned all mention of Mohammed V in public, confiscated photos of him and his family, suppressed the nationalistic press, and forbade nationalist meetings. Their utter failure to stamp out the memory of Mohammed ben Youssef was dramatically demonstrated when Gilbert Grandval assumed his post with instructions from the French government to consult Moroccan public opinion as one step in his task of building a harmonious Franco-Moroccan policy. Grandval freed 150 Moroccan political prisoners upon his arrival and threw open his doors to the Moroccan public. Moroccan response to the new Resident General's advances was an enthusiastic wave of unity. Petitions, letters, and telegrams were sent to Grandval from every Moroccan city by thousands of people from every walk of life—notables, student groups, laborers, craftsmen, merchants, farmers, housewives. In these messages, the Moroccan people showed that they were agreed on three major points: confidence in Grandval; a solution to the throne question by the return of Mohammed V; and the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty while guaranteeing the legitimate interests of France and the French in Morocco.



*THE GRANDVAL PERIOD*

It was impossible for France to ignore completely the clamoring voice of the people. During the Grandval period, the French government finally admitted that the throne question did exist and concluded that it was up to the Moroccan people themselves to settle the matter. France could not openly undo the error it had committed in August 1953 without publicly and internationally admitting that it had been wrong. And so whatever solution was arrived at in the present crisis would have to appear to be the will of the Moroccan people.

It would seem that France should now have been willing to make concessions, but the so-called French "moderates" became more intransigent than ever. Although Grandval's direct action had quickly won Moroccan approval, French colonials eyed his moves with animosity. On the day after the Resident General's nomination, ten persons, including six policemen, had been arrested in Casablanca, incriminated in the European terrorist movement. In spite of undeniable evidence against the prisoners, the European population in Morocco defended the counter-terrorists and blamed Grandval for the arrests. The Resident General incurred even more hostility from the colonials when he fired nine high Residency officials who were unwilling to support his policy of coming to an agreement with the Nationalists.

When it became evident that Grandval seriously intended to bring the former Sultan and his family back to France and promote an evolution of democratic Moroccan institutions, the opposition began to crystallize. Right-wing leaders in Paris found it relatively easy to unite North African European opinion against the Resident General and his policy of conciliation. Marshal Juin and Defense Minister Koenig had a strong following among French military men who held important posts in Morocco and feared the loss of their positions should the Moroccans be given extensive administrative and security powers. Gaullist Minister Raymond Triboulet and Defense Committee Chairman Pierre Montel were also seconded in their support of Sultan Moulay Arafat by the French civil officials in the Protectorate who were opposed to a policy which would accelerate the admission of Moroccans into the administration, and thereby put an end to their own privileges. The presidents of the Bank of Paris and the Netherlands, the Bank of the Parisian Union, and the Bank of Indochina were likewise united with the large settlers and big businessmen in their hostility to any change in the Protectorate which might endanger their interests. With the leading Europeans in Morocco against Grandval, it did not take long to persuade the mass of European workers that the Resident's plans to give Moroccans more authority would endanger their own jobs.

The opposition of Morocco's European population to Grandval's policy

was most dramatically demonstrated during the race riots of July 15 and 16, after a bomb had exploded in downtown Casablanca, killing six Europeans. An organized mob of European workers, backed by the police, burned and pillaged Moroccan shops, homes, and cars, and shot wildly at any Moroccan passerby. These same Europeans blamed Grandval for the atmosphere which produced such riots. Conservative members of the French government threatened to resign if the Resident General were permitted to carry out his program of reforms against the will of the European settlers.

Grandval, nevertheless, obstinately pursued his mission. Oddly enough, his main allies were the leaders of the Moroccan nationalist parties. They knew that retaliation after the Casablanca riots would only bring on widespread repression and thereby injure the chances for a Franco-Moroccan understanding. The Istiqlal party, still not legally recognized, issued orders to the population to aid the Resident General in his mission by remaining calm, keeping their shops open, and refusing any provocation to demonstrate. Violence lessened but did not stop, and nationalist leaders admitted that they had lost much of their control over the people.

Both the Resident General and the Nationalist leaders looked forward with apprehension to the week of August 20, the second anniversary of Mohammed V's exile. There were widespread rumors that the exasperation of the Moroccan people would reach its peak at that time. Grandval warned Paris that the only way to save the country from mass violence was to carry out an immediate and dynamic reform plan. He urged that such a plan be announced before August 20 to ease the tense situation.

It looked for a short time as if Grandval might succeed. The European population seemed to have lessened its opposition. Many French were impressed with the persistence and courage Grandval showed in carrying out his job. They were also partially reassured when Grandval turned over two key posts in his cabinet to a general reputed to be hostile to Moroccan nationalists and in favor of a solution tending toward co-sovereignty. On August 20, however, Grandval was defeated by the French government's indecision. There had been no word about a startling reform plan. The tragic massacres of French men and women at Oued Zem proved that the Resident General had been right—the Moroccan people had had enough. But European blood had been shed, a lot of it. Now there was only one reply: repression, not reform.

The idea of a peaceful settlement was temporarily pushed into the background after the Oued Zem massacres, but more important was the fact that this Berber uprising meant the defeat of French colonial policy in Morocco. This was the end of the myth of two Moroccos: the good Berber, pro-French, anti-Arab, trustworthy, country people versus the bad Arab Nationalists of the cities who had been "perverted by contacts from the West"—or were "under the influence of the East." The tribesmen who had risen up against



the French were Berbers, but they were Moroccans first. These were the people North African colonials had counted on as a sure buffer against the nationalist movement. The colonial bloc in France and Morocco had always backed the old traditions of Islam against the modern aspirations of the nationalists. They had even tolerated the banditry and corruption of their great feudal "friends" of the Atlas. They had praised the warlike nature and savagery of the Moroccan mountain troops during World War II and in Indochina. Blinded by the Berber-Arab myth, the French both at home and in Morocco could not imagine that the tribesmen would be touched by the political evolution which the cities had undergone.

The spread of national sentiment was, of course, slower and somewhat distorted in the rural districts, but it was inevitable and should have been foreseen. When the French built roads, they were helping the spread of nationalism. A state of revolt had been latent in the Middle Atlas for a number of years, for hatred was accumulating among the tribes, which had been ruled with an iron hand by French military and civil authorities. Frequent reports from the south warned that the Marrakech tribes were waiting their opportunity to turn against the detested Pasha.

A number of factors contributed to the actual outbreak of the tribes. First of all, the fall of Dien Bien Phu greatly affected the tribes of the Middle Atlas, which had supplied the French army in Indochina with fighting power. These Berbers saw that the French were by no means invulnerable when pitted against a native army. They also learned how a guerilla war was fought and won. Then, at Easter 1954, the French committed the great mistake of sending Berber tribesmen into the Casablanca area to intimidate the nationalists. Within a few weeks, the authorities recognized the danger of this close contact between the country people and urban workers, but it was too late. Nationalists had succeeded in sowing seeds of insurrection among the tribesmen, who were shocked to learn of the great wrong France had done Islam and every Moroccan in attacking the Sultan. The warriors returned to their mountains with new national emotions—and also with tales of the glorious resistance being carried on by their Muslim brothers in the cities.

The harbingers of revolt in the Berber zones came with the summer harvests of 1954. Fires broke out in fields and forests throughout central Morocco. Another sign of trouble stirring among the tribes was the discovery of an important traffic in arms in the deep south along the Sahara. Early in 1955, high French officials were already concerned about rumors of a kind of maquis organization in the Middle Atlas.

The Berber revolts on August 20 confirmed the fears of a few but came as a shock to the large European public, firm believers in the Berber myth. The North African French, and particularly the military, blamed Resident-General Grandval for the Oued Zem massacres and the raids at the phosphate

mines of Khouribga and the iron-mining town of Ait Amar. Grandval had increased security measures in the cities on the eve of August 20, but he had refused to bring a huge deployment of French troops into the rural districts, fearing that their presence would only provoke trouble. After the uprisings in the Middle Atlas, French armed forces in Morocco literally broke off relations with the Resident General and his few loyal followers. Some of the high military officials resigned; those who remained carried out sweeping operations in the Middle Atlas on their own.

The man who had done nothing more than carry out his government's instructions, who had remained in Morocco against his will at the request of his government, was sacrificed by that government at the conference of Aix-les-Bains at the end of August. The removal of Grandval was the price French right-wingers demanded from the government before they would support the Aix-les-Bains compromise with the nationalists. The "Moroccan lobby" believed that with Grandval out of the way and a military man sent to hold the fort in Rabat, the Aix-les-Bains agreement could be altered to suit their own convenience.

#### *RETURN OF THE SULTAN*

Lt.-Gen. Boyer de Latour, former aid to Marshal Juin in Morocco, was the man chosen to succeed Grandval at the Residency. The Latour clique was made up largely of men with important interests at stake in Morocco and therefore against making any concessions to the Moroccans. Grandval's reform plan was obviously doomed. All the meaning was quickly drained from the Aix-les-Bains agreement. Sultan Moulay Arafa was removed as stipulated, but not before he had delegated his powers to his second cousin. For the Moroccan people his removal meant nothing since they were not so much opposed to the puppet Sultan as to the coup d'état against their legitimate ruler. France still stubbornly refused to give in to the Moroccan peoples' first demand, the return of Sultan ben Youssef. But the die had been cast, and the Sultan's return just a question of time. This had been clear after the summer 1955 riots, which had gravely menaced France's position in its Protectorate. It was even clearer when French-backed Moulay Arafa was forced to escape to Tangier in October, under the threat of a widespread insurrection. Moulay Arafa's retirement was a preliminary victory for the nationalists because the unpopular Sultan had become a symbol of the injustices of French rule.

By the Aix-les-Bains agreement, Moulay Arafa was to be succeeded by a three-man Throne Council which was to supervise the formation of Morocco's first cabinet. The French community in Morocco, along with powerful corporations in France, viewed with anxiety the prospect of increased Moroccan authority in the Protectorate. They feared this would mean a curtailment of many of their privileges, higher taxes, heavier labor costs, and a

reduction in the supply of manual laborers. So a fourth man was added to the Throne Council, giving it a predominately pro-French makeup.

The Istiqlal declared the Council illegal on the grounds that it derived its constitutional authority from Moulay Arafa. The leading nationalist party refused, therefore, to take part in a Moroccan government until Moulay Arafa abdicated and Sultan Youssef was brought back from exile to dispose of his powers as he saw fit. In spite of the Istiqlal's stand, France continued to work with independent nationalists to form a Moroccan government, but it was obvious that such a government could not be effective without the participation of the Istiqlal.

The last bar to the restoration of Sultan ben Youssef was torn down in November when the Pasha of Marrakech rallied to the nationalists' camp. The Glaoui had been built up as leader of the opposition to the Sultan and the nationalists. His abrupt announcement that he had joined the nationalists and supported their demands for the return of Ben Youssef to the throne left French colonial policy without a front. The Glaoui gave no explanation for his change of allegiance. The French public was shocked by the sudden reversal of its staunch ally, but the Moroccans showed little surprise. "We knew all along the Glaoui would see the light one day," they declared. "After all, he is a Moroccan."

What the Pasha probably saw was the progressive weakening of French colonial policy in the face of increasingly insistent nationalist demands which had ended in the concessions of Aix-les-Bains. The Glaoui was clear-sighted enough to realize that the return of the Sultan was inevitable and that unless he joined the nationalist bandwagon he would be politically isolated. Already the August 1955 riots in Marrakech had shown that the Glaoui's position as absolute ruler of the southern Berber tribes was no longer secure.

The Glaoui's defection was the sign for a rush to Ben Youssef's side of the final few opposing elements: the ultra-conservative French settlers' *Presence Française* and some stray pashas and caids who had conspired with the Glaoui in the 1953 plot against Ben Youssef. Moulay Arafa made his withdrawal official by abdicating in favor of his predecessor. The French government had no choice but to bring Mohammed ben Youssef out of exile, and on November 5 it formally recognized him as Morocco's rightful sultan.

For Moroccan nationalists the return of the Sultan is not an end but rather a means to independence. In its recognition of Ben Youssef's right to the throne, the French cabinet pointedly omitted any mention of independence but went so far as to declare its intention to make Morocco "a modern, free and sovereign state" within the framework of "interdependence" with France. The French Premier at that time, Edgar Faure, went even further to say that he recognized that independence was a goal of all peoples, but he added that the Moroccan nationalists would agree to attain this goal by degrees.

It was on November 18, 1955, the 28th anniversary of his accession to the Moroccan throne, that Mohammed ben Youssef announced the abrogation of the 43-year-old Protectorate Treaty. In an important policy speech, the Sultan told his nation that a Moroccan cabinet would negotiate a new treaty with France. The Sultan has the full support of his people, but the role he has assumed as the political and religious authority by which the unity of his empire is to be preserved is no easy task. The question remains whether unity achieved around a martyr can persist now that the martyr holds the reins. Traditional leaders and young nationalists united to fight for the exiled Sultan, but their views on governing Morocco are as far apart as ever. Now that the country's sovereignty has been restored, the different factions seeking political power must be reconciled. The Sultan has momentarily appeased French colonials by his moderate tone and assurances that there will be strong economic ties between France and Morocco under the new treaty. There is the possibility, however, that one day the nationalist parties may withdraw their support from the Sultan should he be forced to make too many concessions to French settlers and old-time Moroccans.

The Sultan is back on his throne and negotiations with France now pick up where they so abruptly left off in August 1953. But Morocco is not the same. The price for national unity—precarious as it may seem—has been high, both in lives and property. Terrorism, police and military repression, have claimed hundreds, even thousands of victims. One of the new Moroccan government's biggest problems will be to temper the settling of accounts, for there is a debt of fear and hatred which many will demand to be paid. Nor will it be easy for a country which has lived under the rule of violence to don immediately the vestments of parliamentary law. Both French and Moroccan leaders will have to regain control of their citizens who have lived through Morocco's lawless years since 1953.



# THE BATTLE OF AZERBAIJAN, 1946

*Robert Rossow, Jr.*

(See map, facing page 1.)

ONE MAY FAIRLY say that the Cold War began on March 4, 1946. On that day 15 Soviet armored brigades began to pour into the northwestern Iranian province of Azerbaijan, and to deploy along the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers and toward central Iran. Simultaneously, another Soviet army of comparable size and composition moved south through eastern Bulgaria, deploying along the short frontier of Turkey-in-Europe. This deployment of heavy armor was accompanied by diplomatic salvos and propaganda barrages on Ankara and Tehran, and by the acceleration of Communist rebel activities in northern Greece, Azerbaijan, and Iranian Kurdistan.

The Soviet offensive fell into two distinct phases. It seems clear that the primary objective during the first phase was the reduction of Turkey, after which the eastern Mediterranean, Suez, the oilfields of the Persian Gulf, and the western approaches to India would have been within easy reach. When this line of attack failed, the Soviet strategy shifted sharply in late spring, when a new assault was launched with Iran itself the primary target. As the common factor in both these phases was the Soviet attack on Azerbaijan, it was largely there that the issue of the entire campaign was decided in the nine months that followed.

Though not a shot was fired, the Battle of Azerbaijan was as significant in its outcome as Bunker Hill, Bull Run, or the First Battle of the Marne. Yet it is the least understood and most poorly chronicled engagement of the Cold War. All the vital facts have been available to the public, but history has yet to correlate them in such a way that its strategic concept and tactical dynamics are clear.

## II

Soviet troops had been in occupation of northern Iran since 1941 to protect the vital wartime supply route by which the United States sent, by 1944, over 4 million tons of lend-lease war materials to the Red army. Although treaty bound to permit the government of Iran to exercise civil authority in the occupied area and to respect Iranian sovereignty, the Soviets

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used the opportunity afforded by their occupation to engineer a Communist rebellion in Azerbaijan, the heart of their occupation zone and a vital communications center between the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Krasnik, the bull-necked and bejeweled Soviet Consul General in Tabriz (the Azerbaijani capital and headquarters of the Soviet occupation), masterminded the rebellion. He exercised his control through an apparatus of Town Commandants, military personnel obedient to the political rather than the military command. Under the euphemistic name of "Democrats of Azerbaijan," the rebels had been covertly organized in the months preceding, and their ranks had been swelled with large number of *muhajirs*, "refugees" from Soviet Azerbaijan, many of whom had been imported to add strength to the military arm of the rebellion. On November 15, 1945, the Soviets began the wholesale distribution of arms to the rebels, and on the following day a carefully planned revolutionary operation was launched.

The Soviets used their own forces to prevent any movement or resistance by the Iranian security troops, who could otherwise have quelled the revolt. Whenever the rebels challenged an Iranian military or police installation, a Soviet force would draw up in the vicinity and the Iranian commander would be informed that no resistance would be tolerated as any disturbance might jeopardize the security of the occupation troops. The Iranians had no sane alternative but to give in.

The incident which attracted most attention occurred on the periphery of the occupation zone. On November 20 a relief column, dispatched by the Iranian government to relieve the beleaguered garrisons in Azerbaijan, was halted near Kazvin by a Soviet military force, whose commander threatened to open fire if it moved further. This flagrant violation of Iranian sovereignty was the subject of a spirited exchange of notes among Great Britain, the United States, Iran, and the Soviet Union, and also was discussed at length at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. It led Iran to make the first complaint to come before the newly formed UN Security Council. None of these measures, however, proved effective.

The rebellion was of course successful, and in December 1945 the "Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan" was established, a Russian puppet independent of all control of the Iranian government in Tehran. A companion regime was established in the Kurdish area south of the Azerbaijani domain.<sup>1</sup>

The leader of the rebels and Prime Minister of the new regime was Jafar Pishevari. A small man in his middle fifties, with steely gray hair and a small brush mustache under a sharp and slightly hooked nose, he had been a leading figure in the Iranian Communist movement since World War I, and had spent the decade 1931-41 in prison. He promptly and effectively initiated a

<sup>1</sup> For an account of this Kurdish regime, see Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Republic of Mahabad," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 1 (July 1947), pp. 274-69.



number of badly needed reforms which were genuinely popular with the people. These included land reforms for the benefit of the peasants, workers' welfare measures, public works, and the improvement of educational facilities.

But there was another side to the regime—the Terror. It is difficult to describe to those who have never lived under a Terror just what it means. It is not only a matter of statistics of persons killed, beaten, and imprisoned. Some strong-arm activity does serve as a base or germ, but the Terror itself is a purely psychological phenomenon—a wave of fear that sweeps through a people. The amount of strong-arm activity required to germinate it varies from place to place, but once the germ is started little is required to keep it growing. A Terror gripped Azerbaijan, and with it the concomitant of hatred, which was later to explode into a bloody pogrom against the rebels themselves.

The Master of the Terror was not Pishevari but the Minister of Labor, Education, and Propaganda, Mohammed Beria (no kin to Lavrenti Beria, the late Soviet MVD Chief). A dark, cocky little man with a thin black mustache and slick black hair, he had risen to prominence in the Communist movement as head of the street-cleaners' union in Tabriz. To execute the campaign of Terror, Beria used a sort of goon squad known as the Society of Friends of Soveit Azerbaijan. Recruitment to the society was carried out by agents of the political police, and anyone who showed opposition or even reluctance was lucky to get off with only a pistol whipping and clubbing.

### III

The Russians were bound by treaty to withdraw their troops from Iran six months after the cessation of hostilities. Evacuation Day thus fell on March 2, 1946. The diplomatic inclination of the time was to stall until that date, for if the Soviets withdrew their forces the Iranian government could settle the rebellion without outside assistance. March 2 came to be spoken of as a sort of magic date, and as it grew near a sense of apprehension and suspense pervaded Iran.

The Soviet order of battle in northwestern Iran then consisted of three under-strength divisions—one infantry division at Rezaiyeh, one horse cavalry division at Ardebil, and another at Tabriz. The only armor supporting this garrison force consisted of 16 Sherman tanks (American lend-lease) and 4 self-propelled guns, all of which were under canvas in an open field adjacent to the Soviet barracks area in Tabriz. As the evacuation deadline approached, the Russians made no move to prepare for departure, and March 2 finally dawned quiet and placid with the Soviet troops well bedded down, their tanks and horses just where they had been all along. The Soviets recognized the day by issuing a brief announcement that, owing to disturbed

civil conditions threatening the security of the USSR's borders, Soviet troops were compelled to remain in occupation of northern Iran.

The failure to evacuate came as no surprise. Plans had already been formulated in Tehran to revive the case before the Security Council, this time with the addition of another flagrant treaty violation. Also, on March 6, the American Embassy in Moscow delivered a strong note to the Soviet Foreign Office urging immediate withdrawal. But the next development came as a shock.

On the night of March 3-4 and the day and night following, the Soviet units stationed in Tabriz began moving out. It was not clear at first what was happening, except that they were *not* proceeding toward the Soviet frontier. Some 150 truckloads of personnel and the 16 Sherman tanks had rolled out in the direction of Tehran, while two regiments of horse with supporting artillery and trains proceeded toward the Turkish frontier. Another large force was reported well south of Tabriz, near Maragheh, moving toward the Iraqi frontier.

On the night of March 4-5 more tanks began to arrive in Tabriz—46 T-34 mediums came in by rail and were taken to the big tank and artillery park in the center of the barracks area. Troops and armored columns continued marching outward from Tabriz in three directions—toward the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers and toward Tehran. On March 6 Marshal Ivan Bagramian, the wartime Commanding General of the Soviet First Baltic Army and a noted authority on armor, arrived in Tabriz and assumed field command of the new force. By March 7 Tabriz was an armed camp. Troops glutted the town, the pale blue shoulder marks of the Soviet cavalry being almost entirely replaced by the red-piped black, with gold tank silhouette, of the Soviet armor. The streets and roads were clogged with military vehicles which supplanted the animals of the earlier occupation force.

These movements, consisting almost entirely of armor and motorized infantry with supporting artillery, continued night and day for almost a month, beginning on March 4 and ending on March 28. During that period at least 15 armored brigades, composed of some 500 tanks with appropriate auxiliary forces, were brought into northern Iran. This army was divided into three assault forces and a reserve which were deployed as follows:<sup>2</sup>

1. One force, based at Khoi, was deployed on the Turkish frontier in two assault elements, one at Maku, the other at Razi, commanding the two roads to central Anatolia passing north and south of Lake Van.

2. A second force was based at Miandoab, with its principal advance element at Khaneh on the Iraqi frontier, only 100 miles or so from the oilfields of Kirkuk and Mosul, and with subsidiary forces at Saqqiz and Shahindaj.

3. A third force was stretched along the road to Tehran, with its base at

<sup>2</sup> See map, facing p. 1.

Zenjan and advance elements at Karej, only 20 miles from Tehran itself.

4. The reserves were divided between Tabriz and Maragheh.

The full significance of the Soviet movement began to be apparent when the Soviets simultaneously moved another armored army, under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin, south through eastern Bulgaria, deploying it along the frontier of Turkey-in-Europe.

Concurrently with these troop movements, the Soviets opened up a powerful diplomatic and propaganda offensive on Turkey. Having denounced the Turko-Soviet Treaty of Friendship the year before, they presented during the first days of March a series of threatening and truculent notes to Ankara demanding base rights in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and the cession to the Soviet Union of the provinces of Kars and Ardehan in eastern Turkey. These two provinces had at one time been populated by Armenians. Having been ceded to Russia by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, they were finally returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Moscow in 1921. Now the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, with the strident support of every propaganda medium the Soviets commanded, launched an all-out campaign to get the provinces back from Turkey on grounds of irredentism.

At the same time, on March 4, the Kurdish Peoples' Republic of Mahabad, the Soviet puppet regime in the tribal area just south of Azerbaijan, proclaimed rights of sovereignty over the large Kurdish-populated areas of southern and eastern Turkey. Even the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic got into the act with a claim, announced on March 5, on the northeastern Black Sea provinces of Turkey, including the port of Trabzon.

It was suddenly necessary to revise the estimate of Soviet intentions. It had appeared that the seizure of Iranian Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan and the extraction of various concessions from Iran were the primary Soviet goals. Now it seemed clear that these were only subordinate means toward a far larger end—the reduction of Turkey, the main bastion against Soviet advance into the entire Middle East.

#### IV

This magnitude of Soviet intentions and the crude threat of force the USSR was using to fulfill them came as a distinct shock to Washington, for American policy until that time had been under the influence of Yalta and Potsdam, when defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan were the over-riding considerations. It was still believed that the Soviet Union could in peace, as in war, be a great and good friend of the West if it were treated liberally and tolerantly.

The turning point in American foreign policy occurred on March 7, 1946, when Secretary of State Byrnes, after careful study of the reports from Tabriz describing the Soviet troop movements and discussion with his prin-

cipal advisers, made the decision to pick up the Soviet gauntlet and seize the initiative in the Middle East, traditionally left to the British. He despatched a sharply worded *démarche* to Moscow and instructed the U. S. delegation to the Security Council, due to meet in a few days, to make an all-out stand on the Iranian case. In so doing he set U. S. foreign policy for the first time in the direction that was later to find expression in the Truman Doctrine and the broad policy of collective security against Communist aggression and expansion.

The note was delivered in Moscow on March 9, and is not to be confused with the earlier note of March 6, which merely registered a *pro forma* protest over the failure of Soviet occupation troops to withdraw from Iran by March 2. The March 9 note was couched in far stiffer and more peremptory language than any previous communication to the Soviet government since recognition. It stated that the government of the United States had been receiving reports of considerable movements of Soviet combat forces and materials of war from the direction of the Soviet frontier toward Tabriz, and outward from Tabriz in the direction of Tehran and the Iraqi and Turkish frontiers. The government of the United States, it went on, desired to learn whether the Soviet government, instead of withdrawing its troops from Iran as urged in the earlier U. S. note, was bringing additional forces into that country. If the Soviet forces were being increased, the U. S. government desired information at once regarding the purposes therefor.

As a pointed warning the Navy Department announced on March 8 that the battleship U.S.S. *Missouri* would proceed in two weeks to Istanbul carrying the remains of the Turkish Ambassador, who had died some time earlier at his post in Washington.

The situation was tense as a major war scare flared—the first since World War II. Hundreds of panic-stricken residents of Tehran, on hearing of the invasion of Soviet armor, piled their belongings on any vehicle at hand and fled, clogging the roads to the south. A swarm of top correspondents descended on Tehran, and the world press used its largest type to headline stories of the crisis.

The Department of State, too, had a moment of panic. The extreme position Washington had adopted was based almost entirely on reports from the Consulate in Tabriz. On March 13 a British Foreign Office spokesman declared that London had not been receiving any reports of serious troop movements in northern Iran and was of the opinion that the reports cited by Washington were exaggerated. It proved after investigation that there was no disparity between the reports from the British and American Consulates, and that the confusion arose only because British communications were somewhat slower. Unfortunately, however, the announcement served to create an element of doubt that was never entirely erased.

Baghdad also announced that it had no information on the reported troop



movements. Even Qavam, the Iranian Prime Minister, denied, for diplomatic reasons, that additional Soviet troops had arrived in Iran after March 2.

The Soviet government did not answer the American note, but Tass was "authorized to state" that the reports emanating from Washington "do not correspond with the facts." It was over the Azerbaijan issue that Gromyko on March 27 first dramatically walked out of a Security Council session. Just before he stalked with his staff from the Council chamber, he made an impassioned speech, in the course of which he shouted, "Stalin has said, and I say again before this tribunal, that *no* new Soviet troops have been introduced into northern Iran since March 2!" As these words came over the short-wave radio of the Consulate at Tabriz, a column of 18 armored half-tracks that had just been unloaded rumbled past on their way to the tank park.

The American public was confused and shocked. In the United States 1946 was the year of demobilization. In Britain it was a year of austerity and dissolution of Empire. The West was still mesmerized by the notion of the Russians as wartime allies. It was a long time yet before the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the spy trials, and the fall of China. Even the very term "Iron Curtain" was only coined by Winston Churchill in the midst of the Azerbaijan affair. Now suddenly, for the first time, editorials and commentators began seriously to discuss the possibility of war with the Soviet Union.

## V

The new session of the Security Council convened in New York on March 21. The Iranian representative, Ambassador Ala, defying instructions issued by his government (under Soviet duress) to withdraw the case from the agenda, made one of the most brilliant and dramatic presentations in the annals of the Council. The U. S. delegation, under the personal leadership of Secretary Byrnes and following the tough policy laid down two weeks earlier, took a vigorous part in the debate, holding to a line that in some respects was even stronger than the Iranian.

Suddenly and dramatically on March 26 Gromyko informed an astonished Security Council that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran "in five or six weeks if no unforeseen circumstances occur." Some days later it was announced that an agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran had been signed whereby the Soviets promised to withdraw their troops as announced. In return for this the Iranians agreed to submit within seven months, for parliamentary approval, a proposal to form a joint Irano-Soviet oil company under Soviet control, a long-standing secondary objective of the Russians in Iran. The agreement also called for the negotiation of peaceful arrangements between the central government and the Azerbaijani rebels "in accordance with existing laws." This left the Security Council without a dispute,

and while the item remained on the agenda for some time to come, further debate was deferred.

There followed some weeks of doubt as to the sincerity of Soviet intentions to evacuate. Mid-April passed and the tanks and troops made not a move. In fact, they seemed to be settling down for a long stay. But suddenly, on April 22, they began coming north in droves, and the congestion of tanks, troops, and military vehicles was even worse then during the in-movement. On May 5 Tabriz itself was evacuated to the accompaniment of a brass band. To be precise, the evacuation was not completed by May 6 as promised. The last long column of tanks ran out of gas about four miles north of Marand, some 50 miles from Tabriz on the main road to the Soviet frontier. They were stalled there until May 10, when a special shipment of gasoline, arranged by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, permitted them to proceed and complete the evacuation.

Why did the Russians suddenly decide to abandon their goal and withdraw? No one can answer with certainty, of course, until the proceedings of the Soviet Politburo are published. Meanwhile one can, however, draw a few conclusions on the basis of hindsight. It appears rather clearly that the Soviet leaders simply miscalculated. Russian ambitions in the Middle East are, of course, of long historical standing and had been explicitly and unequivocally reaffirmed in negotiation with the Nazis in 1940. Now, in early 1946, the United States had voluntarily withdrawn all its military force from the area, and Britain retained only token forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The only major force preventing the Soviet Union from fulfilling its historical aspirations was Turkey. Once it gave in, the other nations of the Middle East were in no condition to offer any serious resistance. The Russians had powerful military forces on both of Turkey's flanks, and deep in Iran. They apparently believed that by a diplomatic and propaganda offensive, accompanied by a show of force, they could produce a disequilibrium in both countries that would permit penetration and subjugation to the Soviet will. It seems clear that they were counting heavily on the fact that the people of the United States and Britain were weary of war and military affairs and wanted only to resume the pursuits of peace. From the outset, the Soviet leaders probably never had any intention of taking a serious risk of war, or even of precipitating a global crisis, but rather thought they could get away with their Middle Eastern gambit while the West was not looking. Thus they repeatedly and blandly denied to the world at large that any Soviet forces were on the move, though their tanks were right before the eyes of those they were intended to frighten.

The USSR miscalculated on two counts. The Turks and Iranians did *not* give in to this display of force and even gained new stimulus and determination out of the challenge. Secondly, the West *did* react to the Soviet move and very strongly. The Soviet leaders did not underestimate the sig-

nificance and portent of the firming of American policy that the affair produced. Moreover, the world press set off a very noisy alarm. It produced a flash public crisis without prior build-up the likes of which the world had not had since the early days of the war. It startled and stunned Americans, but it appears to have startled and stunned the Russians as well. The note of panic generated thereby, added to the firm resistance of Turkey and Iran and the strong position adopted by the United States, apparently led the Soviet leadership to decide that its objectives were more difficult and dangerous than it had anticipated, and that a revision of strategy was necessary. Hence the decision to withdraw.

But the victory was not yet final, for a Communist regime, complete with its own army, remained in control of Azerbaijan, and the Iranian Communists were soon to launch a secondary attack, this time with the government of Iran itself as the immediate target.

In late January 1946 Pishevari had declared a *jihad*—a Muslim holy war—on the rest of Iran, calling on the Azerbaijani people to “rise and crush the Tehran government and create a suitable one!” The “war” was all thunder and no lightning, but the verbal violence raged for four months. The most important result of the call to arms was the mobilization of a tough little professional Azerbaijani army, intended to provide a backbone for the mass of Communist irregulars who had pulled off the revolt. Only a few thousand of these regular troops were stationed in Tabriz, the bulk of the army being based to the south, near Maragheh. Smartly uniformed and well-disciplined, they paraded almost daily for the benefit of the Tabriz populace. Their basic weapon was a sub-machine gun of Czech manufacture, and the Russians later added a number of light tanks and artillery. Several hundred officer candidates were taken to military bases in Soviet Azerbaijan during the spring months for intensive training in artillery, armor, aviation, and chemical warfare. Soviet officers and troops could be seen almost daily in the training grounds just beyond the Tabriz barracks area carrying out joint maneuvers with Azerbaijani forces and training them in the use of Soviet heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy armor.

But at the end of May, on Soviet instructions, the Azerbaijani line abruptly softened. On May 27 Pishevari told a meeting of his cabinet and senior party officials that the Azerbaijan government had to give in and make peace with the central government, “because the Americans and British are using the Azerbaijan question to play tricks with our big friend, the Soviet Union.” When some of his colleagues remonstrated that with their new army they could defend their frontiers against Tehran, Pishevari replied, according to informed sources, that their frontiers stretched far beyond Azerbaijan, and that if, in the game the Americans and British were playing, anything happens to their big friend, they were completely finished.

About two weeks later, in early June, a preliminary agreement was signed

between the central government of Iran and the Azerbaijani regime which recognized the sovereignty of the former over the province and called for further negotiations to settle the ultimate relationship between the two. Nevertheless, the rebel regime retained its army and maintained full and independent *de facto* control over the province.

## VI

The Soviet decision to stay the offensive launched in early March was made about the 24th of that month. There followed a month of hesitation before the troop withdrawal was actually set in motion, and another six weeks passed before the Azerbaijani regime was ordered to soften its attitude. It was thus not until the end of May that the Politburo fully extricated itself from what it considered at the moment, in view of the unexpected American and free world reaction, too risky and ambitious a program.

At this point, entering the second phase of the operation, it reversed its field and started out on the new strategy, with Iran itself the more limited objective. This also required a major shift in tactics. Azerbaijan was now more useful as a cancer inside the body of Iran than as a detached outlying base for Soviet assault forces. Thus the orders to the Azerbaijani rebels to come to terms with Tehran.

Another further Soviet tactic was to maintain constant pressure on the government of Iran for concessions—mainly for oil and air transport rights. These concessions were sought not because of any serious Soviet need for the oil or for the air transport business involved, but because of the opportunity such concessions would afford for further penetration and infiltration, as well as the excuse to maintain constant psychological pressure on the Iranian leaders.

But the main Soviet gambit in this new tactical phase was an attempt to gain control of the Iranian government at cabinet level. The primary target of this effort was Prime Minister Qavam himself, and the main Soviet tool was Prince Mozaffar Firuz, a black-sheep prince of the Qajar family, the dynasty deposed by the present Shah's father. He was a ruthless opportunist, excitable and malicious; many even considered him mentally unbalanced. Before Qavam appointed him his chief official spokesman in early 1946, he was a minor follower of the strongly anti-communist Zia ed Din. But in his new position of influence, made even greater by a close, if obscure, personal relationship with Qavam, he soon became the spokesman of the pro-Soviet element in Iran, outdoing the Tudeh (Communist) party itself.

Qavam himself was an enigma. He claimed, and rightfully, considerable credit for inducing the Soviets to evacuate their troops and for the rebels' recognition in principle of Iranian sovereignty over Azerbaijan. In late June 1946 he announced that elections would be held in December, the Parliament having come to the end of its term some weeks earlier. Simultaneously



he announced the formation under his personal leadership of a new political party—ironically named the Democrat of Iran party, but not to be confused with the Communist Democrats of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The new party would oppose the Communist Tudeh, which, while not a majority party, was then the strongest and best organized single political faction in the country.

But despite this auspicious beginning, Qavam's subsequent actions engendered no little doubt as to his intentions. These doubts increased materially when, on August 2, he reconstituted his cabinet to include three leading members of the Tudeh party and elevated Firuz to the post of Vice Premier and Minister of Labor and Propaganda. In the weeks that followed Qavam filled every available government vacancy with Tudeh party members.

Meanwhile, his vaunted Democrat of Iran party proved to be no more than an ephemeral feet-shuffling operation. Not a single step was taken to organize a party structure, or even a headquarters. Thus far it was no more than the breath of Qavam's voice, and anti-Tudeh personalities who volunteered their services for the new party were either flatly rejected or ignored.

By early October 1946 few could see any reason to hope that Iran could possibly be saved from early Tudeh seizure. The cabinet and the government were packed with Tudeh members. The powerful labor union in the southern oilfields was in the firm control of the Tudeh and had in July carried out a successful strike against the AIOC. The Qashqai, Iran's largest tribe inhabiting the southern province of Fars, were in armed but futile revolt against the incursions of the Tudeh. The Tudeh demonstrated openly and almost daily in Tehran, Isfahan, and other major cities. Negotiations for the reintegration of Azerbaijan had been dragging on for months, with Qavam making no effort to bring them to a head. Zenjan, which the rebels had conceded was beyond their domain, remained in Azerbaijani control, and Qavam took no step to regain it. He made no move to prepare seriously for the elections he had scheduled for December 7. Soviet agents and officials were in a flurry of activity, and the Soviet Embassy in Tehran was at its most truculent and domineering. While the Soviets had failed to reduce Turkey by threat of force, their primary objective during the first half of the year, they were now on the verge of gaining Iran by penetration from within.

## VII

The Soviets made the blunder of overplaying their hand. One of several concessions for which they were momentarily pressing was an air transport agreement which would have given a Soviet airline a monopoly on domestic air traffic in northern Iran. At a meeting of Qavam's cabinet at which the issue was discussed in supposed secrecy, four of the non-Tudeh members

forcefully opposed the granting of the concession. Less than two hours after the conclusion of the meeting, strong-arm men from the Soviet Embassy appeared at their residences, berating them and threatening physical violence to their persons and their families if they continued their opposition.

News of this incident promptly reached the ears of the Shah, who was already deeply perturbed over the trend of events. When Qavam did nothing to protest this bald Soviet intervention or to plug the leaks in his cabinet, the Shah, after receiving assurances of the loyalty of the armed forces (which were disposed to forestall a possible coup d'état), summoned Qavam and demanded his resignation. Qavam had been outmaneuvered and had no alternative but to comply. He then emotionally pledged his loyalty to the Shah, and recalling the services he had rendered to the latter's late father, begged for permission to form a new government. The Shah agreed on three conditions: (1) that Qavam rid himself of the Tudeh members of his cabinet and Mozaffar Firuz; (2) that he immediately organize his Democrat of Iran party into a bonafide and vigorous opposition to the Tudeh, and prepare to hold elections in early December; and (3) that he abandon his negotiations with the Azerbaijani rebels and make immediate preparations to reassert the authority of Tehran over the rebel province. Qavam accepted all the conditions except that he rid his government of Firuz; on that point he demurred, but the issue was finally resolved with the appointment of Firuz as Ambassador to Moscow. On October 19 Qavam reformed his government along the lines dictated by the Shah.

Qavam's motivations and underlying intentions have never been entirely clear. He certainly deserves credit for courageous and clever diplomatic maneuvering during the first phase of the Soviet offensive. Some feel that his soft line during the early months of the second phase was only a clever ruse intended to outwit the Russians. Whether this was his intention or not, it seems obvious that in the fall of 1946 he had brought Iran close to disaster, and his political paralysis, his abundant favors and concessions to the Tudeh, and his relationship with Firuz led some to question seriously his ultimate loyalties. But after the crucial audience with the Shah, he changed his complexion again, and in the final months of the crisis performed as a national hero.

In late November Qavam announced his intention of sending armed forces to Azerbaijan to supervise the forthcoming elections. He reoccupied Zenjan, the Azerbaijanis withdrawing without resistance, and arrested over a hundred Tudeh leaders in Tehran.

Radio Tabriz now launched a vicious personal attack on Qavam, and the Tudeh press became hysterical. The Soviet Ambassador began a series of calls on both Qavam and the Shah, warning that the Soviet Union could not disregard the disturbances which would be created in the region of the Soviet frontier by the dispatch of Iranian forces to Azerbaijan. His manner

was truculent and bombastic; during one such call he said that the Soviet Union would have to revise its attitude toward Qavam personally if he persisted in the course he had adopted. Qavam's answer was to notify the Security Council of the Soviet threats as creating a situation which might endanger international peace.

Before making this notification Qavam asked and received assurances of full American support. On November 27, Ambassador George V. Allen released the following statement to the press: "It is the well-known policy of the American government to favor the maintenance of Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity. . . . The announced intention of the Iranian government to send security forces into all parts of Iran, including any areas where such forces are not now in control, for the maintenance of order in connection with elections, seems to me an entirely normal and proper decision."

As zero hour approached an atmosphere of tension spread once again over Tehran. This time it was not the familiar tension of despair, but rather of hope mingled with apprehension. The big question was whether or not the Russians would send troops to protect their Azerbaijani puppets. The bombast of the Soviet Ambassador gave every reason to believe they would. He continued his calls on Qavam and the Shah, warning repeatedly that the Soviet Union would not remain passive. But with the full assurance of U. S. support, both Qavam and the Shah stood firm.

The Iranian army concentrated its main assault forces just south of the Qafankuh Pass on the road between Zenjan and Mianeh. Opposing patrols established contact in a few skirmishes during the day of December 9, and just after midnight, on December 10, the Iranians attacked the Azerbaijani positions defending the pass. To the amazement of everyone, the Azerbaijanis put up only the most perfunctory defense. The only real fighting occurred in the few instances when General Gholam-Yahya Danishyan, the Azerbaijani Commander-in-Chief and a former Soviet army officer, surrounded by a guard of hard-bitten guerrillas, personally rallied his dispirited troops to stand up to the attacking forces. But these spurts of resistance were not sufficient to dent the waves of attackers, and the Azerbaijani line crumpled the following day. On the afternoon of December 12 Iranian troops entered Mianeh.

### VIII

Meanwhile, events had moved rapidly in Tabriz. It is clear the Soviets had decided that the maintenance of the Azerbaijani regime at this point was not worth the risk of military intervention, and had told its leaders that, except for moral and diplomatic support, they were on their own. This produced a split reaction. Javid, who had been enjoying the post of Governor General in nominal allegiance to the Shah, and Shahboustari, an older and

gentler Azerbaijani Democrat who had become President of the Provincial Council, favored nonresistance and early surrender. On the other hand, the fire-brand Beria and the regime's tough warrior Danishyan wanted to fight to the bitter end. Pishevari was somewhere in between; he wanted to fight, but he was also a realist.

December 11 was the critical day. The morning edition of the official newspaper carried a proclamation signed jointly by Pishevari and Beria calling on the people for a fight to the death. But by noon it was apparent that something had happened. A curfew had been declared but nothing was done to enforce it. The streets were full of little groups of gossiping men and rumors spread like wildfire. By late afternoon a report—which proved to be correct—circulated that Javid had sent a telegram of surrender to Tehran and had ordered a cease-fire. In the early evening Radio Tabriz carried a proclamation, in the name of Beria only, calling on the public not to obstruct the entry of the troops from Tehran, but to submit peaceably and in good order.

The people were stunned. There was no longer any effective authority in control of the city but yet no sign of the troops from Tehran. By midnight intermittent small arms firing began at various points in the city and continued throughout the next three days—some of it in celebration, most of it the settling of old scores by the liberated townsmen.

On December 12 there was still no sign of the Iranian troops. Bands of armed men roamed the city, shops of Communist sympathizers were smashed, and the random firing continued. Large crowds, on whom the reality of liberation was just beginning to dawn, milled about in the center of town. The Soviet Consulate General was under heavy guard, but the shutters were closed and there was no sign of life about. The Governor General's Palace was deserted except for Shahboustari, who was waiting disconsolately in its empty recesses to turn the city over to the victors. Javid waited at his home. Both were nervous over the disintegration of public order in the city and the lack of security forces to control the mobs. They wished the government troops would arrive.

The Democrat party headquarters, which only the day before had been the command post and nerve center of the Azerbaijani regime, was deserted except for three dispirited guards. Pishevari's office was empty and littered with dirty cups, bread crusts, egg shells, and old cigarette butts, silent testaments to what must have been a nerve-wracking last few hours. Early that morning mobs had attacked Beria as he tried to leave the headquarters, but he managed to break away and reach the Soviet hospital. The mob broke in and seized him, then dragged him behind a jeep back and forth over the city, finally leaving his unrecognizable body in the middle of a public square, an ironic end for the former head of the Tabriz street-cleaners' union.

December 13—Friday—was much the same. It was enlivened by a small



band of rebels who fortified themselves in the old Arc citadel, a relic of the 13th-century Mongols, firing away at anyone they could draw a bead on. They held out for three days.

At five o'clock on the afternoon of December 13 a small Iranian force under the command of General Hashimi entered Tabriz. Two days later another Iranian force accepted the surrender of the Kurdish rebels to the south and occupied their capital at Mahabad. But for five days the impenetrable Iron Curtain bordering Iran had parted and swallowed up countless rebel leaders and minor officials. Pishevari made it with ten trucks of loot. For a year or so afterward, he periodically broadcast from Baku promising a return; eventually it was rumored he had been killed in an automobile accident. The others who escaped faded into total anonymity.

In addition to Beria, a conservatively estimated 500 minor Democrats were killed by citizens during the lawless interregnum that preceded the arrival of Iranian troops. Hundreds of others were captured and tried, and scores were hanged. For months afterward nearly every public square in Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan sported rows of rebels swinging from crude gibbets. Thus, after an existence of a year, almost to the day, the "Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan" and the "Peoples' Republic of Kurdistan" came to an ignominious end, and the full authority of the Shah was re-established over the entire Iranian domain.

## IX

On December 13 the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran had demanded another interview with the Shah. He was calling on instructions of his government, he said, to *demand* that the Shah, as Commander-in-Chief, halt his troops to prevent disturbances in the area adjacent to the Soviet Union. The Shah allowed him to get out only one sentence before he interrupted to state that he had great pleasure in informing the Ambassador that the fighting was over and that he could assure him that there would be no disturbances. He then showed him a copy of the surrender telegram. The Ambassador's intelligence was appallingly faulty, for he had not yet heard of it. He stood for several seconds, stunned and speechless, and then, with a gesture of resignation, stalked from the audience room without another word.

Once the news of the surrender was officially confirmed Tehran went mad with joy. Qavam's popularity soared, and when the elections were duly held the following month his Democrat of Iran party received an overwhelming majority, the Tudeh winning only two seats.

There was one more anti-climactic spasm of Soviet activity in the fall of 1947, when the new parliament met to decide whether or not to ratify the agreement Qavam had made the preceding year, as part of the price to obtain the evacuation of Soviet troops, to grant an oil concession to the Soviet

Union. Qavam himself opposed the ratification on grounds that the agreement had been made under duress.

Soviet pressure and propaganda again reached a crescendo, and once again U. S. Ambassador Allen spoke up. In a memorable speech before the Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, he declared in unequivocal terms that Iran was free to choose its own course of action, and that if it chose to reject the proposed oil agreement it could count on United States support in resisting Soviet pressures. The Parliament on October 22 defeated ratification by a vote of 102 to 2.

Russia's traditional drive toward the Middle East was thus blocked once again. Indeed it even lost the advantage it had gained during the military occupation of Iran—a rare, if not unique, occurrence in Cold War history. But perhaps the most momentous consequence of the crisis lay in awakening the free world to the dangers of Soviet aggression, and in setting American policy on the path toward the Truman Doctrine and collective defense.

# ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARABIA

## The Persian Gulf Principalities

Herbert J. Liebesny

THE PRINCIPALITIES of the Persian Gulf coast offer a remarkable contrast to Aden and its hinterland. Not only are the cultural influences different, but the whole historical development of this part of the Peninsula has been along dissimilar lines. Basically these principalities, with some exception in the case of the Bahrein islands, originally constituted little more than tribal-based city states, small settlements which looked toward the sea for their livelihood through dhow building, dhow traffic, and pearl fishing, and inland for trade with the hinterland.

The primary British aim in this area was to make the route to India secure and prevent the establishment of a strategic position by another power which could threaten the approaches to India. The agreements entered into by Great Britain with the various local rulers reflect these aims. They were directed first of all toward the establishment of peace among the local shaykhs, the elimination of piracy, and then toward a consolidation of the British position. The rulers generally bound themselves not to enter into relations with or cede territory to any other power without British consent.<sup>1</sup> For a long time the relationship of the Persian Gulf principalities to the United Kingdom was defined merely as "a special treaty relationship with H. M. Government."<sup>2</sup> Only very recently have these principalities been put officially into the category, at least for some purposes, of British-protected states. Thus the British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order in Council of 1949 declared that for the purposes of the British Nationality Act of 1948, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and the Trucial States were regarded as protected states. They were thus put into the same category as the Malay States, Brunei, Tonga, and the Maldives Islands.<sup>3</sup> There

<sup>1</sup> For further details see Herbert J. Liebesny, "International Relations of Arabia: The Dependence Areas," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 1 (April 1947), pp. 156-65.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the British note to the U. S. Government, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1932, vol. 3, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Statutory Instruments 1949, vol. 1, part 1, p. 522. See also Second Schedule, p. 526.

◆ HERBERT J. LIEBESNY has made a special study of legal problems and developments in the Middle East. Much of the material in the present study is based on personal observations made during a research trip to the Arabian Peninsula in the summer of 1954. The author wishes to express his sincerest thanks to local and British officials in the various countries visited for their assistance.

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appears to be a tendency to apply this terminology generally to the Persian Gulf principalities, thus systematizing their status more than had heretofore been the case.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, there is still a considerable difference in status between these principalities and the states in the Aden hinterland, which are part of a protectorate.<sup>5</sup> Until India became independent, the British Persian Gulf establishment was subordinated administratively to the Government of India. The highest official in the Gulf, the Political Resident, had his seat at Bushire on the Iranian side of the Gulf, from where he moved to Bahrein during World War II. After the independence of India was declared in 1947, the Persian Gulf establishment was subordinated to the Foreign Office in London. As a result the personnel of the establishment was gradually changed over from members of the India Political Service to members of the Foreign Service.

In the meantime, other changes were taking place in the area. The Persian Gulf principalities lost much of their earlier importance. After World War I the threat of German or Ottoman power establishing itself firmly close to the Indian Empire had ceased. With the independence of India, the guarding of the sea lanes was no longer a primary British concern. Economically, Japanese cultured pearls made severe inroads upon the pearl market, and swifter means of transportation led to a decline in dhow building and dhow trade. However, these losses were more than compensated by the development of the oil industry in eastern Arabia. One of the world's largest oil fields was developed in Kuwait; during the last few years rich oil resources have been discovered in Qatar; and Bahrein has profited from a less spectacular but steady oil exploitation. Only the Trucial shaykhdoms have so far been outside the oil boom. The internal development of the oil-producing principalities has been immensely stimulated by the wealth created. However, the sudden imposition of a highly developed modern industry on these small states, which were neither culturally nor administratively prepared for it, has created problems in many fields. The approach to these problems, their solution, and the general development of the individual state has differed from place to place for various reasons.

As a result of these factors the functions of the British establishment in the Persian Gulf are considerably different from those exercised by the British in Aden and its hinterland. The Persian Gulf principalities have remained outside the Colonial Office organization. Their administration by the Foreign Office appears to emphasize their character as basically independent states under the protection of a foreign power. Unlike Aden, there

<sup>4</sup> See, for example Sir Rupert Hay, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary Problems," *Geographical Journal*, vol. 120 (1954) p. 433; *The Statesman's Yearbook 1952*, p. 762, which in contrast to prior years characterizes the Persian Gulf principalities as British-protected states.

<sup>5</sup> Statutory Instruments 1949, vol. 1, part 1, p. 526, First Schedule.



is no colonial establishment into which the administration of the area can be dovetailed. Also, unlike the Aden Protectorate, the British officials in the Persian Gulf are not at the same time advisers to the local rulers. While there are rather elaborate advisory establishments in the various principalities outside the Trucial Coast, they are staffed by individuals, generally British, who are employed and paid by the local rulers and who have no official connection with the British Political Resident Persian Gulf and his subordinates. The function of the Residency is therefore limited to the conduct of foreign relations and the safeguarding of peace and over-all British interests. In addition, the British officials in the Gulf exercise judicial jurisdiction with regard to British subjects and, to a varying extent, with regard to foreigners.

### BRITISH JURISDICTION

The highest British official in the Gulf is the Political Resident, with his seat in Bahrein. Subordinated to him are Political Agents and their assistants in Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and the Trucial Coast. Also subordinated to the Political Resident is the British Consul in Muscat.<sup>6</sup> The exercise of judicial jurisdiction and legislative power by the Political Resident and of judicial jurisdiction by the Political Agents has been regulated by a succession of British Orders in Council issued on the basis of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 as amended and of agreements made with the individual rulers. These Orders in Council were issued separately for each territory; before the severance of the ties to India the British judicial establishment in the Persian Gulf was linked to the Indian judicial system, the Indian codes and other comprehensive legislation were utilized, and appeal from the British courts in the Gulf principalities lay with the High Court in Bombay. When India achieved independence a reorganization of the Persian Gulf Court system became necessary and Orders to that effect were issued in 1949.<sup>7</sup> Endeavors were then begun not only to adjust the system to the new situation, but also to simplify and systematize the exercise of British jurisdiction in the Persian Gulf. The process begun in 1949 was continued by a new series of Orders issued between 1950 and 1953 which superseded the earlier ones. Specifically, the latest Order in Council was issued for the Trucial States in 1950, for Bahrein in 1952, and for Kuwait and Qatar in 1953.<sup>8</sup>

Under these Orders, British jurisdiction basically extends to all British subjects, British-protected persons, and foreigners in the various principalities.

<sup>6</sup> The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman enjoys a more independent status than the principalities in the Gulf. Its administrative and legal development has not been included in this article.

<sup>7</sup> Herbert J. Liebesny, "British Jurisdiction in the States of the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 3 (July 1949), pp. 330-32.

<sup>8</sup> *The Persian Gulf Gazette, Supplement no. 1, October 1, 1953*, contains the text of all these Orders in Council.

ties. However, the composition of the group varies somewhat from one territory to the other. It is widest in the Trucial States, where the judicial jurisdiction of the local courts is restricted to Trucial Coast subjects. All other persons, including subjects of the rulers of other Persian Gulf principalities, are under British jurisdiction.<sup>9</sup> In Qatar, the local courts have jurisdiction over Qatari subjects and nationals of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrein, Muscat and Oman, and the Trucial States.<sup>10</sup> In Bahrein, Iran is added to this list.<sup>11</sup> Local jurisdiction is broadest in Kuwait, where the local courts have jurisdiction not only over Kuwaiti subjects and nationals of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Muscat and Oman, and the other Persian Gulf principalities, but also over nationals of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran. In addition, the courts of Kuwait exercise jurisdiction over stateless Muslims of Palestinian origin.<sup>12</sup> In all the principalities the local courts also have jurisdiction over corporations incorporated under a law enacted by the Ruler.

The present British judicial organization in the Persian Gulf consists of the Chief Court for the Persian Gulf, the Full Court of the Persian Gulf, and Courts in the various principalities. The Political Resident is judge of the Chief Court and there are one or more assistant judges. The latter must have held judicial office under the Crown or must be members of a bar in the United Kingdom of not less than nine years' standing. At the time of this writing, the Assistant Judge is Judge Cyril H. Haines, C.B.E., who does not reside on Bahrein but visits there frequently from London, where he was until recently head of the Claims Department in the Foreign Office. The Chief Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in all matters, either exclusively or concurrent with the Court of each territory.

The Judge of the Court of the individual territory is the Political Agent, with the Assistant Political Agent as Assistant Judge. In addition there may be a Registrar who usually is a lawyer and who may hold preliminary examinations in criminal matters and may hear and determine criminal cases if the case is not punishable by imprisonment of more than three years. The Registrar may not inflict a sentence for imprisonment of more than six months or a fine of more than 1,000 rupees, or both. In the Trucial States the jurisdiction of the Registrar is more narrowly circumscribed, extending only to cases not punishable by imprisonment of more than six months or a fine of not more than 1,000 rupees, or both.<sup>13</sup> The Court in the individual territory has civil and criminal jurisdiction in all matters except those where jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the Chief

<sup>9</sup> Trucial States Order in Council, Article 8.

<sup>10</sup> Qatar Order in Council, Article 8.

<sup>11</sup> Bahrein Order in Council, Article 8.

<sup>12</sup> Kuwait Order in Council, Article 8. The provision regarding stateless Palestinians would indicate that the British courts have jurisdiction over Palestinian Christians.

<sup>13</sup> Trucial Coast Order in Council, Article 15.

Court. Appeals lie from the Registrar to the Court of the territory in question. From the Court of the territory appeal lies in the Chief Court.

Judgments of the Chief Court may be appealed to the Full Court for the Persian Gulf, which consists of not more than three and not less than two judges appointed by the Political Resident from among himself, the Assistant Judges of the Chief Court, judges of the High Courts of Kenya and Cyprus, and members of a United Kingdom bar of not less than nine years' standing. From the Full Court, appeal lies to the Privy Council in London with the latter's leave.

In mixed cases involving local subjects and foreigners, jurisdiction is vested in all territories except Kuwait in joint courts consisting of the Political Agent or another judge of his court and the local ruler or a person appointed by him. Appeal lies to a Joint Court of Appeal, which is similarly composed but excludes persons who sat in the case when heard in first instance. In Kuwait a more complicated system of collaboration between the British and the local courts exists.

The law applied by the British courts in the Persian Gulf still is based to a considerable extent on Indian codes in the form which they had on August 14, 1947. In addition, certain acts of Parliament and Orders in Council also are applicable. Locally, legislation for persons under British jurisdiction can be enacted by the Political Resident in the form of so-called Queen's regulations. These regulations also can be, and have been, utilized to extend to persons subject to British jurisdiction enactments by the local Rulers. A number of the ponderous rules of Indian legislation, particularly in the field of procedure, have been modified and simplified through Queen's regulations and a new Penal Code has been drafted. In addition to these various statutes and enactments, the British courts in the Persian Gulf may take into account local custom.

### BAHREIN

The island of Bahrein has had the most extended and most orderly development toward modernization of all the principalities. This is in large degree owing to the fact that this development was begun in the mid-1920's before the exploitation of oil in commercial quantities and has been directed mainly by one adviser, Sir Charles Dalrymple Belgrave. Also, the income from oil in Bahrein, while steady, has not been so large as in some of the other areas in Eastern Arabia. In the field of administration a number of government departments have been established, some of which are headed by British advisers; a few, such as the Sunni Waqf Department and the Public Security Department, are headed by members of the ruling Al Khalifah family. There is no State Council as in the Hadhrami states. Municipalities have been established in Manama, the capital, and in Muharraq, Hidd, and Rifa'a. All councils except that of Rifa'a, which is

the most recent municipality, have elected as well as appointed members. In Rifa'a all members are appointed.

Among the administrative problems in Bahrein is that of reforming the court system. Until 1926 the only courts, aside from the Agency court, which existed in Bahrein were shari'a courts and the *majlis al-'urfi* (customary law court). The latter dealt primarily with disputes concerning the pearl-diving industry.<sup>14</sup> In 1926 the task of establishing a regular court system was started. The Judicial Department is at present headed by Mr. Salim al-'Ara-yid, who has had previous experience in the Bombay High Court. The shari'a courts are restricted in their jurisdiction to matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The ruling family belongs to the Maliki rite, but there are also a considerable number of Shafi'i and particularly Shi'i in Bahrein.<sup>15</sup> The shari'a courts are therefore divided into a Sunni shari'a court, which at present consists of two Maliki qadis and one Shafi'i qadi, and a Shi'i shari'a court. There is also a Shi'i shari'a court of appeal. Cases other than those concerning personal status are adjudicated by courts staffed with members of the ruling family. Several Small Courts deal with petty cases; other cases are handled by a Senior Court with two judges who sit separately four days a week and jointly with the Adviser one day a week. On that day the more serious cases are heard. Appeal lies from the lower courts to a Junior and Senior Appeals Court. A so-called *majlis al-tijarah*, which is composed of leading merchants, gives advisory opinions on commercial matters and local customs, particularly with regard to the pearl-diving industry. It has been stated that the *majlis al-tijarah* is often dilatory and that it is difficult to replace the members, who serve without compensation.<sup>16</sup>

The main difficulty which besets the judicial system appears to be the absence of a sufficient body of statutory law which would give firm guidance to the judicial personnel. The lack of legal qualifications of the judges, none of whom has had legal training, also has been criticized.<sup>17</sup> The longstanding political dispute between Sunni and Shi'i on Bahrein has in the past tended to aggravate the situation, since Shi'i parties to a suit frequently claimed that they were not getting proper consideration from the judges, all of whom were Sunni. The recent appointment of a British judicial adviser is designed to bring about reforms in the judicial system.

It is interesting to note that many more trivial criminal matters are brought to court now than in former times, since the habit of settling minor disputes out of court is disappearing. This development is no doubt due to both the cultural and employment changes brought about by the oil

<sup>14</sup> For further details see Government of Bahrein, *Annual Report for Year 1365 (December 1945-November 1946)*, pp. 62-66.

<sup>15</sup> See Fahim I. Qubain, "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrein," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 9, (Summer 1955), pp. 269-80.

<sup>16</sup> Government of Bahrein, *Annual Report for Year 1371 (October 1951-September 1952)*, p. 39.

<sup>17</sup> Government of Bahrein, *Annual Report for Year 1372 (October 1952-September 1953)*, p. 40.



industry and the accelerated impact of Western modes of administration. Another important sign of the times is the increase in land cases due to the present high value of land which not long ago was worthless.<sup>18</sup> This is part of the general phenomenon of the change in this region from a society where land meant very little and where boundaries drawn in a featureless desert had very limited importance, to one where the value of land has suddenly become important because of the needs of the oil industry for drilling, housing, and so forth.

### KUWAIT

In contrast to Bahrein, the impact of oil revenues has been sudden in Kuwait. From a relatively poor community with few resources, Kuwait suddenly became a state with an income larger than the opportunities to spend it. With the help of foreign advisers, an ambitious program of development in various fields has been undertaken—roads and schools have been built and the serious problem of providing fresh water was solved at least in part by the construction of a water distillation plant.<sup>19</sup>

It is easy to understand why it has not been simple for the administrative system of Kuwait to keep up with these rapid developments. As in Bahrein, a number of government departments have been created, all of which are headed by members of the ruling family, the Al Sabah. The Ruler himself heads the important finance department. All legislation emanates from the Ruler, and there is no legislative council. Since January 1955 many government orders and decrees have been published in *Kuwait Today* (in Arabic), which appears weekly, and some enactments are also available through individual publications. Also, those which are made applicable to foreigners through Queen's regulations are published in the *Persian Gulf Gazette Supplement*. As in other areas, the rapid economic developments have led to demands for administrative reforms, and in 1954 the Ruler appointed a High Executive Committee to investigate the administration of Kuwait and propose reform measures.

The judicial system of Kuwait generally follows lines similar to Bahrein. The ruling family belongs to the Maliki rite, and this is the rite generally followed by the courts. However, it appears that in matters other than those concerning personal status, the old Ottoman civil code, the Majalla, is utilized. This would mean that an element of Hanafi law is injected, since the Majalla is based on the Hanafi rite. The customs and conventions governing relations among the pearl-fishing crews and their masters and those governing commercial relationships have been codified and were published in A. H. 1359 (1939/40).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> The Kuwait development program and its problems are discussed by Elizabeth Monroe, "The Shaikhdom of Kuwait," *International Affairs*, vol. 30 (July 1954), pp. 271-83.

The present court structure was established in A. H. 1358 (1938/39). The main parts of the court system are the office of the Chief Justice and the shari'a court. The present Chief Justice is Shaykh 'Abdullah al-Jabir Al Sabah. The Chief Justice hears suits and attempts to settle them. If he is unable to do so, he passes them to the shari'a court, or to special committees if a naval or commercial matter is involved. The office of the Chief Justice is also concerned with the enforcement of judgments rendered by the shari'a court or a special committee. The shari'a court has three members, the head of the court and two qadis. However, suits are apparently handled by a single qadi. The judges of the shari'a court have the right to summon witnesses, demand statements from the parties, and render a final judgment. There is no court of appeal. However, a party who feels aggrieved by a judgment of a shari'a court can take the case to arbitration, where the decision of the shari'a court is either approved or the case remanded to the court.<sup>20</sup> In criminal matters the public security department and the police appear to have some jurisdiction.

In the judicial system of Kuwait the idea of arbitration and conciliation is thus still very pronounced. The role of the secular court, that of the Chief Justice, appears to be concentrated on conciliation and on the enforcement of the decisions rendered by the religious court and commercial and naval tribunals. The old Arab system is therefore still clearly visible, even though some systematization has begun. The pressure of business and increasing complexity of the problems before the local courts are very likely to bring about further systematization of the court system and court procedure.

The development of the oil industry in Kuwait has also brought about a physical extension of the state's administrative offices beyond the boundaries of the city. The state, for example, has a public security office located at the oil camp of the Kuwait Oil Company, situated south of the city at al-Ahmadi. The extension of oil operations into the Neutral Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may bring about in time some further extension of official administrative operations.

### QATAR

Qatar's oil development and consequently its rapid economic development date back only a few years. In Qatar, too, British advisers have been selected by the Ruler and three special government departments, all headed by British advisers, have been established. They are the State Engineering Department, the State Medical Department, and the State Police Department. Development has been concentrated in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Roads and a new pier have been built, the town is supplied with electricity, and a water distillation plant has been constructed. A new and large hospital

<sup>20</sup> Most of this data is based upon information kindly furnished by the Chief Justice, Shaykh 'Abdullah al-Jabir Al Sabah.

is being built and the existing hospital has been enlarged for interim use. New police barracks are likewise under construction and the old jail will be replaced by a structure within the new police compound.

The ruling family of Qatar and most of the population are Wahhabi. The Ruler issues decrees which, however, are not regularly published. With the exception of those which are made applicable to foreigners through a Queen's regulation and which are therefore published in the *Persian Gulf Gazette*, the Qatari decrees are not easily accessible. In Qatar the judicial system is again basically similar to that of Kuwait and Bahrein. The shari'a court has jurisdiction in personal status matters. In other matters a court composed of two shaykhs from the ruling family, with the British Adviser participating in an advisory capacity, has jurisdiction. The shaykhs' court bases itself upon customary law and equity. However, the qadi is consulted frequently and has the function of administering the oath in civil and criminal cases.

### THE TRUCIAL STATES

In the Trucial States there has as yet been no oil exploitation and consequently no impetus for the rapid development witnessed in the other Persian Gulf principalities.<sup>21</sup> Dubai, the seat of the British Political Agent, has a lively entrepôt trade, with dhows from many lands lining the inlet on which the town is situated. By contrast, in Sharjah, where the Political Agent used to have his seat, trade is dying down owing to the silting up of the harbor. There are no British advisers in the Trucial Coast and there is no developed administrative machinery. The shaykhs of the various states rule with the help of just a secretary. There are no municipal services and no organized local police force, order being maintained by the British-organized and British-commanded Trucial Levies. Legal cases are as a rule referred to the Ruler or a member of his family. If he cannot settle the matter he passes it to the qadi. If one of the parties is dissatisfied with the qadi's decision, he can appeal to a qadi in another of the Trucial States. In commercial cases, two or three merchants act as a tribunal and refer the matter to the Ruler if they cannot settle it. If the Ruler likewise fails to settle the case, it is referred to the qadi. In consonance with Islamic thinking, the emphasis is thus upon arbitration and amicable settlement, with the qadi taking the case if measures of conciliation fail. Cases are decided primarily according to equitable rules and custom, except for personal status cases where the rules of Islamic law are observed.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> I have had the opportunity of learning about administrative and judicial procedures first hand in only two of the Trucial States, Dubai and Sharjah.

<sup>22</sup> I am indebted for much of this information to Shaykh Ibrahim Midfa'i, Secretary of the Ruler of Sharjah.

### CONCLUSIONS

Modern technology and the impact of the oil industry have drawn some of the smaller states of the rim area of the Arabian Peninsula, notably Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, into the stream of steady and often extremely rapid modernization. In the field of administration and judicial organization this development has probably been somewhat slower than in the more technical fields. No complete Westernization of large areas of the legal system, such as is the case, for example, in the criminal and commercial law of some of the other Arab states, has as yet taken place. However, through Western advisers administrative processes have been modernized to meet the requirements of the rapid technological development. Legislation in the more specialized and technical fields, such as air navigation regulations, rules governing the exploitation of the seabed outside territorial waters, and customs regulations, clearly bear the imprint of Western advice. Other fields of legislation, on the other hand, have barely been touched and the court system still bears much of its original complexion even though some systematization has taken place. Relatively little has as yet been done in the way of codifying any of the larger areas of substantive or procedural law. This is not surprising since the impact of foreign technology and of the new industry in the Peninsula is so recent. As time goes on, the need for further systematization of court procedures, further administrative reforms, and simplification and codification of legal rules is very likely to arise. Furthermore, legal needs are changing. For example, litigation concerning real estate, which formerly was rare in this desert area, is now rather frequent. Another field of law which is developing fast is that regarding liability for personal injury, particularly in automobile accidents.

All these new aspects of the law have to be dealt with by the courts and their personnel, many of whom have had no formal legal education. The problem is a difficult one, but the local states have approached the solution with considerable determination and, given the shortness of time, a measure of success. It is likely that the states of the rim area of the Peninsula will continue to build their further administrative and legal development on the traditional foundations of their culture and will try to blend the old and the new. It would be difficult now to attempt to predict the results of such a synthesis, but it will be extremely interesting to watch further developments in this area, where the impact of modern technology and its needs on an old and very different culture has been more sudden and deeper than in many of the other regions of the world.



## ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN AN ENCIRCLED LAND

*Peter G. Franck*

THE MAJOR POSTWAR developmental efforts of the Afghan government and business groups date from the spring of 1946. In that year the "Grand Old Man" of the kingdom, H.R.H. Hashim Khan, Prime Minister and uncle of the king, signed a contract with the American construction firm of Morrison-Knudsen for the rehabilitation of some of the irrigation works in the Helmand valley and the construction of major trunk roads. After spending nearly \$24 million (of which about \$17 million was paid to Morrison-Knudsen), the country's monetary reserves were severely drained and the Afghan government was obliged to seek financial help from the United States government. Although the latter granted only a fraction of the dollar credit applied for, the \$21-million Export-Import Bank loan of April 1950 was a welcome prop. Both government and private development projects have made significant strides since the U. S. decided to back up the Afghan efforts.

### *WATER DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION: THE U. S. ROLE*

The Afghan economy, with an average annual production of 3 million tons of basic feed and foodstuffs (wheat, rice, corn, and barley), has been living close to the margin of agricultural self-sufficiency. Indeed, droughts and other adverse factors have led to the importation of between 10,000 and 17,000 tons of wheat and flour from the U. S. in three of the past eight years (1947, 1953, 1954). Therefore, reclamation or fuller utilization of potentially productive land within reach of the Helmand, Arghandab, and Kunduz rivers has loomed large in government development plans.

Among them, the Helmand-Arghandab project<sup>1</sup> is the largest, not only in terms of available land but also in the volume of construction and financial requirements. The \$6.7-million Arghandab dam, completed in December 1952, has regularized the erratic flow of the river for 100,000 acres of fertile valley land and thus nearly doubled its fruit- and vegetable-bearing capacity. It is also backing up enough water to supply an additional 56,000 acres with normal requirements. Moreover, the construction of the dam

<sup>1</sup> See map, p. 45.

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
permits the installation of a power plant with an approximate 6,400 kw capacity, which the 85,000 people in Kandahar have sorely needed for some time.

The \$13-million Kajakai dam on the Helmand river, completed in December 1953, has been damming up water to irrigate as much as 500,000 acres, of which not more than 40 percent could be cultivated before (and much of it intermittently, owing to the erratic water supply in the river).

The third element in the irrigation and power project is the construction of diversion dams and canals. The major portions completed by the end of 1954 include the Girishk weir and Boghra canal system of approximately 100 miles, which cost about \$7.5 million. Here, too, foundations for power plants have been provided for in the basic structures. Beginning in the fall of 1953, the old farming communities near Girishk and further down the river were able to benefit from summer water for their crops for the first time since Genghis Khan. Moreover, some 4,000 nomadic families have been settled on newly watered land, with hopes of adequate crops and a new way of life.

By the middle of 1955 approximately \$70 million had been spent on the irrigation program, of which \$21 million had been borrowed from the U. S. Yet the full development of the lands which could have been supplied with water since December 1952 was still far off.

Since 1950 Morrison-Knudsen had warned that the effective use of the regularized water supply would require the repair or replacement of the old hand-built diversion and canal structures as well as the addition of a large number of new structures. Although Morrison-Knudsen also predicted that flood prevention and a stable water supply (without additional water or land) would increase yields both for old and new settlers, even this expectation was soon dashed. The inadequate scope of agronomic investigation led to errors in yield projection. Spotty geological tests failed to ascertain the extent of the need for artificial drainage facilities (underground tiles and deep open ditches). Most important, the difficulties in determining the water requirements of individual crops on the various types of soil, of deciding upon the appropriate size of landholdings, of demonstrating and extending to the new settlers the use of effective cropping and irrigation techniques, and, finally, of establishing the necessary health, education, and marketing facilities mounted as land and water became ready. Even if the way to the intricate solutions of the technological and social problems had been found, there would not have been enough trained Afghan personnel to implement them. Apparently the Afghan government as well as Morrison-Knudsen had hopefully relied on the traditional ability of Afghan farmers to apply the most effective soil practices. It became obvious to the U. S. government in mid-1953 that the project, without help from experienced



extension workers and other experts, was headed for the worst. Since that time, U. S. technical assistance has been essential to the project's success.

But Point Four could not provide the financial support needed to continue a project which was essential both politically and economically. In January 1953 the Afghan government therefore proceeded with a second loan request. The new application for a \$20-million credit encompassed not only the opening up of new land under the Arghandab dam and the Boghra canal but also the improvement—through better drainage and water control facilities—of the existing irrigated acreage. The government also sought financial help for the now feasible power plant at the Arghandab dam, a road maintenance program, and an expensive road-paving program covering 120 miles, mostly radiating from Kabul but also including about 20 miles of streets within the capital. In connection with the road-paving program the government wrote the Export-Import Bank that to some extent the selection had been influenced by certain social and political reasons rather than an analysis based on strict economic principles. It was expected that the effect on the morale of the people and business in general would be such that the roads deserved high priority. This was the first documented reference in economic dealings with the U. S. to the fact that internal political dynamics had a strong bearing on the type and size of projects

selected. Action on the request was postponed pending a new economic appraisal of the entire program.

Over a year later, in May 1954, the reappraisal led the U. S. government to approve a second loan of \$18.5 million even though the need for foreign exchange had now become so great that the Afghan government had applied for twice that amount. The second stage of the development financed by the May 1954 loan included construction of two power plants (including that at Arghandab), new canals, and drainage facilities under the Arghandab dam and the Boghra canal, to be completed in December 1957. The Kabul street project was rejected even though the Afghans considered it urgent. But the most significant aspect of the reappraisal of the development program lay in the new repayment terms which superseded those of the previous loan. Instead of requiring, as in 1950, repayment within 9 years beginning 6 years after the loan agreement, the new terms granted the Afghans 18 years for both loans, to run concurrently from October 1958 until April 1976. In thus altering the terms, the bank corrected a miscalculation underlying the 1950 loan terms, when it had overestimated the earning capacity of the projects it helped finance. Comparable irrigation loans in arid areas of the U. S. (such as those granted by the Bureau of Reclamation) on the average call for repayment over 40 years.

The second phase of the Helmand project did not get under way for some time. Not only was the negotiation of the new construction contract slow, but internal political opposition to a continued financial tie-up with the U. S. had to be overcome—a much more difficult task for a neighbor of the Soviet Union in 1954 than it had been in 1950. Even after approval by the proper ministries, work under the contract was slow in starting. Delays in deciding upon the purchase and design of machinery postponed the initial disbursement of funds under the new loan until the first half of 1955. This meant that the increase in productive capacity of Afghan agriculture was being postponed *pro tanto*. As mentioned previously, the shortages of wheat and flour in 1953 and 1954 had to be overcome by imports. In mid-1955, it may be estimated, not more than 20 percent of the newly irrigable land was in use in the Helmand valley. The prospect that benefits for a larger proportion of the Afghan people were still far away and would require another \$100 million led several observers to believe that the Helmand enterprise was too large an undertaking at the present stage of the country's economic development.

#### INDUSTRIAL GROWTH: TEXTILES AND POWER

The 1949 request for a loan from the U. S. included one power and four industrial projects, calling for a foreign exchange outlay of \$29 million. However, the Export-Import Bank's concern with the pressing food problem



and its determination to hold the first loan to a minimum risk ruled out U. S. financial help for Afghan private industry. German firms, backed by government credit guarantees, jumped into the breach. With their help between 1950 and mid-1955, 15,000 new mechanical spindles were added to the Pul-i-Khumri cotton textile plant, doubling its yarn spinning capacity. Fifty miles north of Kabul, at Gulbahar, a new cotton textile plant is being built with 45,000 spindles and 1,250 looms, giving Afghanistan an annual cotton textile capacity of 65 million meters, or nearly half its domestic requirements. East of Kabul at Sarobie, a new power plant is under construction which by 1957 will deliver 8,000 kw to the Gulbahar textile plant, 4,000 kw to the trolley busses of Kabul, and 10,000 kw for general civilian power requirements of the Kabul population and industries. Finally, to meet the growing requirements of concrete, Czechoslovak engineers, backed by a Soviet loan, will erect the first Afghan cement plant 30 miles north of the capital, with an indicated capacity of 30,000 tons.

The total outlays for these projects may be estimated at the equivalent of \$40 million, indicating an annual investment rate of about \$8 million. Not all of the Afghan capital and control of these projects is nongovernmental. Originally, all large-scale private business enterprise in Afghanistan was fathered by Banke Millie, a commercial and industrial bank founded in 1932 and directed for many years by Abdul Madjid, who for a decade was also Minister of National Economy (1939-1950). Though small entrepreneurs, especially farmers, had a hard time getting credit from Banke Millie (or could not afford the high interest rate of between 12 and 18 percent per annum), the bank was successful in launching the first industrial enterprises. It initially financed the expansion of the textile and power plants. It also obtained control over cotton growing by offering long-term buying contracts at fixed prices and by financing new growing practices. Most important, perhaps, was the bank's financial assistance to karakul traders who frequently had to wait for 6 months or longer before their consignments would be sold. The ability of the bank and its industrial offshoots to control private credit, to obtain and hold skilled personnel, and to apply new technology gave it the position of a state within the State. At the same time, the bank had invited public ire by charging high interest rates, holding karakul breeders and cotton growers to narrow margins, and permitting occasionally undistributed profits to be invested in speculative ventures.

A live-and-let-live policy prevailed under H.R.H. Shah Mahmoud, who succeeded his brother H.R.H. Hashim Khan as Prime Minister in 1946. As part of this policy, the government allocated practically all the foreign exchange needed by the industrial group and maintained a special exchange rate (the "industrial" rate) at a level between the official and the free rates. But the underlying economic rivalry between the Banke Millie group and the government (which had political overtones because of the absence of

tribal and dynastic ties within Abdul Madjid's industrial-mercantile group) broke out into the open when he left the Cabinet in 1950 over a controversial exchange allocation. The break was completed in September 1953, when Shah Mahmoud's resignation ended the line of the King's uncles serving as Prime Ministers. Under his successor, H.R.H. Mohammed Daoud Khan, cousin of the king and a former Minister of War and Ambassador to France, and the Deputy Prime Minister, H.R.H. Mohammed Naim Khan, also a cousin and a former Minister of Public Works and Ambassador to the U. S., a new economic policy of more stringent government control of business took hold. The cousins had not been so closely associated with the Banke Millie group as the uncles and were less impressed with the merits of a free enterprise system within the framework of an underdeveloped economy than they were.

The new approach to economic planning is perhaps best represented by the policies of Abdul Malik, the new Minister of Finance (since the beginning of 1955 also Minister of National Economy) who, perhaps under the influence of his previous experience as Quartermaster General of the Army, has been inspired by Turkey's "étatisme," with which he had become familiar. He found the policies of Banke Millie no longer suited to the country's best interests.

Within the first years of his regime the following curbs on Banke Millie were put through:

(a) The government forced Banke Millie to sell 63 percent of the stock in the Northern Cotton company to the Ministry of Finance, which in turn engaged private merchants to enforce a new cotton buying policy.

(b) The government continued to control textile selling prices and the profit rate of the Banke Millie-owned Textile Co.

(c) The government set domestic minimum prices to be paid the breeders for karakul skins which left too narrow a margin for processing, handling, and selling in New York.

(d) The government forced Banke Millie to sell it 51 percent of the stock in the General Electric Co. (which is building the new Sarobie power plant) and assumed control over that construction.

(e) The government took over the Cement Co. (which long had made plans for the first plant) and negotiated the construction contract involving machinery and a \$5-million credit from Czechoslovakia.

(f) The government charged Banke Millie with tax evasion in connection with capital gain derived from the sale of stock and land.

(g) The government extended exchange control to all proceeds from karakul, wool, and cotton, but raised the buying rate from 16.8 afghanis to between 21 and 26 afghanis to the dollar. This permitted the government to broaden its control over new plant investment, since proceeds from cotton and wool exports could no longer be used to make foreign purchases without

government approval. At the same time, by making available what exchange it wanted at a lower than the free market rate, the government cheapened foreign investment goods.

The impact on business volume and public opinion was such that Banke Millie shares, once scarce at 1,000 afghanis, were now available at 500 afghanis. Moreover, the Bank could no longer obtain ready cash from its shareholders to defray the local cost of the Gulbahar textile plant, thus delaying the plant's completion. The bank's dividends were reduced to 5 percent in 1954, and prospects for 1955 seem dark.

That the new economic policy was not directed against private business as such became evident in laws establishing several new institutions in 1954. These comprised the following:

(a) Through the new Afghan Commercial Bank, 60 percent of whose capital of 120 million afghanis (about \$6 million) was supplied by the State Bank, the government hopes to channel scarce loan funds to small traders at substantially lower interest rates (between 6 and 8 percent), in this way effectively competing with the virtual lending monopoly of Banke Millie. According to reports of New York fur traders, the new bank has contributed to a general lowering of the interest rate.

(b) Through the new Agricultural and Home Industry Bank, whose capital of 150 million afghanis (about \$7.5 million) was supplied by the State Bank, the government expects to make cheap credits available to farmers, artisans, and cottage industries—a group generally neglected by Banke Millie. In 1955, applications in the Gazni and Kandahar areas were being processed successfully. Both of these banks have benefited from technical advice rendered by a United Nations mission.

(c) The Helmand Valley Development Authority, patterned in 1952 after the Tennessee Valley Authority in cooperation with the Point Four mission, coordinates and finances irrigation, reclamation, and settlement activities in the Helmand valley. Flanked by a body of U. S. advisers, it has set up, as subsidiary, the Afghan Construction Company, which is gradually taking over the work of Morrison-Knudsen and in any event will inherit the equipment left by that company.

(d) Through the Supervisory Committee on Foreign Investments the government enforces the new (1954) foreign investment law, which is modeled on the Turkish and Egyptian laws. Under its rules, there is no longer any discrimination between Afghan and foreign capital and no ceilings on the amount of foreign capital participating in a specific enterprise or on the number of foreign employees, provided that the investors contribute to the country's technical and economic advance. Profits, dividends, and proceeds from the sale of the assets, as well as 70 percent of the foreigners' salaries, may be freely transferred to the country of origin after payment of Afghan income taxes. Thus far, only one foreign firm, the German Siemens

Company, has decided to invest in the erection of a repair and replacement parts plant.

(e) A new Commercial Code was issued in 1954 traceable to the Turkish and Swiss codes. It replaces the customary law and shari'a in the fields of commerce and finance.

### *ECONOMIC EFFECT OF ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT*

Regardless of the political color of the government, the total investment in new productive capacity has increased each year since 1949/50. A partial indication of the trend is given in Table I. While the share of the government in total investment has always been large, the role of the government now appears to be dominant.

Such an expansion of investment outlays has caused a strain on both domestic and foreign exchange resources. As Table II reveals, government expenditures (largely owing to the rapid increase in outlays for public works and agriculture) and revenues have been rising rapidly since 1948/49. Although the investments of the State Bank are not reflected in the budget expenditures, they more than doubled in five years, and in the fiscal year ending March 1955 are expected to exceed 1 billion afghanis, or about 8 percent of the value of national production. Revenues have advanced as fast as expenditures. The largest source of revenue had been and still is the customs duty, contributing between 35 and 40 percent of the total. But income taxes, thanks to better enforcement and broader coverage, have increased their relative share. Nevertheless, in each of the developmental years the government has incurred a deficit, with the largest forecast for 1954/55.

*Table I: TREND IN AFGHAN INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES, 1949-1955*

Fiscal Year(a)	(in millions of afghanis)			
	Development Expenditure by Government Budget(c)	Enterprise	Investments by Banks(b) State Bank(d)	Bank e Millie
1948/49	94	—	30	324
1949/50	115	16	31	392
1950/51	238	40	36	433
1951/52	266	36	68	421
1952/53	279	87	138	464
1953/54	218	94	172	n.a.
1954/55(e)	370(e)	112(e)	310	n.a.

(a) March 21-March 20.

(b) Amounts outstanding as of end of fiscal year.

(c) Expenditures for public works, agriculture, and irrigation.

(d) Value of shares owned in industrial enterprises. Loans to private business, which amounted to 158 million afghanis at the end of 1952/53, are excluded.

(e) Estimated.

n.a. Not available.

Source: Ministry of National Economy and Bank of Afghanistan. Parts of this table are reproduced from United Nations *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East*, 1954, p. 59.



Despite the failure of revenues to catch up with expenditures, it is clear from Table II that the net inflationary impact on the economy is less than the budget deficit as shown. This is because the expenditures include those financed by the U. S. credit and to that extent do not affect the flow of money in Afghanistan. Also, in 1952/53 and 1953/54 the government's cash balance increased significantly. On the other hand, the full inflationary impact of the methods of financing economic development comprehends the loans and investments of the banks which are shown in Table I.

It should be noted that, as Table II shows, the government borrowed from the public for the first time in recorded history when in 1954 it issued 7 percent bonds in the amount of 10 million afghanis, of which 60 percent were sold in the year of issuance. Although the State Bank charges not more than 4 percent to the government, the public had to be offered a fraction above the lowest commercial loan rate (6 percent) to make the bonds attractive. The significant aspect of this development is not the amount but the fact that the new government recognized the need for and the feasibility of public borrowings.

The effect of the accelerated development expenditures by private and public bodies since 1946/47 has been twofold. In the first three years, to the end of 1949/50, the rise in the cost of living by about 33 percent corresponded with the expansion of money in circulation. Between 1949/50 and 1953/54 currency expanded another 46 percent, but the cost of living increase was considerably less, thanks to some increase in production and imports. This abatement of inflationary pressures does not negate the fact that the Kabul cost of living index in mid-1955 stood at the level of 600, compared with 100 in 1937/38. Wages have not risen nearly as much and thus there has been a fall in the standard of living since the prewar period.

Table II: AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE, 1949-1955  
(in millions of afghanis)

Fiscal Year(a)	Revenue	Expendi- tures	Balance	New credits from			Cash Holdings
				State Bank	U.S.	Public	
1948/49	318	400	-81	74	0	0	-7(b)
1949/50	387	462	-74	81	0	0	7
1950/51	473	670	-196	109	89	0	2
1951/52	549	713	-165	41	125	0	2
1952/53	614	830	-216	86	153	0	22
1953/54	698	838	-141	90	74	0	23
1954/55 (est.)	744	1141(c)	-397	200	197(c)	6	0

(a) March 21-March 20.

(b) Minus sign means decrease in cash holdings.

(c) According to reports from the Export-Import Bank, the amount disbursed during 1954/55 was only 72 million afghanis, so that government expenditures and the deficit are overstated by 125 million afghanis.

Source: Ministry of Finance. Also reproduced in *UN Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East*, 1954, p. 63.

### STRAIN ON GOLD AND EXCHANGE RESERVES

The 1954 credit from the Export-Import Bank was designed to relieve the strain on Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves—the inevitable corollary of accelerated economic development. As Table III shows, this was not true for the early years of large credit disbursements. The situation looked quite favorable early in the fiscal year 1951/52, so much so that the State Bank bought \$2.5 million worth of gold, the first purchased since the war. From 1952 on, however, there were reversals all along the line. Not only did receipts from karakul sales drop sharply, but imports of petroleum and exchange allocations for the Sarobie and Gulbahar contracts increased dollar expenditures rather sharply. By the time the second loan from the U. S. was negotiated, the State Bank was hard pressed for exchange. The free market rate for the dollar, which had hovered around 30 to 35 afghanis since 1949, inched to 48 afghanis in 1954.

The most serious blow came from the karakul market. The price per raw skin in New York, averaging between \$9 and \$10 in the early postwar years, dropped to less than \$8 in 1950. After a slight recovery in 1953, the price again dropped in 1954 to an average of \$6.50, while in the early part of 1955, \$6 was the going price. The number of skins exported has also dropped in recent years. In the three years 1948-50, the average number sold per year was over 2 million. In 1952 the number dropped to slightly over 1.5 million, and in 1954 total exports were estimated at 1 million skins, with no improvement in sight in the first 9 months of 1955. The cause for this drastic reduction was seen in the loss of flock due to bad winter weather, sheep pests, and the reduction in killings because of the more advantageous mutton

Table III: FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES OF THE BANK OF AFGHANISTAN, 1949-1954

At end of Fiscal Year(a)	Gold(b) and silver (in millions of afghanis)	Net foreign exchange	Gross dollar purchases during fiscal year (in millions of dollars)
1948/49	577	62	14.0
1949/50	577	117	14.8
1950/51	577	244	16.1
1951/52	619	70	14.5
1952/53	619	5	11.7
1953/54	801(c)	n.a.	10.7
1954/55	835(c)	n.a.	16.2

(a) March 21-March 20.

(b) Valued at \$35 per ounce, converted at the pre-1949 exchange rate of 13 afghanis to the dollar.

(c) Converted at the "official" exchange rate of 16.8 afghanis to the dollar, adopted early in 1954.

n.a. Not available.

Source: Ministry of Finance.

prices. To counteract this, the government issued minimum prices in 1954, yet the value of karakul sales overseas in 1954 was estimated at only \$8 million, compared with an average of \$14-\$15 million only two years before. Fortunately, UN technical assistance has made significant strides in the karakul breeding and feeding practices, so that an early improvement may be expected.

The loss in exchange proceeds due to the karakul situation was in part offset by the spectacular gains made in cotton and wool exports. In 1953/54 cotton exports were nearly 14,000 tons, more than 4 times as much as in 1951/52. The result is that at the present time cotton sales provide the second largest single source of foreign exchange, next to dried and fresh fruit (Table IV).

Table IV: AFGHANISTAN: COMPOSITION OF TRADE(a)

	Exports				Value			
	Volume				(in millions of dollars)			
	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54
Dried and fresh fruits (000 tons)	53.8	60.2	64.6	95.7	\$15.9	\$16.6	\$19.8	\$22.0
Hides and skins (000 pieces)	3,409	2,225	1,983	939(b)	16.8	10.5	10.5	8.0(b)
Medicinal herbs (000 tons)	1.9	1.7	1.4	n.a.	0.8	0.5	0.3	n.a.
Cotton, raw (000 tons)	3.2	3.8	13.6	10.7	1.6	3.9	17.0	n.a.
Wool, raw (000 tons)	4.8	4.3	5.5	5.9	6.0	7.4	10.6	n.a.
Other	—	—	—	—	2.9	5.1	3.3	—
Total					\$44.0	\$44.0	\$61.5	\$56.5
	Imports							
	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54
Textiles (000 tons)	6.5	5.1	5.7	6.9	\$16.4	\$17.9	\$16.2	n.a.
Tea (000 tons)	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.3	4.8	3.1	3.0	n.a.
Petroleum (mil. gal.)	1.4	2.7	4.9	n.a.	0.6	1.5	2.0	n.a.
Sugar (000 tons)	1.9	1.0	13.6	n.a.	0.4	0.4	3.3	n.a.
Leather goods (000 tons)	0.1	0.2	0.6	n.a.	0.3	0.6	2.1	n.a.
Other	—	—	—	—	9.1	14.9	15.2	n.a.
Total					\$31.7	\$38.4	\$41.8	\$52.6

(a) Year beginning March 21.

(b) Karakul only. Karakul exports in 3 preceding years were: 2.5, 1.4, and 1.0 million respectively.

n.a. Not Available.

Source: Government of Afghanistan.

Note: Valuations are based on customs declarations at the official rate of 16.8 afghanis to the dollar. Figures exclude the trade on government account (inclusive of the shipments of the Morrison-Knudsen Co.).

The growing political difficulties with Pakistan, resulting from the latter's administrative incorporation of the North-West Frontier Province into a unified West Pakistan state early in 1955, led to a new interruption of transit trade which not only cut off the vital imports of petroleum products and machinery for the various development projects but also interfered seriously with export shipments of fruit and furs. Afghan officials were actively negotiating for air shipments of karakul to maintain the dollar earnings lifeline for the country's economy.

### *COUNTERVAILING MEASURES*

The pressure on gold and foreign exchange reserves concurrently with the expansion of the domestic money flow brought the government up against the legal 50 percent minimum ratio of the former to the latter. Owing to the conservative management of the State Bank, the valuation of the gold stock had for years been in terms of the pre-1949 exchange rate of 13 afghanis to the dollar. Early in 1954, when the total gold, silver, and net foreign exchange barely equaled 50 percent of the currency in circulation, revaluation was found in order and the amount of reserves entered on the books was boosted by 180 million afghanis.

This, of course, did not touch the root of the exchange difficulties. As already mentioned, the government widened the scope of the mandatory exchange surrender quota from exports by including 100 percent of the proceeds of karakul, wool, and cotton. Moreover, it changed the exchange rates drastically by buying exchange from cotton and wool exporters at a higher price than from karakul exporters, and by raising the selling price to importers of other than capital goods from 23 to 30 afghanis to the dollar. Thus, it gave a boost to cotton and wool exports and discouraged ordinary consumer imports.

Aware of the continuing need for long-term foreign exchange needs, the government applied for membership in the International Bank and Monetary Fund in the fall of 1954. After paying 25 percent of its \$10-million subscription to the Fund and 2 percent to the Bank in gold, it was formally admitted in July 1955. At the September 1955 meeting of the Bank's Board of Directors in Istanbul, Finance Minister Abdul Malik requested the dispatch of a fact-finding mission.

### *RE-ORIENTATION IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE POLICY*

The government of Afghanistan recognized from the outset that a development program which involved 30 to 45 percent of the budget and entailed new departures in irrigation and reclamation work would overtax the limited reservoir of trained manpower. Afghanistan was the first country to request technical assistance from the UN under its Expanded Assistance



Program. As Table V indicates, considering the size of the country, it has received a large amount of help, best reflected in the average number of 40 experts assigned per year.

While a description of the UN program in Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this review,<sup>2</sup> it is pertinent to point out that the Afghans had reason to be satisfied with the elimination of malaria from an area inhabited by 1.2 million people at the cost of 12 cents per head, the firm establishment of Afghan malaria control offices, the inauguration of a central and several provincial maternal and child health centers, the production and distribution of vaccine to protect karakul and other sheep against a score of ravaging diseases, the successful demonstration of better breeding and winter feeding techniques for the large livestock population, the substantial improvement of cotton yields and the definitive selection of the best suited seeds, the impressive demonstration of new farm tools which were widely adopted, and the effective advice received on agricultural and small business credit.

But there emerged serious gaps in the UN program. The UN was unable to provide the Afghans with an acceptable and effective senior economic adviser who would organize, train, and assist the 13 commissions set up in 1953 as part of the Central Planning Unit, now largely defunct. Nor were UNESCO and allied agencies successful in developing in time a village community project in which improvement of agriculture, health, and education, in their mutual interaction, could be tested and the lessons applied on a broader scale. The greatest failure which the UN encountered was with regard to the oil-drilling and exploitation project in the northern provinces. After locating promising oil traces, the UN selected and the Afghans in 1952 almost signed up oil-drilling teams in France. But by that time the establishment of NATO had antagonized the Soviet Union, and since the French government owned shares in the oil-drilling firm which was to do the work, Foreign Minister Molotov personally vetoed the project by intervening directly with the Afghan government. Not being backed up

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter I in the forthcoming book, *Hands Across Frontiers*, edited by Howard M. Teaf and Peter G. Franck. (U. S. distributor: Cornell University Press).

Table V: UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

Calendar Year	(in thousands of dollars)						Total
	TAA	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	
1951(a)	\$ 95.7	—	\$ 49.0	\$ 5.4	—	\$ 36.9	\$187.0
1952	276.2	\$ 1.6	142.9	60.4	\$13.0	93.0	587.1
1953	149.2	10.3	101.6	38.5	15.6	93.6	408.7
1954	71.8	3.2	91.1	43.1	20.5	89.9	319.5
1955 (est.)	68.1	21.0	82.6	44.3	38.0	115.2	369.1

(a) Covers period from June 1950 to December 1951.

Source: Technical Assistance Committee, *Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Reports to the Technical Assistance Board* (United Nations).

by mutual security arrangements with the U. S., the Afghan government had no choice but to yield. Interestingly enough, it was the Afghan government which had warned the UN over a year before about the probable outcome of such a project if the UN failed to select teams of "neutral" nationality (e.g., Swiss, Swedes). Although the government of the Soviet Union has since let it be known that it would not object to "neutral" oil-drilling teams, the project, so vital to the Afghan economy, has remained in abeyance. Thus, there is some justice to the Afghans' claim that outside of health and agriculture, they failed to obtain the maximum benefits from the UN program.<sup>3</sup> Yet, had it not been for the UN's health and agriculture projects, increase in cotton production and maintenance of rice and wheat production would have been difficult to achieve.

The U. S. Point Four program, though working with a larger budget, faced far harder tasks than did the UN teams (Table VI). Because the U. S. had a national stake in the Helmand valley through the Morrison-Knudsen contract and the Export-Import Bank loans, the Point Four agency was soon identified by the Afghans with the success or failure of the whole project. Moreover, the political leadership in Washington saw in assistance to the project a chance to demonstrate to the neighbors of Afghanistan the fruits of partnership with the U. S. Early U. S. preoccupation with the Helmand project was also influenced by the internal political situation in Afghanistan: the U. S. Ambassador and several visiting teams warned that failure to solve the problem associated with the Helmand project could result in political chaos and the loss of the bulk of the resources invested in it. There is evidence that this approach made some of the U. S. program planners blind to the need for more fundamental and far-reaching changes (such as in vocational education for agricultural extension) which could not be brought

<sup>3</sup> The refusal of the UN to participate in the Helmand valley program was based on a critical appraisal of its economic value, which led to a rejection of the Afghan request for technical aid in this connection.

Table VI: U.S. POINT FOUR PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN, 1951-1956

Fiscal Year(a)	(in thousands of dollars)			
	Technical Assistance Obligation	Expenditure	Development Assistance Obligation	Expenditure
1951	\$ 64	\$ 29	—	—
1952	258	38	—	—
1953	717	251	\$1,500(b)	\$1,397
1954	1,341	788	1,150(c)	445
1955	1,903	1,350	—	765(d)
1956 (proj.)	2,000	—	—	—

(a) July 1-June 30.

(b) Wheat loan.

(c) Wheat and flour gift.

(d) Includes \$377,000 for freight.

Source: ICA, *Operations Report*, November 16, 1955.

about by advisers far off in the valley. It also made them unaware of the need to attain objectives which would show immediate results, both to the people in the valley and in other parts of the country.

In the spring of 1955 the U. S. Point Four agency apparently felt the need for a re-orientation and recognized that only by putting encouraging tangible results before the people in short order (while the long-run projects continued) could responsible government be made strong and the resistance to ideologies inimical to freedom and democracy be reinforced. Thus its 1955 and 1956 objectives aim at agricultural extension work outside the Helmand valley, especially in areas plagued by famine; also at revamping the basic vocational training institutions (Agricultural School, Institute of Technology) and at modernizing the teacher training system. By mid-1955 three major Point Four teams were busy: (1) the Helmand Valley advisers, assisting on engineering, health, and farm and community aspects of the irrigation and reclamation program; (2) the University of Wyoming team, concentrating on agricultural education and extension, both at the center and in demonstration stations in the field; (3) the Columbia Teachers College team, working on teacher training curricula. Late in 1955, the Near East Foundation entered the picture through a contract with the Point Four agency which envisages a small community development center in which village-level workers will be trained.<sup>4</sup>

Afghan officials have correctly pointed out that the effort of the UN teams was dissipated over too many areas while the U. S. team became enmeshed in difficulties because it concentrated too long on too few projects. On the side of the U. S. and UN teams, it is frequently pointed out that the Afghan government could not spare enough technicians who could understudy foreign experts and take over after their departure. As UNESCO's mission in 1949 pointed out, the problem of transferring new techniques is basically a question of human resources which have to be adapted to the new technology.

#### *RUSSIAN TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE*

Ever since the first Bolshevik government so promptly recognized the independence of Afghanistan after World War I, relations with the Soviet Union have been conducted on a correct business basis. The volume of trade, carried on by state-controlled agencies, accounted for about 20 to 25 percent of Afghan exports and imports. Agreements providing the basis for the barter trade have been regularly renewed, the last in December 1953 calling for a 30 percent increase in the volume of trade over the preceding year.

But since the present Afghan government took over in September 1953,

<sup>4</sup> Earlier projects on which U. S. technical assistance is continuing include the modernization of the coal mines, which bogged down in procurement red-tape.

economic contacts have become more intensive. This development is in part a response to the favorable commercial offers made by the Russians: the price to be paid for Afghan cotton and wool was higher than that from other supply sources, and the prices charged the Afghans for petroleum products and sugar were lower. Moreover, to facilitate the transfer of gasoline and kerosene, large storage tanks had been built in 1951 near the Oxus River. Similarly, when the Soviet Union blocked the UN oil-drilling project, it offered larger quantities of gasoline so that rationing in Afghanistan could be eased.

As a result of the recurrent political strife with Pakistan, Afghanistan's age-old dreams of a free zone in the port of Karachi have collapsed. Moreover, the Afghan government has come to realize that little support can be expected from the U. S. in relation to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the government, although headed by a man who as patriot and former Minister of War committed himself to the independence of the Pathans from Pakistan, did not immediately turn to the Soviet Union. It first made several attempts to free itself from the threat of economic isolation. One of these was the negotiation of a right of way across Iran to the port of Chahbar on the Persian Gulf, a project which would require the improvement of 3,600 miles of Iranian roads. When renewed difficulties with Pakistan in May 1955 made a short-term solution to the transit problem imperative, the Soviet Union countered with more favorable transit conditions through its own territories.

The arrangement by which Russia is currently undertaking the construction of grain silos, flour mills and bakeries, a cement plant, more gasoline tanks, the paving of the Kabul streets (rejected by the U. S.), and the exploration of a pipeline across the Oxus in exchange for cotton and wool, to be delivered over a five-year period, appears to the Afghans as nothing more than a realistic use of their limited bargaining power. Yet it must be recognized that the repayment of the loans, including that for a \$5-million cement plant from Czechoslovakia, represents a commitment of between \$10 and \$15 million. This will require the earmarking of perhaps 15 percent of the exportable quantity of the wool and cotton crop, and considerable quantities of opium, sesame seed, dried raisins, and skins. The Russians have agreed to accept Afghan currency if not enough goods are available at the time. Further Soviet participation in the installation of irrigation works, power stations, and other projects over a period of at least 10 years is indicated by the \$100 million credit offer made on December 18, 1955.

So there emerges a close economic link between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union which, however, has grown out of the urgent desire for a higher standard of living rather than political predilections. For during the past year the Finance Minister also visited Japan, with the result that Japanese-Afghan corporations will establish power stations and industrial plants in the very northern regions where the Russian aid program has been con-



centrated. Long-term credit arrangements are envisaged and Japanese experts have visited Afghanistan for the first time since before the war. Similarly, the above-mentioned Afghan government's arrangements with German business, reflecting the pre-war pro-German sentiments of government officials, businessmen, and the population at large, are no less favorable to Afghanistan than are those with the Russians. That the government of Afghanistan cannot find equally attractive offers from American business is deplorable. But to conclude from all this that the Afghans have taken a firm position on the checkerboard of international political alignments is to ignore the persuasive influence of economic backwardness and economic encirclement.

The approach that U. S. policy makers seem to be following in the face of these intensified economic links between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan does not indicate adherence to a pre-fabricated formula. There is no likelihood that an economic-aid race is to ensue, in which the U. S. would try to outstrip the Soviet Union. Nor is there evidence to indicate that the Afghans will use one as a bargaining weapon against the other.

Nor should it be expected that the U. S. will reduce its aid program as a result of, or in response to, the arrangements with the Russians. The long range technical assistance rendered by the U. S. (and the UN for that matter) differs fundamentally from the work the Russians are doing. The former attempts, in cooperation with the Afghans, to change the existing state of technology on the farms, in the hospitals, and in the schools, and to train Afghans in developing their partly idle resources. The financial aid rendered by the U. S. is primarily designed to add to the resource potential, which improved technology must then convert into reality. There need be no conflict between this type of assistance and the gasoline tanks, grain silos, bakeries, cement plant, and street improvements the Russians are delivering. To the contrary, it is likely, if not probable, that the diversification of the U. S. Point Four program and the new emphasis on immediate and tangible results outside the Helmand valley may have been influenced by the Russian offers. If so, this can be only in the interests of Afghan economic development.

However, the concurrent operation of UN, U. S., and USSR teams in this small country, still confined to a narrow economic base, will require most delicate handling by the Afghan government. Similarly, the Afghan commitment to repay the Soviet Union in goods (which the UN and U. S. Point Four aid programs do not require) will put a strain on the international economic position of the country and must influence its future creditworthiness. Further U. S. credits and the hoped-for advances from the International Bank will depend on a most difficult appraisal of the long-run impact which the new economic relations with the Soviet Union may have on the ties which link Afghanistan so strongly with the free world economy.

## DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

### Israel, Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact

**E**GYPT'S ARMS purchase agreement with Czechoslovakia, made public on September 27, was followed two weeks later by Iran's announcement that it would become a signatory to the Baghdad Pact. Iran joined the other parties to the pact at their initial meeting in Baghdad on November 21-22, when permanent military and economic committees and a secretariat were set up. The second meeting was scheduled to be held in Tehran in April. The United States, although a prime instigator of the defense system expressed through the pact, remained outside the organization while maintaining close liaison with it.

In opposition to the Baghdad Pact, Syria finally concluded a Mutual Defense Pact with Egypt on October 20, and Saudi Arabia followed suit with a similar agreement on the 27th. The joint command of designated forces of these three states was placed in the hands of Major General Amir, the Egyptian army commander; an attack upon one would be considered an attack upon all. Politically, these bilateral agreements were directed against Iraq; militarily, against Israel.

In the meantime, Israel was attempting to bolster its military strength through the purchase of "defensive" arms in the West. Ambassador Eban opened the question with the Department of State in Washington on October 11, and on the 26th Prime Minister Sharett flew to Paris and Geneva to appeal personally to U. S. Secretary of State Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, but without any concrete result. On November 16, two weeks after Ben-Gurion had returned as Prime Minister, a formal request for arms was presented to the United States.

On the night of December 11-12, before the U. S. had announced its decision on this request, Israel launched still another major reprisal raid, this time on Syrian positions

above the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias. Fifty-six Syrians and 6 Israelis were killed in the fighting. The Israeli justification for the raid was retaliation for Syrian sniping at fishing vessels on the lake. Lake Tiberias is entirely within the limits of Israel, which at this point, by virtue of the armistice agreements of 1949, coincide with the former borders of Palestine. However, in mandate days, Syrians living close to the lake shore were permitted to cross the 10-meter strip of Palestine territory bordering the eastern shore in order to fish and water their flocks. Israel has offered to issue similar permits today, but the Syrians refuse to admit Israel's right to do so as this would imply recognition of Israel itself. Incidents arising from this situation had occurred in the past; however, Gen. Burns reported to the Security Council on December 21 that there had been no Syrian interference with Israeli vessels since the beginning of the fishing season in November. It was true that on December 10 Syrian positions had fired on an Israeli patrol boat, but without injury or damage. The Israeli raid, Burns asserted, was out of all proportion to the provocation and its explanation was only to be found in the long build up of tensions on the frontier.

The Israeli raid was followed closely—December 14 to 21—by a Jordanian cabinet crisis and five days of rioting. The crisis came in reaction to a premature attempt by a British government representative to persuade Jordan to sign a new treaty with Britain embodying the Baghdad Pact. The intensity and prolonged nature of the rioting was evidence of the depth of bitterness over Israel and its policy of retaliation. The addition of large numbers of Palestinians to the population of Jordan, following the annexation of Arab Palestine in 1949, weakened the relative importance of the country's dynastic tie with Iraq. Egypt and Syria were now the Arab champions against Israel and the attraction toward them strong. Saudi Arabia, moreover, offered to supply

Jordan with funds which would relieve it of the necessity of relying upon British financial support.

In Israel itself public criticism began to be levelled against Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, generally regarded as personally responsible for the Syrian raid. It was noted that the United States would now be little disposed to grant Israel even "defensive" arms. And whereas Syria's demand that Israel be expelled from the United Nations was extreme, it was not difficult to perceive a coolness toward Israel in international circles.

To offset this reaction, as well as to clarify the basis on which it would negotiate peace, Israel set forth the following proposals: (1) the granting of transit rights to neighboring countries across Israeli territory and the establishment of a free zone in the port of Haifa; (2) the payment of compensation to the Arab refugees; (3) collaboration in a unified development of the Jordan valley waters; (4) minor frontier adjustments to remove strategic and economic anomalies. Two points on which Israel refused to compromise and yet on which the Arab governments still insisted were: (1) the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Palestine if they so desired; and (2) the cession of territory. And aside from these specific differences, one major obstacle still stood in the way of any peace solution: the absence of any real impulse on the part of the Arab governments to make peace with Israel at all. For this, Israel's policy of reprisals had to shoulder a portion of the blame; nor did British and U. S. efforts to formulate a basis for negotiation bring a noticeable change in attitude.

### Breakdown of Buraimi Arbitration

The prolonged Buraimi dispute finally entered arbitration in Geneva on September 11. Both Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, the parties to the dispute (Britain representing the shaykhdoms of the Trucial Oman), submitted voluminous memorials but the proceedings themselves never reached the substantive stage. Britain charged the Saudi Arab member of the court with undue partiality, and his country with attempts to influence by bribery the Trucial shaykhs' loyalty to Britain and

with influencing the Pakistani member of the court during his pilgrimage to Mecca the previous month. The Saudi Arabs denied all of these charges, stating that so far as the Pakistani judge was concerned they had even refrained from giving him the gifts normally due such a distinguished pilgrim.

On September 16 Sir Reader Bullard, the British member of the court, resigned, thus forestalling publication of its decision on the charges, a decision which the Saudi Arabs asserted would have gone against Britain by a vote of 4 to 1. On October 26, following further British accusations of Saudi Arab attempts to win support for its case through bribery of strategically placed individuals, British-led Trucial Oman levies forced the Saudi Arab guards out of the Buraimi oasis. At the same time the British Government announced that it regarded a line well to the interior, first put forward in 1952, as a fair border, but by agreement with the local shaykhs would uphold an unspecified line somewhat more favorable to Saudi Arabia. This action was justified, in the eyes of the British, by a belief that prolonged negotiation with Saudi Arabia would only lead to gradual encroachment on the territory of the shaykhdoms under their protection. To the Saudi Arabs, on the other hand, it was evidence of the weakness of Britain's substantive case.

The Buraimi issue is far broader than the importance of this particular group of oases. It involves, first of all, the whole problem of determining the border between Saudi Arabia and the coastal dependent areas. It is the prospect of oil in this frontier area which has, perhaps more than anything else, made a settlement imperative. But beyond the border problem lies the question of the British—and Western—position in the Persian Gulf. The British wish to preserve the stable and relatively friendly situation which has prevailed along the coasts of Arabia since they entered into treaty arrangements with the various rulers in the course of the 19th century. Opposed to this is the growing Arab desire to free the whole Arab world from foreign political control. In addition to Saudi Arabia's claim to Buraimi, this pressure can be seen in Yemen's claims to a portion of the Aden Protectorate and in the Arab League's proposal to elect the Imamate of Oman to



membership as a sovereign state. This the British strongly oppose, asserting that the Imam owes allegiance to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The degree of the Imam's allegiance has been in question since the tribes of the interior revolted in 1915. The Sultan of Muscat is himself independent but has long leaned on the British for support in maintaining his authority along the coast; he is also in a treaty relationship with the British which effectively excludes other foreign intrusion. It is to offset Britain's support of the Sultan of Muscat that the Imam of Oman has turned to Saudi Arabia and beyond to the Arab League. The loss of Buraimi would mean not only a deep Saudi Arab penetration of the coastal borderlands but also a serious loss of British prestige in the other protected areas.

### New Stage in Franco-Moroccan Relations

Credit for breaking the Moroccan log jam must go to Thami el-Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakech. On October 25 he deserted the French-supported Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Arafa, whom he had helped to put on the throne in August 1953, and declared his allegiance to the exiled Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef. The Glaoui's decision was dictated by the realization, growing upon him since the massacres of the summer, that this alignment with the French in opposition to the Nationalist movement was costing him the allegiance of his Berber tribesmen. France's argument that the Nationalists represented only a portion of Moroccan sentiment now had no substance, and on November 5 it officially recognized Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef's reinstatement on the throne.

The time for building a Moroccan national government and clarifying its relation to France had now come. France for the first time declared the ultimate goal to be a "modern, free, and sovereign" Morocco, but within a framework of "interdependence" with France. The precise nature of this "interdependence" was the catch. But for the time being, with the French assembly recessed and general elections scheduled for January 2, there was no assurance as to what France's policy in practice would be.

As for Moroccan opinion, it is divided

into at least four groups. On the conservative side are the traditionalists, those who hold such a vested interest in the present state of affairs that they view any growth in Nationalist control a danger to their position. Next to them come the Democratic Independence Party, a numerically small group which calls itself nationalist, i.e., professing belief in independence, but with present emphasis on full collaboration with France. The interest of the members of this party appears to be more in the positions which have now opened up for them in the government than in the ultimate goal. The main body of the Nationalists—the Istiqlal—agreed to cooperate with them in the cabinet, and they were assigned 5 of the 18 positions announced on December 7, as against 8 for the Istiqlal (the remaining 5, including the Prime Minister, going to pro-nationalist independents). However, it was a tactical compromise made to get the government going and not the result of a meeting of minds.

The Istiqlal itself is divided into a moderate group, led by Ahmed Balafrej, and an extremist group, led by Allal el-Fassi, now in exile. The ultimate goal of genuine independence for Morocco is the same for both wings. The more moderate, however, believes that it must make the best of what it can get at the present stage, whereas the more extreme is distrustful of all French promises and believes that it must work now, through violence if other means fail, to get specific commitments and a schedule for their fulfillment. For the time being, the el-Fassi wing has agreed to give the moderates and the compromise government a chance. If the present cabinet, under the independent M'barek Bekkai, fails to bring concrete results, the extreme wing will call for a renewal of direct action to bring them about. In this it probably will be supported by the present moderates.

Pressures from a variety of directions constantly bear upon both the French advisers in Morocco and the new Moroccan cabinet, and it will be no easy task to hold together the various factions represented. It is here that Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef will play a crucial role. He has become the symbol around which Moroccan sentiment has crystallized; he must now demonstrate a combination of moderation, firmness, and timely initiative to maintain his authority.



## Chronology

SEPTEMBER 1—NOVEMBER 30, 1955

### General

1955

*Sept. 10:* Under the sponsorship of the Arab International Tourist Union, delegates from Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon met in Jerusalem to discuss methods of promoting tourism.

*Nov. 21:* The Prime Ministers of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey and Foreign Secretary Macmillan of Great Britain opened in Baghdad the first meeting of representatives of the Baghdad Pact. The U. S. established military and political liaison with the conference.

*Nov. 22:* The 2-day organizational meeting of the newly-named Council of the Baghdad Pact ended with the announcement that permanent military and economic committees and a secretariat would be formed in Baghdad. In addition, the Council would continue to function, with the ambassadors of each country to Iraq serving as members. The next meeting of the Council at the Foreign Ministers' level would occur in Tehran in April 1956. The U. S. would continue its informal association with the committees working in Baghdad.

### Afghanistan

(See also Pakistan)

1955

*Sept. 13:* Afghan and Pakistani officials joined in raising the Pakistani flag over the embassy in Kabul, thus marking the end of a dispute which had begun on March 30 when an Afghan crowd wrecked the embassy. The Afghan Foreign office, however, stated that it was not dropping its demand for "Pushtunistan."

*Nov. 20:* A 5-day meeting of the Lio Jirga (Grand Assembly of the Chieftains) ended with a resolution supporting the idea of a plebiscite to decide the future of the Pathan area disputed with Pakistan. It was also recommended that the government find means to re-establish the balance of power "which was upset by Pakistan's decision to accept arms aid" from the U. S. A third resolution announced the body's refusal to recognize "Pushtunistan" as a part of Pakistan.

### Algeria

1955

*Sept. 5:* More than 300 arrests were made in France as the government attempted to end agitation among Algerians living there. The French government also criticized the activities of "foreign inspirers" and specifically protested to the Syrian

government because of provocative broadcasts from Damascus. It was further announced that similar representations had been made to the Arab League on Sept. 2.

A nationalist band cut off the water supply for the city of Philippeville.

*Sept. 6:* Governmental authority in Philippeville and Constantine was transferred from civilian to military hands, although martial law was not declared.

Of those arrested on Sept. 5 in France, about 200 Algerians were flown to Algiers to stand trial for extortion to help finance nationalist activities.

*Sept. 13:* The French government outlawed the Algerian Communist party because of its support of recent nationalist activities. Police raided party offices throughout Algeria.

*Sept. 17:* Governor General Jacques Soustelle proposed that in the Sept. 27 meeting of the Algerian assembly new measures should be passed to substitute elected local councils for direct French administration in rural communities.

*Sept. 22:* The UN General Assembly's Steering Committee defeated the motion of 15 Asian and African nations that the Algerian situation be included on the Assembly's agenda.

*Sept. 25:* French troops and planes began a major offensive against terrorists on the edge of the Sahara, southeast of the Aurès mountains.

*Sept. 26:* Muslim representatives in the French National Assembly and in the Algerian Assembly announced plans to oppose Premier Faure's program for further integration between France and Algeria.

*Sept. 27:* Governor General Soustelle cancelled the scheduled meeting of the Algerian Assembly after the Muslim members had announced a boycott of the Assembly.

*Sept. 29:* By a vote of 28 to 27 with 5 abstentions, the UN General Assembly voted to overrule its Steering Committee and add the Algerian problem to the agenda. French Foreign Minister Pinay stated "my government will consider as null and void any recommendation which the Assembly might make in this connection."

*Oct. 1:* The French government ordered the withdrawal of its entire delegation from the General Assembly as a protest over the Algerian vote of Sept. 29.

*Oct. 12:* The French cabinet proposed several immediate reforms for Algeria, and promised a complete review in the near future of the 1947 statute bringing Algeria into the French Union. The immediate reforms would include a greater degree of local autonomy, redistribution to small owners

of land now being insufficiently used, separation of Muslim religious activities from state control, and increased school instruction in Arabic.

**Oct. 13:** Premier Faure opened a major parliamentary debate on Algeria. In discussing his program for Algeria, he listed the immediate reforms which had been announced on Oct. 12, emphasized the need to steer a middle course between assimilation and separation for Algeria, and promised free, democratic elections to provide a basis for future reforms.

**Oct. 18:** By a count of 308 to 254, Premier Faure's cabinet won a vote of confidence from the National Assembly on its Algerian policy.

**Oct. 22:** French troops continued heavy action against nationalists on the Algerian-Tunisian border.

**Nov. 25:** The UN General Assembly unanimously approved an Indian motion that it not "consider further the item titled 'The Question of Algeria.'" The French government immediately announced that its delegation would return for full participation in the Assembly.

**Nov. 26:** The French government announced that by the end of December, 16 additional infantry battalions and 3 armored squadrons would be sent to reinforce the troops already stationed in Algeria. It was also stated that 16 companies of Algerians would be formed, beginning in January 1956.

**Nov. 27:** French troops killed 30 nationalist rebels in scattered clashes in the Constantine area.

## Arab League

(See also Algeria)

1955

**Sept. 3-4:** The League's Political Committee met in Cairo. Discussion centered on the agenda for the UN General Assembly, nominations for vacant UN posts, the Palestine question, and the French position in North Africa. The members agreed to support Greece in the Cyprus dispute.

**Oct. 9:** The Foreign Ministers of the League countries met in Cairo.

**Oct. 13:** The Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, meeting as a subcommittee of the full Foreign Ministers committee, announced that they had studied the Jordan River development proposals of U. S. Ambassador Eric Johnston and had decided that the plans required further work and for this purpose had returned them to a committee of technicians.

**Oct. 15:** The League council of Foreign Ministers announced the adoption of several resolutions during its Cairo meeting: an Arab League flag was approved and arrangements were completed for the establishment of information offices in Latin America and the Far East. Various resolutions relating to Palestinian refugees and a unified passport for all Arab states were postponed until the next session of the council.

**Oct. 17:** The Arab League refused to reply to a British note in which it was claimed that Oman, which had applied for League membership, was not independent and thus not a potential member. The note had stated that Oman was under the jurisdiction of the Sultanate of Muscat.

**Nov. 5:** The League's Oil Committee opened a 4-day meeting in Cairo to discuss means of coordinating the oil policies of the member states, promoting the Arab oil industry, and combatting the smuggling of Arab oil into Israel.

**Nov. 16:** The Political Committee of the League, ending a 6-day special session called by Saudi Arabia to discuss the Buraimi oasis dispute, recommended that the occupying forces be withdrawn, that a new arbitration commission be formed, and that in the interim the oasis be under the jurisdiction of an international body. The committee also resolved to support the Amirate of Oman against outside dangers.

## Cyprus

1955

**Sept. 6:** In an attempt to break a stalemate in the London talks on Cyprus, British Foreign Secretary Macmillan suggested that gradual steps be taken to develop limited self-government on the island. The Cypriotes would eventually elect an assembly and have their own cabinet, although a British governor would continue to control defense and foreign affairs. Members of the Greek delegation agreed with the idea of self-government as a means for the islanders to gain practical experience, but resented the fact that Britain had not mentioned eventual self-determination for Cyprus.

**Sept. 7:** The Foreign Ministers' conference in London ended as Britain refused to modify its disapproval of eventual self-determination for Cyprus. Foreign Secretary Macmillan recommended that the three governments involved (Britain, Greece, Turkey) set up a committee to oversee the establishment of limited self-government on the island.

**Sept. 9:** The British government announced that it intended to go ahead with plans for limited self-government on Cyprus, despite the lack of approval on this subject at London. At the same time, reinforcements were sent to the 4,000 British troops already on Cyprus.

**Sept. 12:** Over 600 demonstrating Cypriote Greeks stoned major buildings in Limassol.

**Sept. 15:** The British government on Cyprus outlawed the Greek political action group EOKA (National Organization of Cypriote Fighters). British troops raided five villages to collect hidden arms.

**Sept. 17:** Riots broke out in Nicosia and several villages; the British Institute building in Nicosia was gutted in a fire started by the demonstrating crowds.

**Sept. 19:** One of the two Cypriote members of the government's Executive Council resigned in pro-

test over British opposition to self-determination for Cyprus.

*Sept. 21:* The UN General Assembly's Steering Committee rejected, by a vote of 7-4, a Greek proposal that the Cyprus issue be included on the Assembly's agenda.

*Sept. 23:* By a count of 28-22, the General Assembly upheld its Steering Committee in refusing to add the question of Cyprus to its agenda.

*Sept. 25:* Britain appointed Field Marshal Sir John Harding, retiring chief of the Imperial General Staff, as Governor of Cyprus and commander of British forces on the island.

*Sept. 29:* Thousands of Greek Cypriotes left their jobs in a 24-hour general strike. Demonstrating groups clashed with police in several towns, and British authorities arrested 121 of the strikers.

*Oct. 11:* Governor Harding announced the breakdown of talks with Archbishop Makarios. It had been hoped that the talks would lead to an agreement ending the recent violence on the island, thus making possible the first steps toward self-government for the Cypriotes.

*Oct. 25:* A 3-man board of British officials under the chairmanship of Governor Harding was put in charge of the security of the island.

*Oct. 26:* Students in Famagusta demonstrated against a new dusk-to-dawn curfew.

*Oct. 27:* Nearly 2,000 persons rioted in Nicosia until subdued by tear gas.

*Oct. 28:* Riots broke out and British troops were called into action in 6 towns as a result of a government ban on demonstrations marking the 15th anniversary of Greece's rejection of the Italian ultimatum in World War II.

*Nov. 5:* Archbishop Makarios, before leaving for a visit to Greece, announced a modification in his demands for Cypriote self-determination: if Britain would accept the idea of self-determination for some unfixed future date, then the Greeks of Cyprus would be willing to cooperate with Britain in ending terrorism and establishing local self-government.

*Nov. 19-24:* Demonstrations in favor of *enosis* continued. Four British soldiers were killed.

*Nov. 26:* Governor Harding declared a state of emergency on the island. The death penalty was provided for illegally carrying firearms or explosives.

## Egypt

(See also Arab League, Palestine Problem, Sudan, Syria)

1955

*Sept. 1:* Five days of talks between Egyptian officials and Lebanese Foreign Minister Franjijah ended with the two countries agreeing to consult and exchange information on all matters relating to defense, foreign policy, and public security.

*Sept. 6:* Egypt and Russia signed a barter agreement by which Egypt would exchange 60,000 tons

of the current rice crop for 500,000 tons of crude oil from Russia.

Twelve members of the 44-man Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church asked the government to remove Patriarch Anba Yusab II from office.

*Sept. 12:* An earthquake caused heavy damage in Cairo and other parts of the country.

*Sept. 14:* The cabinet approved the establishment of trade offices in Communist China.

*Sept. 21:* The government ordered the suspension of the Coptic Patriarch, Anba Yusab II, and called a meeting of the Holy Synod to select a 3-man committee to assume his functions.

*Sept. 24:* The government abolished, as of January 1, 1956, the entire system of Shari'a and non-Muslim religious courts.

*Sept. 27:* Egypt announced an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the exchange of cotton in return for arms. According to later information, the arms received would reach a total of about \$80 million, with the individual weapons priced at a fraction of their real value. The purchase, only a small part of which would be paid for in cash, would include 200 MIG jet fighters, 100 tanks, 6 submarines, and artillery.

The Alexandria cotton futures market reopened after being closed for nearly 3 years.

*Sept. 28:* U. S. Assistant Secretary of State George Allen flew to Cairo to discuss the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms purchase with Prime Minister Nasir.

*Sept. 29:* Britain sent official protests to Egypt over its arms agreement with Czechoslovakia.

*Oct. 10:* The Soviet ambassador to Egypt announced that his government was prepared to offer technical assistance to Arab countries.

*Oct. 20:* A Soviet ship arrived in Alexandria with the first shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia. A Communist Chinese ship unloaded arms at Suez.

An Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact was signed in Damascus. (For text, see p. 77.)

*Oct. 22:* Two experts from the International Bank arrived in Cairo to continue discussions regarding a loan for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.

Britain protested Egypt's unilateral invitations to the 7 nations selected to oversee the Sudan's process of self-determination. In the invitations, Egypt set forth terms of reference for the election without consulting Britain.

*Oct. 27:* Prime Minister Nasir and Amir Faysal, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, signed a 5-year defensive alliance in Cairo. The pact stated that an attack on either party would be considered an attack on both, that a supreme council, war council, and joint command would be established, and that the joint commander would exercise command only over those troops specifically assigned to him. (For text, see p. 77.)

*Nov. 2:* Deputy Prime Minister Gamal Salim was

given the additional function of Minister of Communications; Fathi Radwan, former Minister of Communications, was appointed Minister of National Guidance.

*Nov. 8:* The newly created Egyptian-Syrian Defense Council selected Maj. Gen. al-Hakim Amir, commander of the Egyptian army, as the first joint commander of the armies of the two nations.

*Nov. 10:* Britain and Egypt reached agreement on arrangements for the safe passage of British ships through the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, a point controlled by Egyptian military positions. Britain agreed to give advance notice for its ships entering the gulf.

*Nov. 11:* France announced its intention to resume the sale of arms, including jet fighters, to Egypt. The sale had been suspended two months before because of anti-French broadcasts from Cairo to French North Africa.

*Nov. 16:* Egypt warned the U. S. that if it filled the Israeli arms request, Egypt would be compelled to buy more arms elsewhere.

*Nov. 21:* Talks between the International Bank and an Egyptian delegation on financing the High Dam at Aswan opened in Washington.

*Nov. 24:* Egypt ended its press and radio attack on French activities in North Africa in exchange for France's resumption of shipments of previously ordered arms.

## Ethiopia

1955

*Oct. 3:* The Export-Import Bank of Washington approved a credit of \$24 million to be used by the Ethiopian government in the development of commercial air fields and aviation facilities.

*Nov. 3:* Ethiopia celebrated the 25th anniversary of Emperor Haile Selassie's coronation.

*Nov. 4:* Emperor Haile Selassie promulgated a new constitution replacing that of 1931. The constitution granted an elected parliament and a bill of rights, defined the rights of the Emperor (which still included a veto over all acts of Parliament), and stated that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the established state church. It was also announced that the first codification of Ethiopia's civil, penal, commercial, and maritime laws had been completed.

## India

1955

*Sept. 4:* The central committee of the Congress party recommended the termination of peaceful invasions of Portuguese Goa, thus ending its tacit approval of previous marches on the enclave.

*Sept. 5:* Leaders of the opposition Communist, Praja Socialist, and Hindu Communal parties rejected the Congress party's decision to ban further peaceful invasions of Portuguese colonies.

*Sept. 7:* The Indian Parliament approved the Congress party's renunciation of peaceful invasion. The resolution required that Indian troops prevent peaceful demonstrators from crossing the border into Goa.

*Sept. 9:* The U. S. offered India 10,000 tons of surplus wheat to assist in relief work among victims of recent floods.

*Sept. 11:* The Muslim party of Bombay state was dissolved. Its leaders recommended that all members join the Congress party.

*Sept. 12:* The lower house of Parliament approved a government-sponsored bill which included detailed regulations of the management of private industry. The bill was aimed at achieving more efficient management of businesses, greater protection for investors, and prevention against the growth of monopoly.

*Sept. 17:* Indian police turned back some 50 Communists attempting to march across the border into Portuguese Goa.

*Sept. 21:* The cabinet announced its decision to prevent all foreign news publications from printing editions in India.

*Oct. 8:* Thousands of refugees fled as serious floods continued from the Punjab north to the Himalayas.

*Oct. 9:* Prime Minister Nehru announced a plan completed by a 3-man study commission for the realigning of all state borders. According to this plan, India would be broken down into 16 administratively equal states instead of the present unequal 29 states. All but two of India's 14 major language groups would have a state of their own. The Prime Minister announced that the Congress party would back the plan when it was submitted to Parliament.

*Oct. 10:* Although India's reorganization plan was generally well accepted, Master Tara Singh, leader of the Sikhs, criticized the failure of the plan to include a separate state for the Sikhs. Also, in Bombay, some of the Marathi-speaking people denounced the plan because it did not give complete control of Bombay to Maharashtrians.

*Oct. 15:* The International Bank announced that discussions on the development of the Indus river would continue between India and Pakistan for another 6 months past the original deadline of Sept. 30.

*Nov. 9:* A committee of the Congress party announced a modification in the Indian reorganization plan issued on Oct. 10. Because of the demands of the Maharashtrians of central and western India for a state of their own, the previously announced Bombay state would be subdivided into a Marathi-speaking state, a Gujarati-speaking state, and a separate state for the city of Bombay.

*Nov. 18:* Prime Minister Bulganin and Communist party leader N. S. Khrushchev of the Soviet Union arrived in New Delhi for an official visit.

*Nov. 20:* About 100 persons were injured in Bombay city as a result of riots objecting to the pro-

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posal of Nov. 9 to make Bombay a state separate from that proposed for Marathi-speaking peoples.

*Nov. 21:* Bulganin and Krushchev, speaking before an informal joint meeting of the Indian Parliament, emphasized the agreement between India and the Soviet Union on international affairs.

## Iran

(See also General)

1955

*Sept. 19:* President Bayar of Turkey arrived in Tehran for a state visit.

*Sept. 25:* A special military court sentenced to death Morteza Yazdi, a founder of the outlawed Tudeh party.

*Oct. 8:* The Shah, opening the new session of the Senate, voiced Iran's need for regional security and a "friendly and neighborly" Soviet Union.

*Oct. 9:* Prime Minister Hussein Ala announced the appointment of 'Ali Qoli Ardalan as a Minister of State.

*Oct. 11:* Prime Minister Ala told the Senate that the cabinet had approved Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact of February 24, 1955, which previously included Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain, and Pakistan.

*Oct. 12:* The Soviet Union, in a note to Iran, said that Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact contradicted "the good-neighborly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union and certain treaty obligations of Iran."

*Oct. 16:* In reply to the USSR's note of Oct. 12, Iran said that the Soviet Union had misunderstood Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact, which was only a device for legitimate defense.

*Oct. 19:* The Senate approved Iran's participation in the Baghdad Pact by the affirmative vote of 39 of the 44 members present.

*Oct. 20:* The foreign affairs committee of the Majlis unanimously approved Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

*Oct. 31:* The Export-Import Bank of Washington announced the extension to Iran of a credit of \$780,000 to partially finance the cost of equipment for two electric power plants in Tehran.

*Nov. 17:* Prime Minister Ala was slightly wounded in an attempt to assassinate him in a Tehran mosque.

*Nov. 26:* The Soviet Union in a second note to Iran objected again to Iran's participation in the Baghdad Pact, saying that the step violated Iran's treaty obligations to the USSR.

## Iraq

(See also General, Palestine Problem)

1955

*Sept. 1:* A royal decree nationalized the Baghdad Light and Power Company, Ltd., and stated that compensation of 2 million dinars would be paid

the company. The decree ended a 50-year concession which was due to expire in 1978.

*Sept. 4:* Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement for full cooperation and exchange of information in combatting subversive and Communist activities. Iraq already had similar agreements with Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iran.

*Sept. 8:* Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id left for a 2-week visit in Turkey. During his absence Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud, Minister of Communications and Works, acted as Prime Minister.

*Nov. 14:* 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Tekerli was appointed Minister of Justice and Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud was transferred from the Justice Ministry to that for Development and Reconstruction.

## Israel

(See also Palestine Problem)

1955

*Sept. 16:* The Mapai, Ahdut Avodah, and Mapam parties agreed to join the new cabinet which Prime Minister-designate Ben-Gurion had been attempting to form. The parties stated that they hoped to include various non-socialist and religious parties in the coalition government.

*Sept. 22:* At a well near Huleikat, oil was struck in Israel for the first time.

*Oct. 11:* The Israeli ambassador to the U. S., Abba Eban, asked the Department of State to promise Israel whatever arms aid it needed to match the current shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia to Egypt. He said that under the U. S.-British-French arms declaration of 1950, the U. S. was committed to maintain a balance in the Middle East.

*Oct. 12:* An extraordinary meeting of the Knesset opened at the request of the opposition parties to discuss Israel's defense position in view of the Communist sale of arms to Egypt.

The Progressive Party announced its decision to participate in the Ben-Gurion Cabinet.

*Oct. 24:* A resolution in the Knesset expressing anxiety over the arming of Egypt and Iraq and calling on "the powers" to aid Israel with arms was approved by an 84 to 5 vote, all parties backing the motion except the Communists.

*Oct. 26:* Prime Minister Sharett flew to Paris for conferences with U. S. Secretary of State Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Macmillan on the possibility of arms aid for Israel.

*Oct. 27:* Prime Minister Sharett arrived in Geneva to continue his conferences at the Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting there. He said that he hoped Israel would not be forced into a preventive war against the Arabs.

*Oct. 31:* Prime Minister Sharett completed his talks in Geneva with an interview with the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister Molotov. No results of the meeting were announced.

*Nov. 1:* Prime Minister Sharett left Geneva for Jerusalem.

President Izhak Ben-Zvi appealed to Prime Minister-designate Ben-Gurion and the Hapoel Hamizrachi party to compromise their views so that the religious party could be included in Ben-Gurion's new government.

*Nov. 2:* David Ben-Gurion announced to the Knesset the composition of his new 5-party cabinet. The cabinet would include 9 Mapai members; 2 each from the Mapam, Hapoel Hamizrachi, and Ahdut Avoda parties; and 1 from the Progressive Party. The members were as follows:

David Ben-Gurion—Prime Minister, Defense  
 Moshe Sharett—Foreign Affairs  
 Zalman Aran—Education and Culture  
 Levi Eshkol—Finance  
 Yosef Burg—Posts  
 Mordecai Bentov—Development  
 Israel Barzilai—Health  
 Israel Bar-Yehuda—Interior  
 Moshe Carmel—Communications  
 Kaddish Luz—Agriculture  
 Golda Meyerson—Labor  
 Peretz Naphtali—Minister without Portfolio  
 Pinhas Sapir—Trade and Industry  
 Pinhas Rosen—Justice  
 Behor Shitreet—Police  
 Moshe Shapiro—Religious Affairs and Social Welfare

*Nov. 3:* Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's cabinet was approved in the Knesset by a vote of 73 to 32, with 3 abstentions.

*Nov. 16:* Israel formally submitted to the U. S. a request to purchase arms "under the most lenient conditions of credit and price." Details of the request were not made public, but it was understood to include 40 to 50 jet aircraft, heavy tanks, anti-submarine vessels, and anti-aircraft weapons.

## Jordan

(See also Arab League, Lebanon, Palestine Problem)

1955

*Sept. 8:* King Husayn returned to Amman after a 3-day visit with King Sa'ud.

*Sept. 23:* The government decided to nationalize the British Telegraphs and Wireless Company and entered into negotiations to buy the firm's equipment.

*Oct. 30:* Edwin W. Pauley, a U. S. oil developer, signed a 55-year agreement with the government under which Pauley would be granted 8 months to explore the country and then select an area one-third the size of the entire country for intensive oil explorations. In the event that oil should be discovered, profits would be divided on a 50-50 basis.

*Nov. 1:* King Husayn opened the new session of parliament.

*Nov. 3:* President Bayar of Turkey arrived in Amman for a state visit.

*Nov. 5:* Britain announced that it was supplying Jordan with 10 jet fighters, as well as personnel to train Jordanian pilots.

*Nov. 21:* Jordan announced that it would remain neutral in relation to the Baghdad Pact, the Syrian-Egyptian Defense Pact, and the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Defense Pact.

## Lebanon

(See also Arab League, Egypt, Palestine Problem)

1955

*Sept. 7:* Foreign Minister Hamid Franjiyah and Minister of Finance Pierre Edde resigned from the cabinet. The disagreement was thought to result from the Foreign Minister's recent negotiations with Egypt, at which he had agreed to cooperate with Egypt in certain matters of common interest.

*Sept. 13:* Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh resigned after 4 members of his cabinet had resigned during a heated parliamentary attack on the Prime Minister. President Chamoun asked Rashid Karami, Minister of Economy in the outgoing government, to form a new cabinet.

*Sept. 19:* Rashid Karami, the new Prime Minister, announced the make-up of his cabinet, as follows:

Rashid Karami—Prime Minister, Interior  
 Fu'ad Ghusn—Deputy Prime Minister, Justice  
 Amir Majid Arslan—Defense  
 Kazim al-Khalil—Post and Telegraph, Social Affairs  
 Salim Lahhud—Foreign Affairs  
 George 'Akl—Education, Information  
 Joseph Skaff—Agriculture  
 Nazih al-Bizri—Health, Economy  
 Jamil Shihab—Finance  
 Jamil al-Mikkawi—Public Works

*Nov. 4:* Italy and Lebanon signed a trade agreement under which barter trade would take place up to a limit of LL 8 million. Lebanon would export cotton yarn, iron ore, and fruit, and import woolen cloth, machinery, and automobiles. The agreement also provided for Italian investment in and economic aid to Lebanon.

*Nov. 12:* Lebanon and East Germany signed a trade and payments agreement under which Lebanon would export agricultural products and import manufactured goods.

*Nov. 19:* King Husayn of Jordan arrived in Beirut for a 6-day visit.

*Nov. 23:* British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, en route from Baghdad, stopped briefly in Beirut to urge the government to consider an economic tie with the Baghdad Pact powers even though it could not consider complete affiliation with the organization.

## Libya

1955

*Nov. 11:* A royal decree dissolved parliament and fixed January 8, 1956, as the date for new elections.

*Nov. 17:* Britain and the U. S. announced plans to present Libya with equipment for the development of an armored car squadron.

*Nov. 25:* Italy and Libya agreed to establish a mixed arbitration commission to exercise jurisdiction over questions arising between the two governments. This commission would replace a UN tribunal exercising the same function for the past 5 years. Italy and Libya would each appoint a member to the commission and a third member would be appointed by the Secretary General of the UN.

*Nov. 29:* The Libyan American Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Texas Gulf Producing Company, was granted an oil concession in Libya. If oil should be discovered, the agreement would require a payment to the government of 12½% royalty on all oil and gas up to 15,000 barrels a day. Above that point net profits would be shared on a 50-50 basis.

## Morocco

1955

*Sept. 2:* After an initial audience with Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, the new Resident General, Pierre Georges Boyer de Latour, visited the interior of the country, where he removed from office a number of French and Moroccan officials.

*Sept. 7:* The French delegation to discuss reform plans with ex-Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef on Madagascar gave an optimistic report on the chances of agreement with the former Sultan. The delegation was seeking approval of French plans for a regency council to replace Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa.

In Cairo, Allal al-Fassi, exiled leader of the Istiqlal party, condemned the French plan for Moroccan reform and insisted on the immediate return of ben Youssef to the throne. Al-Fassi thus openly broke with those Istiqlal leaders who had been negotiating with the French cabinet for the past month.

*Sept. 8:* Five Moroccans were killed in police counter-fire against native terrorists in Casablanca.

It was reported that former Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef had accepted the French reform proposals. With the completion of talks between the ex-Sultan and the French officials, the government permitted a nationalist delegation to fly to Madagascar.

*Sept. 10:* 'Abd al-Krim, exiled Moroccan nationalist leader, denounced from Cairo the plan for a regency council and demanded complete French evacuation of Morocco.

Gen. Georges Catroux, leader of the French delegation to Madagascar, said that France planned to create a free and sovereign state in Morocco which would be permanently tied to France by an act of "interdependence."

*Sept. 12:* The French cabinet gave final approval to Premier Faure's plan to remove the Sultan under honorable conditions, form a regency council, and negotiate with a representative Moroccan government for internal reforms.

*Sept. 14:* Disagreements within the French cabinet delayed the initiation of the plan approved on Sept. 12.

In Rabat, some 500 French *colons* protested the projected French policy in a demonstration before the residency.

*Sept. 15:* Delay in beginning the French plan for Morocco continued as the cabinet and Moroccan nationalists were unable to reach an agreement on the proposed regency council.

*Sept. 17:* Resident General Latour journeyed to Paris to participate in talks on the makeup of the regency council.

*Sept. 21:* Resident General Latour returned to Rabat with full authority from the French cabinet to settle the stalemated negotiations for a regency council.

*Sept. 22:* Three Moroccans were killed and 4 persons wounded during demonstrations in several cities in Morocco.

*Sept. 24:* The French Ministry of Defense recalled Pierre Montel, pro-*colon* chairman of the National Assembly's defense committee, who had been in Morocco inspecting defense arrangements.

*Sept. 26:* In a note to France, Spain stated that it should have equal rights with France in arranging any major change in the status of Morocco.

Moroccan stores in Marrakech and Fez closed in response to a strike call by nationalist organizations.

*Sept. 30:* Reports stated that Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa had finally agreed to abdicate, but only under several conditions, the most important of which was that he be succeeded by a member of his family rather than a regency council.

*Oct. 1:* Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa left Rabat for the International Zone of Tangier "without in any way renouncing our rights" to the throne. He left the "affairs of the crown" in the hands of his distant cousin, Moulay 'Abdullah ben Moulay 'Abd al-Hafid.

The French government issued its declaration of intentions for Morocco in which it was stated that Morocco should be given greater self-government responsibility, although at the same time recognizing the permanence of the link between France and Morocco.

Moroccan nationalist leaders indicated that they would not participate in any government under the Sultan's cousin.

*Oct. 2:* Nationalist attacks and demonstrations broke

out in a number of cities, being especially strong and organized in the north near the border of Spanish Morocco. French troops were immediately sent into action near Fez.

*Oct. 3:* Attacks against French posts by tribes from the Atlas Mountains, the most serious such incidents in recent days, were being brought under control by French troops.

The French government ordered Resident General Boyer de Latour to follow its instructions in arranging for a regency council to replace the Sultan.

*Oct. 4:* Moroccan guerrillas threatened the French command post at Aknoul, near the border of Spanish Morocco.

*Oct. 5:* The French government demanded that Spain take action to stop guerrillas in Spanish Morocco from entering the French zone.

*Oct. 6:* Attacks against the French from the Riff Mountains continued.

French Premier Faure dismissed four members of his cabinet because they disagreed with his policy of conciliation toward the Moroccan nationalists.

*Oct. 7:* The Istiqlal party proposed that it act as intermediary between French troops and guerrilla bands in the Riff Mountains if it were given "a political basis to work from."

*Oct. 8:* Lieut. Gen. Rafail Garcia Valino, High Commissioner for Spanish Morocco, said that he had strengthened patrols along the French Moroccan border in order to prevent aid from being given to rebel forces in the French zone.

A demonstration of French *colons* in Rabat brought about the resignation of François de Panafieu, chief assistant to the Resident General and a proponent of Premier Faure's moderate approach to the nationalists.

*Oct. 9:* Premier Faure, by a vote of 477 to 140, won approval in the National Assembly of his reform plan for Morocco. This plan included the abdication of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, the formation of a 3-man regency council, and the establishment of a representative government to negotiate with France on detailed reforms.

*Oct. 10:* A 24-hour general strike of French citizens, called by the *Présence Française*, proved effective in Morocco's major cities.

*Oct. 15:* Grand Vizier Hadj Mohammed al-Mokri officially declared the Sultan's throne to be vacant and announced the formation of a 4-man regency council to carry out the royal functions. The council, whose decisions would be "unanimous," would be comprised of al-Mokri; Si M'barek Bekkai, an independent nationalist; Si Tahar Ouassou, a Berber conservative selected by Resident General Latour; and Hadj Mohammed Sbihi, a neutral who was thought to be sympathetic toward the nationalists.

*Oct. 21:* The Istiqlal party announced its refusal to participate in a government operating under the regency council established on Oct. 15, which had

asked Fatmi ben Slimane to form a government. The Istiqlal's objection to the council was that it had been established under the authority of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, whom it did not recognize as a legitimate occupant of the throne. The Istiqlal also stated its program in relation to France: ben Moulay Arafa must renounce all his rights, the French should issue a statement showing their intention to lead Morocco toward a completely independent status, and there must be long-range plans for the abrogation of the protectorate treaty of 1912.

Nationalist demonstrations in Rabat led to the death of 3 Moroccans.

*Oct. 22:* Fatmi ben Slimane accepted the regency council's invitation to form a government. He said that his major aim would be to work out a new relationship between France and Morocco so that Morocco could exercise its full sovereignty while still guaranteeing the legitimate interests of France.

The Democratic Independent party announced its approval of the new regency council. The *Présence Française* joined the Istiqlal party in saying that the council was illegal, although giving different reasons for the illegality.

*Oct. 25:* Thami al-Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech, reversed his strong support of the French position in Morocco and stated that only with the return of ex-Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef to the throne would the Moroccan people be able to find "unity and calm."

*Oct. 26:* Moroccan religious leaders aligned themselves with Thami al-Glaoui and the Istiqlal party in favoring the return of ben Youssef. The *Présence Française* issued an announcement stating that it would no longer oppose ben Youssef's return if certain unnamed conditions were met.

*Oct. 30:* Exiled Sultan Sidi Mohammed Moulay ben Arafa abdicated and announced his hope that former Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef would be allowed to return to the throne.

*Oct. 31:* Ex-Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef arrived in Nice from his place of exile on Madagascar.

*Nov. 1:* Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef flew to Paris and conferred with Foreign Minister Pinay. After the talk, the former Sultan issued a statement in which he agreed to the French plan for "interdependence" between France and Morocco announced on Oct. 1. Ben Youssef received Prime Minister-designate Fatmi ben Slimane and the four members of the regency council.

*Nov. 2:* The 4-man regency council submitted its resignations to Mohammed ben Youssef.

The Istiqlal party announced that it would not participate in any government formed by Fatmi ben Slimane.

*Nov. 5:* The French cabinet officially recognized Mohammed ben Youssef's right to return to the Moroccan throne. The cabinet also reaffirmed its earlier decision to make Morocco a "modern, free,



and sovereign state" within a framework of "interdependence."

*Nov. 8:* Thami al-Glaoui, foe of the exiled Mohammed ben Youssef for the past several years, prostrated himself and asked the forgiveness of the now-reinstated Sultan.

*Nov. 9:* André Dubois, prefect of police in Paris, was appointed Resident General in Morocco, replacing Lieut. Gen. Boyer de Latour.

*Nov. 12:* Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef dismissed all viziers appointed to their posts by his predecessor, Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Araf.

*Nov. 16:* Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef arrived in Rabat, ending over two years of exile.

*Nov. 18:* Ben Youssef, in a major speech in Rabat, declared the end of the 43-year-old French protectorate over Morocco, saying that his first aim would be to form a responsible and representative government. He emphasized the need for a continuing close association with France, both for purposes of external defense and internal improvements.

*Nov. 19:* A series of shootings and mob actions occurred throughout the country. A deputy to the Pasha of Fez was killed in the Sultan's courtyard. In a village near Meknes, 4 persons were killed and 26 wounded, including 6 French police, in a clash between a demonstrating crowd and the police.

*Nov. 20:* Demonstrations continued in Morocco's cities, with deaths for the past 2 days totalling 14.

*Nov. 21:* A French army officer and civilian were killed in the Riff area near Fez. Resident General Dubois issued instructions that French military and civilian authorities should suppress by force all manifestations of violence.

*Nov. 22:* The Sultan appealed to the people to prevent further disorder.

*Nov. 23:* Resident General Dubois asked that the authorities in Spanish Morocco cooperate with the French in ending the recent incidents.

*Nov. 25:* Ahmed Balafrej, leader of the moderate wing of the Istiqlal party, announced his party's views toward future government organization. He had just returned from a meeting of Istiqlal leaders in Madrid participated in by the exiled Allal al-Fassi, leader of the more extreme nationalists. The Istiqlal's program would recognize the need for continued French control of Moroccan foreign and defense affairs in the immediate future. It would demand that the Istiqlal have at least twice as many cabinet posts as any other party, and that these include the Ministries of Interior and Justice.

*Nov. 26:* Berber guerrillas in the Riff area ambushed a military convoy, killing 15 French soldiers and wounding 10.

Allal al-Fassi was greeted by a huge crowd upon arriving in Tetuan, Spanish Morocco.

*Nov. 30:* M'barek Bekkai, a non-party nationalist and close associate of the Sultan, was appointed Prime Minister-designate. He immediately ac-

cepted the position and said he hoped to form his government within the next week.

## Pakistan

(See also General, Afghanistan)

1955

*Sept. 9:* The government announced that final agreement had been reached with Afghanistan on the "flag incident" of March 30. No details of the agreement were released.

*Sept. 10:* Hussayn Shaheed Suhrawardy, leader of the opposition Awami League, charged the Muslim League with a long series of fraudulent and illegal actions in the recent elections for provincial legislators. It was these legislators who had selected the members for the new National Assembly.

*Sept. 11:* Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed 'Ali charged that both India and the UN had failed in the agreed plan for a Kashmir plebiscite.

*Sept. 19:* Governor General Ghulam Mohammed resigned. He was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza, who had been acting Governor General since Aug. 7.

*Sept. 22:* Khan Sahib, Minister of Communications, was urged to resign from the cabinet by followers of his brother, Khan 'Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, leader of the tribesmen in the North-West Frontier Province, who had been arrested the previous week because of his opposition to the government's bill to unify all of West Pakistan.

*Sept. 23:* Pakistan became the fourth signatory to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact of Feb. 24, 1955.

*Sept. 26:* Two cabinet positions which Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed 'Ali had been temporarily occupying were filled by members of the United Front party from East Pakistan. Hamidul Huq Choudhury became Foreign Minister and Akshay Kumar Das, a Hindu, was made Minister of Economic Affairs.

*Sept. 29:* The new Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq Choudhury, stated that his official acts would be based on a "spirit of friendship" with the Soviet Union. He also voiced approval of Egypt's request for arms from Communist countries.

*Oct. 3:* The Governor General signed the bill uniting West Pakistan into one province after the assembly had approved the measure by a vote of 40 to 13, with 27 abstentions.

*Oct. 14:* A united West Pakistan province came officially into existence. Mustaq Ahmed was sworn in as governor and Khan Sahib as chief minister.

*Oct. 17:* Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed 'Ali announced several changes in his cabinet. Syed Amjad 'Ali, former ambassador to the U. S., took over the Finance Ministry from the Prime Minister. Fazlul Huq, Minister of Interior, was given the additional portfolio of Minister of Education after the resignation of Syed Abid Hussayn from that post. Malikur R. Kayani was appointed Minister of Communications, succeeding

- Khan Sahib, the new chief minister for West Pakistan.
- Oct. 18:* Pakistan recalled its ambassador to Afghanistan following a similar step by Afghanistan on Oct. 14, taken in protest against the forming of a united West Pakistan.
- Oct. 22:* The opposition Awami League party opened its membership to non-Muslims, the first major Pakistani party to do so.
- Oct. 23:* An Awami League conference unanimously adopted a resolution disapproving Pakistan's treaty ties to the U. S., the Baghdad Pact powers, and the members of SEATO.
- Nov. 17:* The U. S. and Pakistan announced agreement on the use of about \$20 million of assistance funds to improve Pakistan's highways, air bases, and port facilities.
- Nov. 26:* Thousands of citizens demonstrated in Karachi demanding that Pakistan work to gain complete control of Kashmir.
- Nov. 29:* Twelve members of the parliamentary opposition, including Husayn Shaheed Suhrawardy, leader of the Awami League, walked out of the National Assembly to protest the Prime Minister's refusal to interfere with the arrest of two members of the Assembly by the East Pakistan government.
- Nov. 30:* It was announced that Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed 'Ali would visit China in April 1956.

## Palestine Problem

1955

- Sept. 1:* Prime Minister Sharett of Israel stated that there would be no further attacks against Egypt provided that all forms of Egyptian attacks ceased. The Egyptian government said that it was considering the Israeli cease-fire request.
- Two Egyptian jet fighters were lost in action near Gaza, Israel claiming that the planes had been shot down.
- Sept. 2:* Iraq offered full military and other aid to Egypt in the event of an Israeli attack on the Gaza strip.
- Sept. 3:* There was a heavy exchange of mortar fire along the Gaza border. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, UN truce supervisor, immediately requested that both sides accede to his cease-fire request. Israel announced its acceptance of this request.
- Gen. Burns cabled UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld requesting that the Security Council take action to prevent further Israeli-Egyptian hostilities.
- Sept. 4:* Egypt joined Israel in accepting General Burns' proposal for a cease-fire.
- Jordan announced that if Israel should break the armistice with Egypt, then Jordan would consider its truce with Israel ended.
- Sept. 6:* The Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission condemned both Israel and Egypt for violations of the armistice on Aug. 22, leading to

nearly two weeks of violence and about 70 deaths in the Gaza area.

- Sept. 7:* Gen. Burns recommended to Secretary General Hammarskjöld that a kilometer-wide demilitarized zone marked by barbed wire be established in the Gaza area. This was in effect a slight modification of one part of the over-all truce plan that Gen. Burns had been presenting for several months.
- Sept. 8:* The UN Security Council unanimously approved a British-French-U. S. resolution calling on Israel and Egypt to cooperate with Gen. Burns in fixing tighter border controls.
- Sept. 9:* Israel announced its willingness to cooperate with Gen. Burns in additional negotiations as urged by the UN Security Council.
- Sept. 10:* The Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission censured Jordan for a series of sabotage incidents on Sept. 6, but the UN member of the commission complimented Jordan for its earnest efforts to halt such actions.
- The Egyptian War Ministry announced new regulations for shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. According to these all ships sailing in Egyptian territorial waters must obtain permission at least 72 hours before the ship entered the Gulf.
- Sept. 11:* The Israeli Foreign Ministry challenged the Egyptian-imposed regulations on shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. The spokesman said that international law guaranteed equal rights at the entrance to a gulf.
- Sept. 13:* Civilian raiders from Lebanon crossed the border into Israel and planted several delayed action bombs.
- Sept. 14:* Lebanon allowed Israeli police to cross the border in their search for the group of raiders of Sept. 13.
- Israeli Prime Minister Sharett said in an interview that the proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem made by U. S. Secretary of State Dulles on Aug. 26 were constructive, but they raised several important questions. Chief among these was the need for assurance that the Arabs would use the proposed reimbursement money for the refugees as intended. In addition there was the matter of payment for Jewish property which had been abandoned in Arab countries and the problem of the Arab boycott and blockade of Israel. The Prime Minister stated that Israel would never surrender any of its territory in the suggested redefining of borders.
- Eric Johnston, special Ambassador from the U. S. on Jordan valley development, arrived in Cairo and went into immediate session with Egyptian officials.
- Gen. Burns began talks in Cairo, where the Egyptian government said it was considering the UN proposal for a neutral zone and barrier along the Gaza border.
- Sept. 19:* The UN Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Egypt for its raid into Israel on Aug. 25.
- Sept. 20:* Egyptian troops withdrew 500 meters from

the Gaza border and began erecting barbed wire fences along stretches of the new line. The Egyptian government stated that this served as Egypt's answer to Gen. Burns' request for a neutral zone between Egypt and Israel, and that it was now up to Israel to demonstrate equal goodwill.

*Sept. 21:* Israeli troops entered the demilitarized zone of al-'Awja in the southern Negev. The Foreign Ministry stated that the troops would remain until Egypt had withdrawn two military groups alleged to be in the zone in violation of the armistice agreement. Gen. Burns strongly protested the action to the Israeli government.

*Sept. 22:* Arab infiltrators killed three passengers on a bus 8 miles south of the Lebanese border, according to an Israeli announcement.

Israel apologized for having seized the UN headquarters building in al-'Awja but refused to withdraw from the demilitarized zone until Egypt had given up its two nearby outposts.

*Sept. 25:* Prime Minister-designate Ben-Gurion declared that Israel would open the Gulf of Aqaba to its use within a year even if force were needed.

*Sept. 30:* The Lebanese government began to move all refugees without a passport back at least 6 miles from the Israeli border.

*Oct. 2:* Both Israeli and Egyptian troops were withdrawn from al-'Awja.

*Oct. 3:* Egypt protested to UN officials that Israel had left policemen behind when its troops had abandoned al-'Awja.

*Oct. 9:* The exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, announced his complete opposition to the Jordan River development plans being put forth by U. S. Ambassador Eric Johnston.

*Oct. 10:* Israel charged that Egypt was maintaining military posts on the Sinai peninsula which were larger than those permitted under the 1949 armistice.

*Oct. 12:* Eric Johnston flew from Cairo to Jerusalem after failing to dissuade Arab leaders from deferring action on the Jordan River development plans.

*Oct. 13:* Jordan announced, with the approval of Egypt, that new regulations would require 4 days' prior notice for ships entering the port of Aqaba.

*Oct. 16:* Egyptian troops fired on an Israeli patrol as it approached an Egyptian check point near the demilitarized zone of al-'Awja. According to Israel, the Israeli soldiers were escorting UN officials.

Minor clashes on both the Syrian and Jordanian borders were reported by Israel.

*Oct. 19:* In a report to the UN General Assembly, Henry R. Labouisse, head of UNRWA, wrote that only if Palestinian refugees were given the choice between repatriation to Israel or compensation for their old lands, would they cease to oppose long-term resettlement plans for their future.

*Oct. 22:* Israel informed the U. S. that it would

postpone for the immediate future any independent attempt to begin development of the Jordan River water.

Israeli troops raided Syrian territory in retaliation for the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier several days before.

*Oct. 26:* Gen. Burns arrived in New York to report to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold.

Egyptian forces occupied but soon withdrew from an Israeli post near the demilitarized zone of al-'Awja.

*Oct. 27:* Israel charged that Egypt had established a military post within the al-'Awja demilitarized zone. An Egyptian announcement stated that Israel was illegally maintaining troops in the vicinity of al-'Awja.

Israel claimed that a Syrian patrol had penetrated the demilitarized zone in the Dan area, but had been thrown back.

*Oct. 28:* Israel, retaliating, as it said, for Egyptian actions at al-'Awja, attacked an Egyptian post at al-Kuntilla, on the Egyptian side of the old Palestinian boundary halfway between al-'Awja and the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel claimed 10 Egyptians killed and 20 prisoners taken before the patrol withdrew behind the border.

*Oct. 29:* Egypt raided the Israeli settlement at Nirim, northwest of al-'Awja near the Gaza strip.

*Oct. 30:* Israel reported that Egypt had opened fire on Israeli troops at three points along the Gaza border.

*Oct. 31:* Israel announced that it had repelled an Egyptian raid in the Nirim area.

Gen. Burns said in New York that he thought "some action" was required by Britain, France, and the U. S. to deal with the current situation in Palestine.

*Nov. 1:* Israel announced that it had killed 3 Egyptian attackers near Beersheba.

*Nov. 2:* Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel, in a speech presenting his cabinet to the Knesset, offered to meet with Arab leaders in an attempt to avert the threat of war. Egypt refused the invitation.

*Nov. 3:* Israeli forces attacked an Egyptian position at al-Sabha, near the border of the al-'Awja demilitarized area. Each side claimed an important victory with heavy casualties for its opponents.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold sent new and secret peace proposals to both Egypt and Israel. He also stated his "grave concern" over the nature of the Israeli military action at al-Sabha earlier in the day and protested against Israel's restrictions on the movements of UN observers before and during the battle.

Egypt admitted that it had "inevitably" advanced some "check posts" into the al-'Awja demilitarized zone several days before, but denied that this was sufficient reason for the Israeli attack on al-Sabha, as claimed by the Israelis.

Britain protested the Israeli military action at al-Sabha.



**Nov. 5:** Lebanese sources reported that Syrian troops had shot down an Israeli plane. Egyptian-Israeli exchange of fire continued both at the Gaza strip and near al-'Awja.

**Nov. 6:** Israel claimed that Egypt was maintaining troops in prohibited numbers on the Egyptian side of the al-'Awja zone. Under the armistice agreement, Egypt was permitted to maintain only check posts in that area.

**Nov. 8:** Egypt claimed that it had repulsed an Israeli attack against a frontier post near Elath. Israel said that one of its patrols had been ambushed there.

**Nov. 9:** President Eisenhower warned against the dangers of an arms race in the Middle East, and said that the U. S. would continue to consider only requests for arms "needed for legitimate self-defense."

In London, Prime Minister Eden, speaking of the Palestine conflict, offered to do "anything that we can do to help . . . for the sake of peace." Although not definitely mentioned, it was understood that he was offering British services to mediate in the threat of a renewed war.

**Nov. 12:** Prime Minister Nasir of Egypt said that Prime Minister Eden's speech of Nov. 9 marked the first time that a major Western leader had taken a constructive attitude toward the Palestine controversy.

Gen. Burns arrived in Cairo to discuss with Egyptian officials the Nov. 3 peace proposals of UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld. Although the details of the plan were not made public, it was announced that Egypt objected to the proposals because they included the assumption that the al-'Awja demilitarized zone belonged to Israel. Egypt contended that al-'Awja must remain neutral and demilitarized until its ownership could be determined.

**Nov. 13:** An Israeli official said that Israel, in order to further a peace settlement, was still prepared to grant the Arabs transit routes across Israel, the use of free port facilities at Haifa, and compensation for lands left by Arab refugees. Israel was not prepared, he said, to surrender any of its territory.

**Nov. 14:** Israel offered to exchange 90 Egyptian and Syrian prisoners for 8 Israeli soldiers held by the Arab states.

**Nov. 15:** Jordan and Israel agreed that their border would be opened during the Christmas season to permit Christians within Israel to visit Bethlehem.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel rejected Prime Minister Eden's offer of Nov. 9 to mediate the Palestine controversy. Ben-Gurion said that the British proposal would "truncate the territory of Israel for the benefit of its neighbors."

**Nov. 16:** Israel indicated its conditional acceptance of the secret UN peace proposals of Nov. 3.

**Nov. 18:** Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban in New York rejected the UNRWA proposal of Oct. 19 that the Arab refugees be given a choice between

repatriation to Israel or compensation for their former lands.

Jordan charged that an Israeli patrol had crossed the border in an attempt to kidnap some Arab farmers. One Israeli soldier was killed.

**Nov. 22:** Israel reported 4 Egyptian attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians in the al-'Awja and Gaza areas.

**Nov. 23:** Egypt charged that an Israeli infantry force had attacked an Egyptian base in the Gaza strip during the night.

**Nov. 30:** The UN's special political committee approved by a vote of 38 to 0 a resolution appealing to the member governments to continue their financial support for UNRWA. The resolution also expressed "grave concern" that no permanent solution to the refugee problem had been found. Seventeen nations, including the Arab members, abstained on the vote.

## Saudi Arabia

(See also Arab League, Egypt)

1955

**Sept. 11:** The arbitration board of 5 members appointed to settle conflicting claims to the Buraimi oasis opened its hearings in Geneva. Sir Hartley Shawcross, who began the British presentation, claimed widespread bribery was being used by the Saudi Arabs to win the favor of local rulers.

**Sept. 16:** Sir Reader Bullard, British member of the Buraimi arbitration board, resigned on the ground that the Saudi Arabian member, Yusuf Yasin, had "hopelessly compromised the position of the tribunal" by acting as a member of the Saudi government rather than "as an impartial arbitrator."

**Sept. 21:** King Sa'ud expressed regrets that Sir Reader Bullard had resigned from the arbitration board, thus making completion of its work impossible. He hoped that a new appointment would be made soon.

**Sept. 30:** The Ministry of Finance solicited bids for a Riyadh-Medina-Jidda railway.

**Oct. 4:** The British government charged Saudi Arabia with "deliberate, systematic and persistent" bribery in attempting to win possession of the Buraimi oasis.

**Oct. 26:** Saudi Arabian troops were forced out of the Buraimi oasis and other areas to the west by British-led Arab levies from the Trucial Coast. In announcing the action, British Prime Minister Eden said that a fair boundary would be the "1952 line," but that Britain was willing to "uphold a line which is more favorable to Saudi Arabia."

**Oct. 27:** Saudi Arabia complained to the UN Security Council that Britain was responsible for the Oct. 26 attack on the Buraimi oasis.

**Oct. 30:** Saudi Arabia called for an emergency meeting of the Arab Leagues' political committee to discuss the occupation of Buraimi on Oct. 26.

**Nov. 12:** It was announced that Saudi Arabia had



asked Britain to agree to the creation of an international commission to be sent to the Buraimi oasis to study a settlement.

*Nov. 24:* Britain rejected the Saudi Arabian suggestion for a neutral arbitration commission, saying that this approach had already failed.

## Sudan

(See also Egypt)

1955

*Sept. 17:* The official inquiry into the August mutiny in the southern Sudan opened.

*Sept. 30:* Britain and Egypt announced an agreement to remove all of their troops from the Sudan by Nov. 12.

*Oct. 8:* The opposition Umma party announced its view that a new non-partisan cabinet should be formed to supervise the election for self-determination.

*Oct. 30:* Egypt informed the Sudan and Britain that it approved of the Sudanese suggestion of Aug. 29 to hold a national plebiscite as the means of self-determination.

*Nov. 7:* Britain agreed to the holding of a Sudanese national plebiscite.

*Nov. 8:* The government requested that Britain and Egypt allow the simultaneous holding of elections for a constituent assembly and the national self-determination plebiscite.

*Nov. 10:* After losing a parliamentary vote of confidence 49 to 45, the cabinet of Prime Minister al-Azhari resigned.

*Nov. 12:* The withdrawal of Anglo-Egyptian troops from the Sudan was completed.

*Nov. 15:* Isma'il al-Azhari was rechosen Prime Minister by the Parliament after a switch in votes gave him majority support, 48 to 46, with one abstention. The cabinet would be the same that had resigned on Nov. 10 except that Buth Diu was made Minister of Animal Resources.

*Nov. 19:* The al-Azhari cabinet refused to consider reforming itself on a non-partisan basis as had been suggested by the opposition.

*Nov. 21:* Death sentences were confirmed for 80 civilians involved in the August uprising in the southern Sudan.

The government informed Egypt that it would welcome the resumption of talks on the division of the Nile waters and also sent a series of proposals which were "fair to both sides."

## Syria

(See also Algeria, Arab League, Egypt, Palestine Problem)

1955

*Sept. 1:* An agreement was signed between Syria and Lebanon ending the Bank of Syria and Lebanon's concession to issue currency in Syria and transferring this right to the government.

*Sept. 6:* Shukri al-Quwwatli was sworn in as Syria's

new president. The cabinet of Sabri al-Asali tendered its resignation. President al-Quwwatli asked Nazim al-Kudsi, leader of the Sha'b party, to form a new government, but the request was turned down for reasons of health. The President next asked Sa'id al-Ghazzi, an independent deputy, to form a cabinet.

*Sept. 13:* Sa'id al-Ghazzi announced his new cabinet, as follows:

Sa'id al-Ghazzi—Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Munir al-Ajlani—Justice

Rashad Barmada—Defense

Rizqallah Antaki—Economy

Mamun al-Kizbari—Education

'Abd al-Wahhab Humad—Finance

Mustafa Mirza—Agriculture

'Abd al-Baqi Nizam al-Din—Public Works, Communication

'Ali Buzo—Interior

Badri 'Abbud—Health

Hasan al-Atrash—Minister of State

Asad Harun—Minister of State

Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad—Minister of State

The cabinet included representatives of the Sha'b party, the Constitutional bloc, the Democratic bloc, and several independents.

*Sept. 24:* The new cabinet of Sa'id al-Ghazzi was given parliamentary approval by a vote of 88 to 33. The opposition was made up of the Socialist Renaissance party, the National party, and a number of independents.

*Oct. 20:* Syria and Egypt signed a military agreement providing for a unified command for their armies. Under the terms, a joint defense council would be formed composed of the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the member countries. Each country would regard an attack on the other as an attack on both. (For text, see p. 77.)

*Oct. 21:* Prime Minister al-Ghazzi flew to meet King Sa'ud, presumably to discuss the newly signed Egyptian-Syrian defense pact.

*Nov. 17:* A trade agreement between Syria and the Soviet Union was announced. Under the agreement, Syria would ship various agricultural products in return for machinery, cars, and assorted manufactured and chemical products.

*Nov. 27:* Syria announced a final payments agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company in connection with its pipeline across Syria. IPC agreed to pay LS 80 million for use during the past 3 years and LS 65 million annually in the future. The government also announced that negotiations for new royalty arrangements with Tapline would begin soon.

*Nov. 30:* Syria and Communist China signed a trade and payments agreement providing for the exchange of commercial representatives and the encouragement of trade.

## Tunisia

1955

**Sept. 13:** Prime Minister Tahar ben Ammar handed his resignation to Bey Sidi Lamine, thus preparing the way for the first all-Tunisian cabinet.

Roger Seydoux was appointed Resident General for Tunisia, replacing Gen. Boyer de Latour, the new Resident General for Morocco.

**Sept. 17:** The Bey approved the formation of a new cabinet under Tahar ben Ammar, an independent. The new cabinet, which included 5 Neo-Destour party leaders and 1 Jewish member, did not include a Minister of Defense or Foreign Affairs, as France would continue to handle these functions. The cabinet members were as follows:

Tahar ben Ammar—Prime Minister  
Mongi Slim—Interior  
Khadim ben Achour—Justice  
Muhammad Badra—Agriculture  
Hei Nouira—Finance  
Muhammad Masmoudi—Economics  
Djellouli Fares—Education  
Sadok Muqadem—Health  
Ezzedine al-Abassi—Public Works  
Fathi Fouhir—Social Affairs  
Cahdli Rhaim—Post Office  
Albert Bessis—Reconstruction, Housing

**Nov. 17:** The national convention of the Neo-Destour party voted to exclude from party membership Salah ben Youssef, leader of the extreme nationalist wing.

**Nov. 18:** The Neo-Destour convention recommended an economic development program for Tunisia which included the expansion of producer co-operatives, heavy investments in power development, the nationalization of large farm areas belonging to religious foundations if they were not used to their fullest extent, and a revision of the major 99-year industrial concessions made within the past 3 years.

Salah ben Youssef, the former secretary-general of the Neo-Destour, spoke to a rally in Tunis criticizing the Neo-Destour's friendly relations with France and emphasizing that Tunisia was an "indivisible part of the Arab world."

## Turkey

(See also General, Cyprus,  
Iran, Iraq, Jordan)

1955

**Sept. 6:** Following news of a small dynamite explosion on the grounds of the Turkish consulate in Salonika and in protest against Cypriote agitation for union with Greece, mobs roamed the streets of Istanbul attacking and wrecking Greek churches and businesses in the city, as well as those of other minorities and foreigners. Similar demonstrations occurred in Izmir.

**Sept. 7:** Greece officially protested to Turkey over the mob violence of Sept. 6.

**Sept. 8:** The NATO permanent council met to examine the Greek-Turkish dispute.

**Sept. 10:** Prime Minister Menderes announced a number of moves following the anti-Greek riots of Sept. 6. He accepted the resignation of Interior Minister Namik Gedik, removed from command three generals stationed in the Istanbul area, and transferred to undesignated posts the Director General of State Security, Edhem Yetkiner, and Istanbul's Chief of Police, Alaeddin Dris. In Istanbul itself, some 3,000 rioters were arrested. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir were placed under martial law.

**Sept. 12:** Prime Minister Adnan Menderes shifted two positions within his cabinet. Ethem Menderes resigned as Minister of Defense to become Minister of State, and Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Köprülü was named Defense Minister.

**Sept. 18:** In identical notes, U. S. Secretary of State Dulles appealed to Greece and Turkey to return to their previous friendly relationship within NATO.

**Sept. 20:** Army officers, who had been supervising martial law in Istanbul and Ankara since the riots of Sept. 6, closed five major newspapers, including *Ulus*, the newspaper of the opposition Republican People's party, and *Hurriyet*, the largest paper in the country. All five papers were charged with violating censorship laws in printing various items and comments about the recent riots.

**Oct. 15:** The majority Democrat party expelled 10 of its deputies from the party because of their opposition to the government's press control law.

**Oct. 18:** Sixty delegates to the annual conference of the Democrat party walked out of the sessions in protest against Prime Minister Menderes' dismissal of 10 members from the party on Oct. 15. Ten of the 60 resigned from the party.

**Nov. 4:** Turkey's latest census showed its population to be 24,109,000, an increase of 3 million over the 1950 census.

**Nov. 29:** After criticism in the convention of the Democrat party of the government's handling of the economic crisis, all 16 members of Prime Minister Menderes' cabinet resigned. The Prime Minister, who did not resign, was given a vote of confidence by the convention.

## Yemen

1955

**Nov. 22:** It was announced that Yemen and the Yemen Development Corporation of the U. S. had signed a 30-year oil agreement under which the company would be given exploration and development rights in the northern two-thirds of the kingdom (except for the immediate coastal area) and the company and Yemen would split any profits on a 50-50 basis. If commercial quantities of oil should not be discovered within six years, the contract could be voided.

## DOCUMENTS

### Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact (October 20, 1955)

### Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact (October 27, 1955)

[Editor's Note: The text of these two pacts is identical on most points. An unofficial translation of the Egyptian-Syrian Pact is printed below. Where variant readings occur, the wording of the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact is given in a footnote.]

**Article 1.** The two contracting countries affirm their keen desire for lasting security and peace and their determination to settle all their international differences by peaceful methods.

**Article 2.** The two contracting countries consider any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them as an attack on them both. Consequently, and in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, they undertake to extend speedy assistance to the attacked country and to take immediately all measures and use all means at their disposal, including armed force, to repel the attack and restore security and peace.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the League Council and the Security Council shall be immediately informed of the attack and the measures taken to deal with it.

The two contracting countries pledge that neither of them shall conclude a unilateral peace settlement or any kind of agreement with the aggressor without the consent of the other country.

**Article 3.** The two contracting countries shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the security of the Arab area in the Middle East, or the territorial integrity or independence or security of any or either country.<sup>1</sup> In the event of an immi-

nent threat of war or a sudden international emergency of a menacing nature, the two contracting countries shall immediately take the preventive and defensive measure required by the situation.

**Article 4.** In the event of a sudden attack on the borders or the forces of either of the contracting countries, they shall immediately determine the measures needed to put the provisions of this agreement into effect in addition to the military measures taken to meet such an attack.

**Article 5.** For the fulfillment of the purposes of this agreement, the two contracting countries have agreed to establish the following organizational machinery: A supreme council—a war council—a joint command.

**Article 6.** (a) The Supreme Council shall be composed of the Foreign and War Ministers of the two contracting countries.

(b) It shall be the official authority from which the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command shall receive all directives relating to military policy. It shall have the power to appoint or dismiss the Commander-in-Chief.

(c) At the suggestion of the War Council, it shall organize the Joint Command, define its terms of reference and its duties and make any amendments therein upon the recommendation of the War Council. The Supreme Council shall have the right to set up any committees or subsidiary or

serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the territorial integrity or independence of either country.

<sup>1</sup> The two contracting countries shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever

provisional councils whenever such a step is deemed necessary.

(d) The Council shall be empowered to examine the recommendations and decisions of the War Council on matters outside the jurisdiction of the Chiefs of Staff.

(e) The Council shall issue rules of procedures for its meetings and for the functions of the War Council.

**Article 7.** (a) The War Council shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the two contracting countries.

(b) It shall serve as the Supreme Council's advisory body. It shall submit recommendations and directives in connection with military planning and all the duties assigned to the Joint Command.

(c) The War Council shall make recommendations on war industries and on communications facilities required for military purposes, including their coordination for the benefit of the Armed Forces in the two contracting countries.

(d) It shall prepare statistical and other data on the military, natural, industrial, agricultural, and other resources and potentialities of the two contracting countries and on everything related to their joint war effort. It shall submit to the Supreme Council proposals for the exploitation of these resources and potentialities for the benefit of the war effort.<sup>2</sup>

(e) The War Council shall study the programs drawn up by the Joint Command for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces at its disposal. It shall also study the possibilities of applying them to the armies of the two contracting countries and shall take the necessary steps to carry them out. It shall submit its findings to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(f) This Council shall have a permanent military body to make all preparatory studies on the questions coming up before it. The Council shall organize the functions of this body by drawing up procedural rules for this purpose. It shall also draw up its budget.

<sup>2</sup> This paragraph not included in the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact.

**Article 8.** (a) The Joint Command shall consist of:

(1) The Commander-in-Chief.

(2) The General Staff.

(3) The units detached for the security of the Joint Command and the conduct of its activities.

This Command shall be permanent, functioning in peacetime and wartime.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief shall command the forces put at his disposal. He shall be responsible to the Supreme Council. His duties shall be:

(1) To draw up and implement the programs for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces placed at his disposal by the two contracting countries so that they may become a dependable unified force; and to submit these programs to the War Council for examination or to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(2) To prepare and carry out joint defense plans to meet all eventualities arising from any possible armed attack on one of the two countries or on their forces. For the preservation of these plans, he shall rely on the decisions and the directives of the Supreme Council.

(3) To deploy the forces put at his disposal by the two contracting countries in peacetime and wartime in accordance with joint defense plans.

(4) To draw up the budget of the Joint Command and to submit it to the War Council for consideration prior to final endorsement by the Supreme Council.

(c) The appointment or dismissal of the Chief Aides of the Commander-in-Chief shall be undertaken by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. As for the rest of the Command Staff, appointments and dismissals shall be undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief in agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army concerned.

**Article 9.** (a) The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, in peace and wartime, all striking units including the troops concentrated on the Palestine borders. The War Council,



in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, will fix the number of troops to be entrusted with each of the two tasks, the recommendations of the Council to be considered as final immediately on being approved by the Supreme Council.

(b) The War Council, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, shall make a precise list of the installations and bases necessary for the carrying out of plans and will decide on priority.<sup>3</sup>

**Article 10.** (a) A joint fund in which the two contracting parties will participate shall be established for the achievement of the following objectives:

(1) All expenditures incurred by the Joint Command shall be equally shared by the two contracting parties.

(2) With regard to the expenses for the maintenance of military installations mentioned in Article 9, paragraph (b), they shall be borne in the proportion of 65% by the Egyptian Republic and 35% by the Syrian Republic.

(b) Each of the two contracting states shall pay all salaries and indemnities for the military and civil personnel to be seconded for duty by it with the Joint Command, the War Council, and other com-

mittees in conformity with the financial regulations of each of them.<sup>4</sup>

**Article 11.** None of the provisions of this pact shall in any way affect or be intended to affect the rights and obligations which may result from or which may accrue in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or with the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of world peace and security.

**Article 12.** This treaty shall be for a term of 10 years automatically renewable for further terms of 5 years.<sup>5</sup> Each of the two contracting parties may terminate the pact by notifying the other party at least one year before the expiration of any of the above terms.

**Article 13.** This treaty shall be approved in conformity with the constitutional rules in force in each of the two countries, the instruments of ratification to be exchanged at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus within a period not exceeding 30 days from the date of the signing of the pact which will come into force immediately on the exchange of the documents.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> **Article 9.** The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, in peace and wartime, such forces as may be deemed necessary by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. This shall be done with the approval of the Supreme Council.

<sup>4</sup> **Article 10.** Each of the two contracting countries shall pay the salaries and remuneration of the military and civilian personnel attached to the Joint Command, the War Council, and other committees in accordance with its own financial regulations.

<sup>5</sup> This treaty shall be for a term of 5 years automatically renewable for further terms of 5 years.

<sup>6</sup> This paragraph not included in the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### GENERAL

**SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, edited by Sydney N. Fisher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955. 262 pages; bibliography, index to 282. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Afif I. Tannous*

Following a brief explanatory foreword and a stimulating introduction, the symposium under review opens with a chapter on "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East" and ends with one on "The Crisis in the Near East." In between are thirteen chapters covering a variety of subjects: "The Nomads," "The Villager," "The Israeli Farmer," "The Industrial Worker," "The Bazaar Merchant," "The Entrepreneur Class," "Economic Planners," "The Army Officer," "The Clergy in Islam," "The Intellectuals in the Modern Development of the Islamic World," "The Minorities in the Political Process," "The Immigrant in Israel," and "The Palestine Arab Refugee." The bibliography at the end presents an adequate selection of publications related to each one.

The reader who is attracted by the dynamic title of the volume must be cautioned not to expect to find "social forces" developed as a central theme that binds and integrates the various presentations. However, there is ample compensation for this lack of integrated treatment in the fine quality of the material produced by the fifteen contributors, all of whom are highly qualified in their respective fields, and most of whom have had significant experience in the area. Also the reader can, with some diligent effort on his part, supply the missing links to form a connected whole.

It is suggested, therefore, that the reader study the first and the last chapters (by E. A. Speiser and T. Cuyler Young, respectively) before taking up those in between. Both cover the area as a whole, highlight

ing the major processes, factors, and trends, and thus providing a helpful orientation for the rest of the book.

The critical reader will find in the book a number of points to disagree with and others to question. The following are three, among others, which this reviewer thought noteworthy.

In his thorough and stimulating discussion in Chapter I, E. A. Speiser portrays traditional Islam as "the underlying cause of the present ills of the Near East." This conclusion is not supported by all the facts. One can readily cite a number of causes, outside the province of Islam, for the current problems of Muslim society. Furthermore, if traditional Islam is the cause, how can one explain the remarkable growth of Arab-Islamic civilization in earlier days? Conversely, how can one account for the current ills of non-Muslim countries of the Middle East? Also, when Islam is analyzed and appraised in terms of its foundations and principles, its inherent dynamism is revealed through the simplicity of its hierarchy and the establishment of consensus and reason as two of its four sources of authority. (See Chapter X, "The Clergy in Islam" by S. R. Shafaq, for a brief, but clear statement on this subject, and Chapter XI, by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, for a thorough appraisal of the role of the intellectuals in the revival of Islamic society.)

On page 101, Dalton Potter, in the chapter on "The Bazaar Merchant," makes the following statement: "[The bazaar merchant] is almost the only member of the urban pattern who has contact with the rural economy. . . . He plays, therefore, a crucial role as the mediator of the multiplicity of forces for change in the Middle East." This is something of an overstatement. Besides the merchant (who undoubtedly plays an important role, as the author has shown clearly in his analysis), there are other leading urban elements who

are in active and direct contact with the rural economy and who play more important roles relative to its destiny. Among these are absentee landlords and tribal chiefs, professional people of various callings who engage in part time agricultural activity and maintain identification with their village or tribal background, and certain political leaders and intellectuals who have espoused the cause of the peasant and tribesman.

In his penetrating and clearly presented analysis of the role of the minorities in Chapter XII, J. C. Hurewitz tends to over-emphasize the "cultural mosaic," the "fragmentation," the "diverse communities," and the "pluralistic society" of the Middle East. Granting the existence of these features of diversification, the reviewer is inclined to ascribe to them minor importance relative to the underlying and dominant features of unity. Among these are the community of Islam (which certainly supersedes the differences of its various sects), the Arabic language (mother tongue of some 70 million people living in one continuous area), family and community organizations, and cultural values that are fundamentally the same, especially within the large Arab segment of the region.

But these and other critical observations that one could make are minor when compared with the valuable and timely contributions the book contains. Outstanding is its functional approach through analysis of the roles played by the region's major occupational groups.

♦ AFIF I. TANNOUS is a member of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U. S. Department of Agriculture.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945 to 1954.** New York: United Nations, 1955. 236 pages. \$2.50.

*Reviewed by Peter G. Franch*

This is the latest of the annual surveys of economic conditions in the Middle East which have been published by the United Nations since 1949. It departs markedly from its predecessors in three respects: (1)

it traces the development from the end of World War II to 1954 (in some cases to 1953, in others to estimates for 1955); (2) it concentrates on selective country analyses of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey; and (3) the geographical coverage excludes Afghanistan which, having joined the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, is now included in the annual surveys of that organization.

The introduction to the volume endeavors to present an over-all view of major trends in the area. However, instead of filling in the gaps left by the selective country analyses, this section is little more than a summary of the seven country studies. Here lies the major shortcoming of the volume. In a survey covering ten years of Middle East economic developments one would also expect a chapter on the Arabian Peninsula countries (or at least on the oil developments there). In addition, a discussion of the economic problems surrounding the Arab refugees should not have been omitted. Finally, Jordan and the Sudan, usually included within the geographical coverage, deserve some attention. With respect to these gaps, the reader must depend on earlier annual surveys by the UN.

The country analyses are on the whole more complete and make better reading than those contained in earlier surveys. They follow a uniform pattern in that each discusses in turn agriculture, industry, foreign trade and balance of payments, public and private finance and prices, and development projects. There are, however, significant differences in the depth of analysis and quality of organization. The best chapters are those covering Egypt and Israel. The intricate relationships between the relative profitability of Egyptian cotton, wheat, and fruits in view of fluctuating world and internal prices and the multifaceted control devices of the Egyptian monetary authorities are superbly treated. An additional section on population trends in Egypt might have contributed to an understanding of the urgency of Egypt's over-all economic problems.

In the chapter on Israel, population

changes are adequately treated. Moreover, the authors avoid misleading interpretations of Israel's development by deflating the income and investment data with the aid of the wholesale price index. The discussion of the attempts to maintain internal and external equilibrium in the face of pressing investment needs is concise and comprehensive. Included, also, is specific recognition of the fact that the use of property abandoned by the Arab refugees reduced the need for a still greater rate of investment and made it possible to raise agricultural production more speedily. The treatment of Israel suffers only from the omission of the economic trends between 1945 and 1948 (which the title of the volume promises). A comparison of pre-1948 with post-1948 conditions would have been illuminating.

The chapter on Iran contains a good summary of the post-1951 oil developments and of the progress (or lack of it) made under the Seven Year Plan. The treatment of the AIOC's accounts prior to 1951 leaves the reader with the impression that all funds spent outside Iran were gross investment income. Actually, these sums included the cost of operation and administration of units of the company not located in Iran.

The discussion of Lebanon fails to give account of the population trends, but is far superior to previous presentations, primarily because so much new statistical material has been made available particularly in the national income accounts.

The chapter on Turkey contains a detailed discussion of industrial progress, but the discussion of public finance in inflationary pressures lacks the clarity and good organization of the corresponding sections in the chapters on Egypt and Israel. There are no tables on public revenues, public debt, or currency in circulation. Nor are the autonomous budgets integrated with the government budget.

Despite these few shortcomings, the volume is the best available survey of a decade of Middle Eastern economic developments.

♦ PETER G. FRANK is Senior Economist with the Conference on Economic Progress.

**Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages**, by S. D. Goitein. New York: Schocken Books, 1955. 234 pages; bibliography, chronological table, index to 257. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by Walter J. Fischel*

This book is the ripe fruit of thirty years of research by a mature scholar and expert, the Chairman of the School of Oriental Studies at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, who is well known through his edition of Beladhori's *Ansab al-Ashraf* and his many studies pertaining to Biblical, rabbinical, and Islamic literature. Deeply rooted in both Hebrew and Islamic cultures, the author is, in view of his training, background, and many decades of residence in Palestine, superbly equipped for the task of exploring the cultural, social, and intellectual contacts between Jews and Arabs throughout the centuries. Indeed, he has given us a new work full of substance, soundness, and wisdom, yet at the same time stimulating and challenging.

To indicate the rich content of this work it must suffice to mention but a few of the major topics dealt with. After a historical survey of Jewish-Arabic relations in pre-Islamic times and a discussion of the common origins of the Jews and the Arabs, their earlier contacts, and their prolonged and fertile symbiosis during the Middle Ages, the discussion turns to the question of why the history of the two peoples has taken such different courses, how the Jews responded to the challenge of Islamic civilization and adapted themselves to the changed conditions, and what the actual and legal position of the Jews was under Arab Islam.

Illuminating is Goitein's discussion of the socio-economic transformation and communal reorganization of the Jewish people during the first creative five centuries of their coexistence in the Arab lands of Islam. Particularly detailed are the chapters dealing with the Jewish participation in the medieval civilization of Islam, the linguistic and philosophical contacts under the Muslim impact, and the influence of

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Islam on Judaism in the field of Hebrew poetry, sectarianism, law and ritual, folk literature, and art. For all these topics the author makes full use of the results of previous investigations (Goldziher, Horowitz, Margoliouth, Torrey, Wensinck, and others) and ably integrates with them the conclusions of his own research as gained particularly from his fruitful studies of the Yemenite Jewish communities and the Geniza documents of the Middle Ages.

He shows throughout his clear and readable presentation a balanced judgment of and deep insight into the very nature and essence of the Arab-Jewish symbiosis. He weighs carefully the intense similarities, affinities, common characteristics, and dissimilarities of the two peoples. Among others he correctly and objectively states "that the revival of Hebrew in our times would be entirely unthinkable without the service rendered to it by Arabic in various ways a thousand years ago." There is no place in the book for self-glorification or derogatory remarks on either side. The only discord for the reader in Goitein's scholarly presentation is the rather unusual and unnecessary frequency of his use of the first person, and of so many personal reminiscences which could have been omitted without loss to the value of the book.

Goitein expressly avoids any discussion of politics except for a few comments on the possible future position of Israel amidst its Arabic environment and the factors which might bring about a future rapprochement. The book is nevertheless eminently "political" in the sense that it could and should serve the "experts" of the Israeli-Arab question as a guide to enable them to appraise objectively and thoughtfully in the light of the past, the present and the future of Arab-Jewish coexistence.

♦ WALTER J. FISCHER is Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature and Chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Languages at the University of California, Berkeley. His book on *Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane* and his edition of *Semitic and Oriental Studies in Honor of William Popper* have recently been published by the University of California Press, Berkeley.

LES CHRÉTIENS D'ORIENT, by Pierre Rondot.  
Paris: J. Peyronnet & Co., 1955. 322 pages.  
1,200 fr.

*Reviewed by Edward J. Jurji*

That Eastern Christians are alive, that it would be an error to see in them merely a degenerate reminder of a glorious past, that although afflicted with inordinate contemplation and traditionalism, they do exert themselves every once in a while and surprisingly enough achieve a thing or two in the modern world, and that they live not simply in this century but in and for the future as well—these are among the presuppositions that animate the volume under review. Dividing the subject into four main parts, the highly sensitive author begins with a description of the so-called Christian mosaic of the Middle East, then probes the interplay of Christianity, Islam, and Arabism. He passes next to weighing the destiny of such communities as the Copt, Armenian, and Eastern Orthodox, finally closing his narrative on a note of critical scrutiny as he examines the present status and outlook of Eastern Christianity. A sort of epilogue depicts the world role of Eastern Christians.

Written with Western, more particularly French, readers in mind, the work for obvious reasons discusses such aspects of the cultural, religious, political, and social scenes as fit into the author's terms of reference. It was M. Rondot's ambition, he confides, to write the kind of text which he wished someone had put in his hands a quarter of a century ago when he first saw the Levant. In the treatment of complex problems, the book lays no claim to erudition and nowhere pretends to be exhaustive. Despite this lack of pretension, the account, true to the best in the Gallic tradition of refinement, succeeds unusually well in setting the carefully garnered materials in bold relief. The author's objectivity allows him to face the facts squarely and to state his case persuasively, producing the kind of historical interpretation of which only a just and truthful judge is capable.

Among its arresting disclosures, the vol-

ume notes that as of 1920 France lacked in Syria-Lebanon a forthright and realistic Arab policy. Relying upon the already outmoded strategy of offering the Catholics protection as a wedge of entry into the Ottoman Empire, the mandatory power, in coping with the rising tide of Arab nationalism, showed little imagination and less discretion. The point is later made that the USSR has demonstrated a rather remarkable degree of benevolence in favor of the Armenian Republic, and that the Armenians in return for the relative freedom in the cultural and religious spheres which they enjoy have rendered the Red regime conspicuous services.

Somewhat less adroit are instances such as that which labels Faris al-Khuri of Syria a Greek Orthodox. Likewise, is the failure to include Charles Malik of Lebanon in the roster of eminent citizens belonging to that communion. One wonders what prompts our discerning author, moreover, to classify both Coptic and Orthodox Christians—along with Armenians and Assyrians—within the category of those suffering at the hands of Muslim rulers and majorities. Elsewhere (pp. 27-29), the omission of the American University in a rather wordy section on the city of Beirut and its cultural vitality is quite disconcerting. That Amin Rihani had an occidental culture, "singularly British," will certainly shock those who knew the man.

For the rest let it be emphasized that Rondot has struck a timely and sincere note. He about covers the central issue when he frankly says that the Christians of the Middle East need be no one's clients. Members of these communities, he affirms, are seeking to serve in partnership with their Muslim countrymen. Against heavy odds, they uphold a kind of universalism—one of the rarest characteristics left—and stoutly endeavor to weave together a semblance of unity between the armed camps of our age.

◆ EDWARD J. JURJI is Professor of Islamics and Comparative Religion at the Princeton Theological Seminary.

A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES. Vol. I: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS. Edited by Marshall W. Baldwin. Maps by Harry W. Hazard. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. xxvi + 694 pages, 14 maps, illus. \$12.00.

*Reviewed by Robert W. Crawford*

This long-awaited first volume of a projected 5-volume history of the Crusades contains chapters describing the background and existing conditions in both Europe and the Near East. The first crusade, the crusade of 1101, and the second crusade are traced; also included are chapters emphasizing the careers of Zengi, Nur al-Din, and Saladin through the year 1189. Although one may not agree with some of the arbitrary decisions set forth in the Note on Transliteration and Nomenclature, the painstaking labor is obvious in the resulting consistent treatment. The volume is well indexed and contains maps differentiating between occupants of the same place at different times, a gazetteer, and a list of dates and events.

The editors and contributors should feel more than satisfied with this volume. It reveals an effort to combine flowing historical presentation with sections which are usable without undue reference to the whole. This dual purpose has been achieved with a minimum of repetition by use of footnote references to necessary background material found elsewhere in the book. The section entitled "The Italian Cities and the Arabs before 1095" is the only one in which a bias is evident. Because of its connotations, it is unfortunate that the word Saracen appears 53 times in 14 pages.

For those interested in examining some of the detailed points of the book, the following suggestions are offered. On page 125, a probable reason for no Assassins being apprehended as incendiaries of Aleppo is that all available men of the city had been called to fight a diversionary fire set by the Assassins in a neighboring village, thus giving them free access to Aleppo. The implication on page 157 that the principle of dynastic succession was a basic Muslim idea is wrong, although it was held by the Mus-

lims of the time. On page 159, al-Hakim's persecutions of Christians are wrongly ascribed as the sole ones "inside Islam." The discriminatory regulations of 'Umar II, Harun al-Rashid, and al-Mutawakkil should also be mentioned. On page 388, it is said that "Ridwan cared nothing for Moslem solidarity, but instead had a leaning toward the Assassins." This same idea is also found on page 400. It is essentially a continuation of the bias of the Sunni author Ibn al-Athir. Ridwan's logical source of support was from the Assassins, while they needed the protection of some recognized ruler. Thus, his lack of union with the Muslim world was the result of his reaction to his position in the contemporary political picture. On page 424, the letter referred to was intercepted by Timurtash rather than received by him. It was written to the head of the Aleppan delegation, Kamal al-Din's great-grandfather, by his son, stressing the dire conditions of Aleppo. It was not meant for Timurtash as the Aleppans correctly feared that if he knew the true conditions existing, he would not aid them. On page 453, the reference to Kutlug Abek as the "nominee" of Mas'ud follows Ibn al-Qalanisi's use of the verb *wallaya*, but al-'Azimi's (born in 1090-1091) use of the verb *tasallama* in this connection should be considered.

In reference to the lack of Fatimid help to the besieged Muslims in Tyre in 1124, it is interesting to compare the attribution of this failure on page 422 to the murder in 1121 of the vizir al-Afdal with page 454, where evidence is found of the Fatimid land and sea defeat in 1123. The statement of page 519 attributing the grant of the title of *al-malik al-'adil* to Nur al-Din by the Sultan in 1154 is erroneous. An inscription from Aleppo, dated 1149, includes this title. On page 522, it is stated that Nusrat al-Din was "dispatched as governor to Harran." Rather, he fled there, fearing the wrath of Nur al-Din. Harran had previously been granted to him. On page 619, the using of the approach of Ramadan as one of the main reasons for Saladin's truce with Bohemond of Antioch in 1188 is not necessarily

valid as many Muslim battles are recorded during Ramadan. Also on page 619, the statement "above all he hoped to avoid giving occasion for another crusade," is totally inconceivable. Regardless of Saladin's treatment of the area, the very loss to Christianity of Jerusalem virtually assured another crusade.

The above remarks notwithstanding, this book is an excellent, well-rounded addition to crusading literature.

♦ ROBERT W. CRAWFORD is a research associate working on a handbook of the Arabian Peninsula at the American Geographical Society. He recently spent eighteen months on a Ford Foundation Fellowship studying the crusading period in northern Syria.

RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE ESPAÑA, by José María Cordero Torres. Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1954. 346 pages. 80 pes.

*Reviewed by John D. Harbron*

Blandly titled *Foreign Relations of Spain*, this relatively new book by the Falangist historian José María Cordero Torres is free of all the jingoistic, sabre-rattling propaganda associated with Falangist books of a decade ago. Subheadings of the introductory chapters do indeed look ominous, especially the very first subheading, "Fatherland, Nation, State." But the following interpretations of Spain's place in relation to the UN, the League of Nations, various European organizations, the Pan-American system, and the Arab world are given a balanced treatment. For example, the author still speaks of the "Mediterranean world," but is willing to admit the validity of such other terms as the "Asian world" or the "Arab world." For a modern Spaniard, this is a most significant admission.

Cordero talks coherently and chronologically about Spain's relations with the Arab area. He lists in the footnotes the treaty relations with contemporary Arab republics, but reminds his readers that the medieval Spanish kingdoms had trade and political agreements with the Arab and Moorish empires of earlier times. Thus Spanish friendship with the Arab area is not a new development. "We know," says Cordero,



"that Spain has many Arab elements in her past and many honorable Arab links in her present." Footnotes illumine his factual presentation and are valuable in that they offer a limited bibliography on Hispano-Arab relations of both past and present. A fat footnote does justice to his benefactors, if not to historical balance, by explaining in detail the present regime's diplomatic campaign to woo the Arab East.

It is interesting to know that Spain had occasion in the 19th century to enter into agreements with certain areas east of the Mediterranean. However until the recent friendly approaches to Pakistan, Indonesia, and Iran, Spain's diplomatic and trade interests in the East terminated with the loss of its Pacific island possessions at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898.

Of equal interest are the general chapters, interpretive in nature, which explain Spanish reactions to world situations and crises in terms of the environmental and racial development of the Iberian Peninsula. The once predominant Arab influence on Spain is not underestimated.

To this reviewer, who remembers the inflammatory explanations of Spain's place in contemporary events as presented by Falangist authors of the 1940's, this book is a demonstration of the rationality of a movement from which time has removed most of the rough edges.

♦ JOHN D. HARBRON is a specialist on Spanish and Latin American affairs and a former assistant professor at the Canadian Services College.

## ARAB WORLD

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE CHANGE IN A LEBANESE VILLAGE, by John Gulick. New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1955. 188 pages, illustrations. \$3.50.

*Reviewed by William D. Schorger*

The number of those in the Middle East who derive their primary subsistence from agricultural activities is variously estimated

as from 65 to 80 percent of the total population. The significance of this figure, in terms of an understanding of social dynamics in the area, has been obscured by many factors. The most important of these has been simply the lack of information on specific peasant communities which would permit understanding in depth and detail and put an end to specious generalizations. In the last decade, American anthropologists have been active in attempting to remedy this situation. Five community studies have been conducted in Lebanon alone, and two in Syria. The first of these to reach publication is Dr. Gulick's study of the Greek Orthodox Lebanese village of al-Munsif. The title of the study suggests both more and less than the actual content of the monograph.

The inhabitants of al-Munsif regard themselves as being descended from a common ancestor. In keeping with this indigenous statement of the situation, the author has concerned himself almost exclusively with those patterns for the organization of interpersonal relations in which participation is defined by real or fictitious kin ties. Certain extra-kinship structures, such as the village council and faction, are mentioned but not described in any detail. The author, presumably via the marriage and birth records in the possession of the village priest, has amassed a truly impressive amount of information on the descent units of this community. The lineage structures of the group are analyzed in great detail and with a degree of reliability almost impossible in non-Christian communities.

"Culture change," as considered here, is essentially the process of change induced by persons, institutions, and goods introduced from Western Europe and America. There is an assumption of a static condition prior to Western influence which takes little cognizance of internal change. Again, change is treated by the author principally in relation to the social (here, primarily kinship) self-identification of the individual, and in relation to the definable kinship units. The economic aspects of routine village existence and the economic processes



in change are summarized in a very brief fashion. Detailed information on basic subsistence patterns, as well as on the concrete functions of kin or other corporate groups, is lacking. Additionally, there is little speculation on the influence on this particular village of the American missionary school which was located in it for some time, the widespread knowledge of English on the part of the villagers, or the effects of the economic ties, via the outside employment pattern, with such foreign institutions as the hospital of the American University of Beirut.

As "a Lebanese village," al-Munsif is actually representative of a religious minority in a heterogeneous national population. As it is not emphasized in the study, a recognition of this fact is necessary for adequate evaluation of the materials presented. According to the available, if somewhat antiquated, census data, the Greek Orthodox population in Lebanon is fourth in size of the various national sects: it is roughly one half the size of both the Sunni and Shi'a Muslim groups, and one third the size of the Maronite population. This position of numerical inferiority, generally ignored by the author, has a number of major functional consequences in an area where religious affiliation defines economic, social, and political status and opportunity to such a marked degree. For instance, in-group marriage is essentially religious endogamy. The pattern of village endogamy, noted in this case, may be highly idiosyncratic. It certainly cannot be said to be characteristic of Muslim or Maronite communities in Lebanon. Again, receptivity to foreign imports, linguistic, institutional, or material, is highest among those minorities whose sense of political weakness causes them to look for allies outside the national boundaries. This tendency is well illustrated by the Maronites. Theoretically, numerically, and politically dominant in Lebanon today, their perception of the threat to their position constituted by the internal Muslim groups, reinforced by Muslim Syria, not to mention their regional minority position under the Ottoman Empire, has caused

them to seek cultural and political identification with the French.

The author, in his conclusions, is primarily concerned with changes in value systems relating to land, religion, and kinship. He finds a weakening in the traditional "devotion to the land." As regards religion, it seems weakened as a system of belief, but still strong in relation to political behavior. In the area of values relating to kinship, "there have been almost no changes whatever." That this observation is apparently based largely on the value-statements of informants, rather than the observation of the concrete behavior of specific kin in reciprocal economic and social relationships, may well weaken the conclusion.

An ingenious section, treating with in-groups in the Middle East in general, concerns itself with linkages between population elements based on kinship, common residence, nationality, religion, and language. In this analytic framework of concentric spheres, the author concludes that kin-oriented values and behavior patterns have retained vitality because kinship, local group, and sect are all virtually coterminous for the people of al-Munsif.

◆ WILLIAM D. SCHORGER, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Near Eastern Studies in the University of Michigan, has conducted studies of Muslim agricultural communities in Morocco and Lebanon.

BAHREIN ISLANDS, by Fereydoun Adamiyat.  
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955.  
x + 268 pages. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Majid Khadduri*

The Bahrayn Islands have been the subject of diplomatic controversy for about a century and a half. Hardly to be seen on the world map other than as tiny spots in the Persian Gulf, they have attracted rival powers because of the riches of their ancient pearling industry, their oil deposits, and their strategic position. Iran is not likely to give up its hopes of possession even though its claim to these islands has often been disregarded. Should the present situation in the Persian Gulf become unfavor-

able to Great Britain, Iran's claim might assume a certain seriousness, and it might seek excuses for a fresh attempt to claim possession of Bahrayn's sovereignty. Iran's present-day silence is by no means the end of this controversy.

Dr. Adamiyat's book may be divided into three main parts. The first is made up of a brief geographical introduction and the history of Bahrayn from antiquity to the 19th century. The second, Chapters 2-5, perhaps the most interesting and most detailed part of the book, deals with the diplomatic controversy between Great Britain and Iran during the 19th century. The last two chapters deal with the diplomatic controversy from the beginning of the 20th century to the present, and include a discussion of the legal aspect of the dispute. The lack of balance in this arrangement is due to the fact that the four chapters dealing with the 19th century have been taken from the author's doctoral dissertation on the subject of Anglo-Iranian diplomatic relations during the 19th century, to which he added an introduction (Chapter I) and two concluding chapters dealing with the contemporary aspect. The four chapters taken from the author's dissertation, prepared under the guidance of Professor Sir Charles Webster, are by far the most interesting portion of the book.

Although the writer could not completely suppress his national bias in the middle four chapters, his presentation of the controversy during the 19th century is on the whole objective, based in the main on published and unpublished documents which he had consulted during his study in England. This high standard of research, however, has not been maintained in the first and the two concluding chapters. Not only is Dr. Adamiyat's national bias more pronounced, but there are also serious errors in his facts and interpretation. For instance, he makes the following statement: "As a direct product of the dichotomy of the two corresponding national origins, both Persian and Arabic are the standard modes of speech. Approximately 50,000 of the total population belong to the Shia sect of Per-

sia." Dr. Adamiyat, in other words, wants to leave his reader with the impression that all of the Shi'a of Bahrayn are of Persian origin. He fails to indicate that the majority of the population of Bahrayn is of neither Persian nor of purely Arab race, but is called "Baharna," a people who are regarded as the descendants of Arabs taken by Nebuchadnezzar into Iraq, only later to flee from that country and settle in Bahrayn. They are in the main Shi'ites, but not all Shi'a are Iranians, as the case of Iraq demonstrates. By not taking into consideration the non-Iranian origin of many Shi'a, Dr. Adamiyat places undue emphasis on the strength of Iran's claim to Bahrayn.

Nor are the sources which Dr. Adamiyat used satisfactory or authoritative. For example, his use of Arabic sources is very limited. He seems to rely on quotations from Tabari, Yaqut, and others taken out of context from Arabic works in Persian or Western translations. He does not make much use of works by Nabhani on the history of Bahrayn or of James Belgrave's *Welcome to Bahrayn*, which, although written as a guide to visitors, is both accurate and full of information on the history and present conditions of the shaykhdom.

The final chapter deals with the legal controversy. One would have expected either a new interpretation or new materials which might re-evaluate the Iranian point of view. Unfortunately, Dr. Adamiyat presents nothing new or original in support of the Iranian case, which is to be found fully stated in Iranian notes to Great Britain. The reviewer is of the opinion that the British notes do not give evidence of a recognition of Iranian sovereignty over Bahrayn as Dr. Adamiyat contends, and that the general principles of international law do not support the Iranian argument that a territory belonging to a sovereign state cannot be legally detached so long as the right of ownership has not been transferred by an official act. If admitted as valid, this rule would permit any state to advance a claim to territory on the ground that its loss in the past had not been confirmed by an express approval of the owner.

The juridical status of Bahrayn should not be defined merely in terms of the modern law of nations, for Bahrayn was transferred from Iranian to other hands at a time when the modern law of nations was still in its formative period. Further, the European powers often entered into transactions with the Eastern nations on the ground that such arrangements were outside the pale of European public law. Thus, as I have suggested in my paper on "Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrayn," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 45 (1951), pp. 631-647, the principles and rules of Muslim public law should be no less investigated than the principles and rules of Western law in the study of disputes between Muslim and Western powers originating in the formative period of the modern law of nations.

♦ MAJID KHADDURI, Professor of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, recently returned from a tour of the Middle East during which he visited the Bahrayn Islands.

THE DESERT AND THE STARS, by Flora Armitage. New York: Henry Holt, 1955. 318 pages. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by William Yale*

Flora Armitage has done a difficult job admirably. She has avoided the pitfalls which beset an author who undertakes to write the biography of a man so unusual as T. E. Lawrence, being neither unduly swayed by that small group of his friends who created the "Lawrence cult" nor overly impressed by the lavish praise which some of the most notable men of England have heaped upon him. Driven by an impelling interest in the personality of Lawrence rather than in his achievements as a military leader and writer, Miss Armitage began some ten years ago a study of Lawrenciana which led her to the preparation of this biography. It is thus not a book hastily compiled to defend Lawrence against the ruthless attack on his reputation and character by Richard Aldington in his recently published *Lawrence of Arabia*.

*The Desert and the Stars* is competently written and thought-provoking, but leaves unanswered the question of whether Lawrence will remain an outstanding historical personality of his day. It is doubtful whether the reputation of Lawrence as a military and political figure will endure the test of history. Too much is now known about the Arab revolutionary movement and revolt against the Turks for well-informed writers to perpetuate the myth that Lawrence, as stated by one recent reviewer, "raised the desert tribes in successful rebellion against their Turkish master." Lawrence's role in Middle East affairs from 1915 to 1924 was an incidental and minor one historically. But in the field of English literature he will ever remain a noted figure if only because of his correspondence with leading men of letters. His reputation as a writer will depend largely upon the judgment passed on *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* by future critics who will not be subject to the persuasive spell of his personality.

Although Flora Armitage points out several of the striking contradictions in Lawrence's personality, there are some of a political nature on which she does not comment. She apparently does not note the moral implications of scholars who in peacetime accept jobs to further camouflage an espionage map-making expedition already disguised under the religious mantle of the Palestine Exploration Fund. Lawrence's flippant attitude toward this somewhat nefarious deception of the Ottoman government was evident in his remarks to the present writer in Cairo during the autumn of 1914. While Flora Armitage notes that Lawrence made enemies among the French at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, she seems unaware of the fact that from early 1915 (when Lawrence wrote Hogarth, "If Idrisi is anything like as good as we hope we can rush right up to Damascus, and biff the French out of all hope of Syria") to 1919 the French had every reason to distrust Lawrence. At the time Lawrence was writing to Hogarth, he was unconcerned about Arab national hopes and unencumbered



by promises to them. His concern was for British imperial interests only.

Lawrence's letters reveal his astounding immaturity in 1915. He had no grasp of the political situation in Arabia or of the magnitude of the military effort which would be necessary before the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and the Arab army would capture Damascus two and a half years later. More significant, perhaps, was his lack of any sense of loyalty or responsibility toward Britain's ally France, in striking contrast to his sense of shame at his deception of the Arabs.

By his closest friends and by some of his famous contemporaries, Lawrence was considered a great man. On the whole, despite her understanding and portrayal of the contradictions and flaws in his character, Flora Armitage appears to concur.

◆ WILLIAM YALE is professor of history at the University of New Hampshire.

## ETHIOPIA

THE ETHIOPIAN EMPIRE: FEDERATION AND LAWS, by Nathan Marein. Rotterdam: J. Vurtheim & Sons, 1954. 455 pages. \$10.00.

*Reviewed by William H. Lewis*

Judge Marein's latest book must be acknowledged as a standard reference work despite its lack of analytical depth. *The Ethiopian Empire* provides an all-inclusive enumeration of recently decreed Ethiopian legislation as well as brief descriptions of existing Ethiopian and Eritrean judicial systems and court procedures. In the absence of well-established Ethiopian legal codes, and in the light of an evident need for greater Western appreciation of Ethiopia's problems in the modern world, Judge Marein's contribution is indeed unique. For, as a result of excellent organization of material and uniformity of treatment, the author has drawn Ethiopia's disparate laws together in semi-codal form. When read in conjunction with Margery Perham's *Gov-*

*ernment of Ethiopia*, this new study provides a well-rounded view of this East African state.

Judge Marein's study does suffer, however, from one glaring deficiency which perhaps is inevitable considering the limitations placed upon the author by his official position as Advocate General and Adviser to the Ethiopian Government. Although the author acknowledges that many basic changes have taken place in Ethiopia since the appearance of his *Judicial System and the Laws of Ethiopia* in 1951, he does not provide a clear impression of their nature, extent, and import. Especially useful would have been a more detailed appraisal of the judicial and political consequences of Ethiopian-Eritrean federation.

Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was worked out in the UN as a compromise solution to their postwar status. An overriding consideration in the UN's decision was the close traditions and common history which the two territories shared for a millennium prior to the Italian conquest of Eritrea in 1896. Indeed, the peoples of southern Eritrea and northern Ethiopia have, in centuries past, constituted the Coptic Christian heartland of the Ethiopian Empire. However, the borders of this Ethiopian-Eritrean heartland have long been populated by ethnically distinct peoples who, from time to time, have resisted Ethiopian (Amharic) hegemony. Largely Muslim in religious persuasion and tribal in political loyalty, many of these peoples did not welcome the unqualified return of Eritrea to Ethiopia after the conclusion of the Italian occupation. Their representatives called vociferously for some assured measure of self-government and guarantees for the preservation of internal autonomy. Ethiopia, on the other hand, protested its long historical and legal ties with Eritrea and enjoined the return of this territory to the Ethiopian Crown.

The UN resolution of December 2, 1950 sought to satisfy the expectations of all the parties most vitally concerned by calling for the establishment of Eritrea as an autonomous unit in federation with Ethiopia.



Because this resolution was a manifest compromise, it left many issues undecided, including: (1) the type of federation which was to be established; (2) the administrative and operational relationships which are to exist between Ethiopia and Eritrea; (3) the manner in which amendment of the federal system is to be undertaken; and (4) the arbitral procedures to be followed in the event of disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea concerning interpretation of the UN resolution. These and a number of related and equally important questions deserve review and interpretation. It is indeed a pity if we have to wait for less informed judgment than Judge Marein's on these matters.

♦ WILLIAM H. LEWIS is a specialist on African affairs who has devoted much of his time to a study of the Ethiopian Empire.

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN

VILLAGE INDIA: STUDIES IN THE LITTLE COMMUNITY, edited by McKim Marriott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. xix + 269 pages. \$4.50.

INDIAN VILLAGE, by S. C. Dube. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955. xiv + 248 pages. \$3.00.

*Reviewed by Richard D. Lambert*

There are still several hundred thousand villages in India to go before it can be said that a social scientist is part of the occupational structure of the typical Indian village, but recent American reinforcements are encouraging.

Formerly, village surveys conducted by Indians and Britons were heavily oriented toward economics or ethnography. Since World War II, a growing number of American anthropologists have added a salutary compulsion to relate their research in individual villages to the general structure of social science theory and methods, but have not entirely supplanted the older tradition. The eight studies included in Marriott's *Village India* illustrate the conceptual-

izing approach; the single village survey in Dube's *Indian Village* is a much advanced model of the comprehensive description type of approach.

*Village India* contains a collection of papers which were presented at a seminar organized by Robert Redfield and Milton Singer at the University of Chicago in April and May 1954. These papers are especially interesting for the variety of approaches taken by the contributors and for the dispersion of the villages among a number of the subcultural regions of India. In northern India, two villages are located in Uttar Pradesh, one in Delhi District, and one in Gujarat. In south India, two villages are in Mysore State and two in Madras Province. No claim is made to a geographic sampling of important regional differences, nor do the authors argue that each village is a miniature replica of the subcultural region into which it falls. The emphasis is rather upon conceptual variations. To grasp the nuances of conceptual and methodological differences, the reader should have at hand Redfield's University of Uppsala lectures, published under the title of *The Little Community*, which were the point of departure for the seminar.

Redfield selected a cutting point on his earlier folk-urban continuum, and urged scholars to undertake comparative studies of the little community as a complete and isolable ecological unit. The degree to which the Indian villages are self-contained units and the various approaches to the study of such units is the primary focus of the symposium.

M. N. Srinivas provides a structural description of a village in Mysore, cataloguing ethnographic and occupational units and discussing their roles in the village economy, political organization, and the symbols of their social stratification. Alan R. Beals traces the broad socio-economic changes in Indian society over the past century and relates them to changes in practices within another Mysore village. These disturbing factors as they affect the relationships of constituent units in the village are discussed by E. Kathleen Gough

from the viewpoint of the breakdown of Brahman feudal supremacy in a Tanjore village. In contrast, Bernard Cohen describes similar processes from the viewpoint of the outcaste Camars of a village in the Uttar Pradesh. Gittel Steed isolates the personality variable from village social patterns, discovering no essential homogeneity of personality styles within caste or class groups; she also analyzes a life history document of a Rajput landlord. Oscar Lewis finds few uniformities between a village near Mexico City and an Indian village in Delhi Province. McKim Marriott concerns himself directly with theoretical questions in a general article on the little community. He suggests that the village is isolable as a unit of study in varying degrees throughout the subcontinent—more so in the south than in northern India; that a more fruitful approach would be to conceive of both universalistic and parochial cultures influencing social patterns of the little community. Finally, David Mandelbaum discusses the world-view of a people outside the "greater Indian cultural stream"—the Kotas of the Nilgiri hills. While the emphasis in the symposium is upon approach and the articles cover most of the questions raised by Redfield, the studies are rich in detailed descriptive data not easily available elsewhere.

Dube's *Indian Village* is conceptually eclectic, but descriptively comprehensive. It describes the village of Shamirpet near Hyderabad City, a predominantly Hindu village of 2,500 people, in the Telengana region. The research represents the anthropological part of a multifaceted Social Service Extension Project conducted by six faculties of Osmania University. As a microcosmic description of a subcultural area, it is excellent. The chapters cover the ecology, the social and economic structure, rituals, kinship, levels of living, interpersonal relationships, and social change. While the section on socialization is a bit heavy on sex education to the exclusion of other types of learning, in general all of the data a student of social structure would want are presented at least in outline form. Dube prom-

ises to follow his descriptive survey with several papers of a more theoretical character.

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ONE MAN'S INDIA, by Arthur Stratton. New York: W. W. Norton, 1955. 282 pages. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by Marvin H. Harper*

Of the writing of books about India there seems to be no end, but Arthur Stratton has succeeded in writing one which is different. First of all, it does not seek to explain India's complex political system to Western readers. It is not a record of interviews with the great and near great. No effort is made to solve any of India's baffling social or economic problems. Most of the places mentioned in the usual tourist guide are passed over with scant notice. In short, the book is aptly described by the title. It is one man's reactions to experiences which he encountered on a somewhat leisurely and decidedly unorthodox tour from Darjeeling to the Deccan, reflecting his impressions of the people he met and the places in which he met them. Of these, he remembered best Kinchinjanga towering high above his head in Darjeeling, the spreading banyan tree in Calcutta, the great Juggernaut Temple at Puri, the exotic temple of the Sun God at Konarak, the flower garlands at holy Banarases, the stepped tank at Amber, a holy man in Bombay and a salesman in Lucknow, the crowd at the Hindu Holi festival, and the Kailasa temple carved out of virgin rock at Ellora.

One of the striking qualities of the author is his rare ability to see the unusual in ordinary situations. Almost every monument visited, every experience encountered, has its symbolic meaning for him. A fine example of this is seen in his visit to Agra and the Taj Mahal. Most foreign visitors to the Taj have filled pages describing its matchless beauty. The Taj itself left Stratton cold. But it leads him into contemplation of the deeper significance of the love

of Shah Jehan, who built the Taj for his queen Mumtaz Mahal, whose tomb it encloses. Or again, a visit to the Ajanta Caves causes him to reflect on the nature of Nirvana, the Buddhist heaven. "Nirvana can best be unvisualized but understood as a positive negative, a pure void hollowed out in pain of pain."

Stratton often interrupts his narrative to make excursions into by-paths to describe for the reader unfamiliar but interesting aspects of India's life. For example, a reference to the sari worn by the hostess on his plane leads into a full-page discussion of the dress of Indian women. Or a cup of tea in Darjeeling introduces a 7-page essay on tea, tea gardens, and a Scottish tea planter. These excursions may well be the most interesting aspects of the book to those who have never visited India.

But this interesting and delightful book is marred, it seems to me, by several defects. The writer has taken a somewhat condescending attitude toward the Indian people. This is possibly owing to the fact that he viewed India from the sidewalk, so to speak. It is unfortunate that he did not have the opportunity of staying in Indian homes where he might have come to feel himself a member of the family, rather than in hotels from which he went out to view Indian life as an outsider. The author has managed to pack into his pages a great amount of valuable information about India's history, philosophy, and religions, but this is something which he has learned from his reference books rather than from intimate contact with living Indians. Again, the writer seems to have a somewhat morbid interest in the sex life of India, which leads him to describe in detail his contacts with the street women in Darjeeling and Calcutta and his reactions to the phallic symbols which he found in the sculptures on the temple of Shiva at Bhuvaneswar and of the Sun God at Konarak, and to present a somewhat erotic interpretation of the structure of the Taj Mahal. The omission of these references would in no wise have destroyed the interest of the book and would have made it much more acceptable to cul-

tured Indians and many Western readers as well.

In spite of these defects, *One Man's India* is extremely well worth reading. Its descriptions are vivid, its insights are penetrating, and its spirit is appreciative of the best in Indian life and culture.

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**HORNED MOON: AN ACCOUNT OF A JOURNEY THROUGH PAKISTAN, KASHMIR AND AFGHANISTAN**, by Ian Stephens. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. 288 pages, illustrations. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by James W. Spain*

Ian Stephens, former editor of *The Statesman* of Calcutta and Delhi, writing about India and Pakistan—which he does penetratingly and delightfully in *Horned Moon*—insists on calling the whole area "Delkaria." Delhi, capital of India, and Karachi, capital of Pakistan, each give their first letters to the name; as Stephens explains it: "three each for luck, and a couple more for fun."

This semantic improvisation provides a clue to Stephens and his book. Most people who still are reluctant to accept the harsh fact of the 1947 Partition fall into two categories: antiquated "pukka sahibs" in the London clubs, who refuse to admit any change since they last held sway; and burning-eyed fanatics of the Hindu communalist parties in republican India, who still demand conquest of Muslim Pakistan for inclusion in a Hindu super-raj.

Ian Stephens, paradoxically, is an Englishman whose most unselfish devotion and sympathy was extended to "Delkaria" after his countrymen had laid down their scepter. Despite nine years as editor of a newspaper in predominantly Hindu Calcutta, he is enthusiastically pro-Muslim. His virtue is that he persists in seeing India and Pakistan, politically and permanently divided as they quite properly are today, as parts of a vital whole independent of the artificial administrative unity imposed in the past by the British raj.



The skeleton of *Horned Moon* is the narrative of a trip through the northwest corner of the subcontinent in 1952. Despite dozens of superb photographs and a careful delineation of routes, *Horned Moon* is far more than a travel book. Stephens dips freely into 21 years of experience in India to cast light on events of the crucial years leading up to and succeeding independence.

Most interesting and probably most controversial is Chapter 5, appropriately entitled "Origins of Tragedy," in which Stephens suggests that preparations had been made well in advance of Partition to take over Kashmir for India. He lays heavy blame for the Kashmir imbroglio on Lord Mountbatten, describing the Viceroy and his wife as having "become wholly pro-Hindu." On the 26th of October, 1947, the night before Kashmir's accession to India, Stephens had dinner with the Viceroy: "The atmosphere at Government House that night was almost one of war. Pakistan, the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah were the enemy."

Stephens' peculiar talent, however, is for portraying graphically the charm and romance of the people and lands he loves without glossing over their harsh reality. He loves most the Pathans of the wild hills along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier; the vivid sensuousness of his descriptions of them is alien to the reserved English but truly representative of the tribesmen themselves.

Only in the last fifteen pages, which deal with a brief trip to Kabul from Peshawar, does Stephens' magic touch falter. The account is flat, dry, and unsympathetic. After the glowing color of the preceding pages, it is anti-climactic and might well have been omitted. Afghanistan and the Afghans deserve better. They have received it, however, only rarely, even from the most gifted of Western writers, and it is not to Mr. Stephens' discredit that the compelling but enigmatic attraction of the isolated kingdom eludes him also. Certainly, *Horned Moon* as a whole deserves the same wide acclaim and consideration in the United

States that it has already won in England and "Delkaria."

♦ JAMES W. SPAIN contributed "Pakistan's North-West Frontier" to the Winter 1954 issue of THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. He has travelled widely in the areas described in Mr. Stephens' book.

## IRAN

PERSIAN OIL: A STUDY IN POWER POLITICS, by L. P. Elwell-Sutton. London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1955. 335 pages. 25s.

*Reviewed by Harvey P. Hall*

Mr. Elwell-Sutton's *Persian Oil* is a welcome tonic to one whose appetite may be jaded by a reading of Brig. Longrigg's recently published *Oil in the Middle East*. It is a lively account from start to finish, with full appreciation of the personalities, rather than just the people, involved in the story of Persian oil from its beginnings to the present day. There is something reassuring, moreover, in the sight of a Western scholar turning the tools of research against his own kind, not out of malice, but out of a conviction that his compatriots should be made to see the folly of their ways before it is too late.

The two villains of Mr. Elwell-Sutton's story are the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the international oil "cartel," represented by the consortium which is now producing and refining Iran's oil in association with the National Iranian Oil Company. The sin of the first was cupidity, ill concealed behind a façade of snobbish self-righteousness. In support of his accusation the author produces a long array of facts, figures, and statements drawn from the stock market, parliamentary debates, personal correspondence, newspaper files, and every other conceivable source. It all adds up to a persuasive total, but since the reliability of this evidence is all-important to the value of the book, it is a pity that Elwell-Sutton has not given us more specific references to the sources he has used. The only footnote is on page 328, giving the price of British Petroleum (AIOC) shares at the end of July



1955; there is no bibliography. This does not deny the fact that so far as this reviewer is aware the author's use of his materials is accurate and judicious.

But it must also be said that Mr. Elwell-Sutton at times comes close to being carried away by his indignation. At such moments one cannot help but wonder to what extent the AIOC and the British Treasury were deliberately attempting to defraud the Iranian Government or were merely the captives of an outmoded mentality. The chief legal and moral point at issue was the sanctity of contracts. The Iranian argument was that no contract between a government and a private company can stand in the way of an exercise of sovereign rights; Elwell-Sutton adds the further argument that even in Western law certain contracts are invalidated because of gross inequity (a matter discussed at some length in *The Merchant of Venice*). He then goes on to demonstrate that the AIOC concession agreement is a case in point, and that Britishers should have been the first to recognize this fact. Not only did the AIOC and the British Government fail to measure up to the West's own standards, but their policy was politically unrealistic as well.

As for the international oil "cartel," Elwell-Sutton's complaint is that it acted in collusion with AIOC in 1951-53 to prevent Iran from selling its own oil on the world market. That this was the case is clear; however, any accusation of cupidity against the "cartel" is not so demonstrable. Here Elwell-Sutton fails to take into sufficient consideration such factors as established channels of transportation, location of markets, dollar vs. sterling exchange, or reliability of supply. It was Iran's refusal to recognize certain firm—if deplorable—facts of international oil distribution and marketing that made it so difficult to reach an agreement. The solution that Iran wanted would have involved adjustments that the major oil companies did not feel it was worth their while to make. Undoubtedly they will make a good thing out of their present contract with the Iranian Government; on the other hand, Iran is

now being paid on the same order as all other underdeveloped oil-producing states. And one great intangible gain is that the principle of evolutionary concessionary arrangements is now accepted. The "defeat" which Iran has suffered is not so grim as Elwell-Sutton implies.

U. S. policy in Iran comes off rather well, at least in comparison to the British. United States interests were not narrow minded; Elwell-Sutton feels, however, that the U. S. exaggerated the danger that nationalization would play into the hands of the Soviet Union. And all the West failed to appreciate the fact that the surge of emotion which brought about nationalization was a popular movement that deserved respect and consideration. It is still strong, and unless the West has learned its lesson, the spirit of Iran can well rise up in revolt again, the next time possibly with a more tragic ending.

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## ISRAEL

ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION, 1948-51, by Emanuel Rackman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. 196 pages. \$3.00.

*Reviewed by Paul L. Hanna*

Dr. Rackman's monograph on the constitution of Israel is neither a political anatomy of the young Jewish state nor a functional study of its government in action. It is, rather, an exposition and analysis of the conditions and forces which led to the development of an unwritten constitution during the first three years of Israel's life as a sovereign state. The organization of material is primarily topical, although a loosely chronological pattern is followed in the first part of the volume as the analysis moves from the structure and practices of the official Jewish community in mandatory Palestine, through the activities of the Provisional Government of Israel, to the debates

and legislative enactments of the First Knesset. Nonchronological chapters on the religious problem, territorial and military problems, the status of non-Israeli Jews, and economic and social problems make up the second part of the book.

Dr. Rackman sees clearly that basic disagreements—most notably those between religionists and secularists—made the adoption of a written constitution for Israel almost impossible in a time of stress and war, when national unity had to be preserved at all costs. He also recognizes that Israel's emergence from the Jewish community of the mandatory period and the experiences of its political leaders made almost inevitable the adoption of parliamentary rather than presidential forms. He expounds with considerable skill the basis and nature of the multiple-party system in Israel. Yet one feels that he does not really approve of any of these things. He fears for individual freedom and civil liberties in a planned economy where there is no written constitution and no judicial review of legislation. "The future," he says with apparent foreboding, "will reveal whether Israel can maintain the freedom of her citizens." He is alarmed at the absence of checks and balances between the executive and the legislative under the cabinet system. "One finds," he remarks, "no evidence whatever of a growing initiative on the part of the legislators to assume leadership in the lawmaking process." He dislikes the multiple-party system. "Most of the faults found with Israel's constitution," he writes, "are due to the multiplicity of political parties, the mutual hostility and suspicion of the parties, and the perpetual domination of the parties by their leaders."

Throughout the book the author criticizes the Israeli parties for their narrow views, selfishness, and failure to act for the general welfare. He seems to assume that there is an objective general welfare which all men, if only they are sincere, will perceive and toward which they will be ready to advance. As rabbi, lawyer, and professional political scientist, Dr. Rackman might be expected to show more realism.

The supporters of Agudat Yisrael are certainly sincere in their belief that only a state based on Torah, on *their* concept of Torah, and not on a written constitution reflecting secular, rationalistic views of personal rights and freedoms can fulfill the legitimate needs of the Jewish people. The secularist-constitutionalists are equally sincere in their opposing view. Only through the conflict and compromise of diverse views can constitutional development take place. Israel has probably chosen—or rather been forced by circumstances to accept—the wisest course in holding to the flexibilities of an unwritten constitution and to an established parliamentary pattern. The multiple parties are far more a normal and proper reflection of the diversity of the religious, cultural, social, and economic interests of the heterogeneous Israeli people than the outgrowth of any peculiar selfishness of the groups, any overweening ambition of the leaders, or even of the system of proportional representation adopted in Knesset elections.

It is probably true, as Dr. Rackman says, that the "resolution of the religious issue would clear the way for the drafting of a written constitution and the possible merger of Mapai with the religious labor parties." The religious issue, however, is certain to be long in resolution, and the reader is likely to agree with the author's final, rather resigned, comment that "the principal patterns of . . . [Israel's] constitution were already formed in the first three years of the State's existence."

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## TURKEY

LE LOUP ET LE LÉOPARD: MUSTAPHA KÉMAL OU LA MORT D'UN EMPIRE, by Benoist-Méchin. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1954. 438 pages. 900 fr.

*Reviewed by Jean Deny*

Edouard Herriot once said of Mustafa Kemal, "He stands at the east of Europe as

one of the greatest statesmen that history has revealed."

All great men resemble one another in certain ways, and Atatürk's biographers have not hesitated to draw comparisons. Gentizon has compared him to Peter the Great. General Charles H. Sherrill, in his *A Year's Embassy to Mustapha Kemal*, has compared him, simultaneously, to Washington, Moses, Martin Luther, and Henry VIII of England. He even reminds one of Catherine II of Russia in his faith in his destiny and in his impetuous, at times blind, devotion to the task at hand. Atatürk was not far from considering Gauls as ancient Turks, as Catherine saw Slavs everywhere, even in Peru, Mexico and Chile. Several authors have drawn parallels between Atatürk and various dictators brought forth by World War I. One of these, the late Count Sforza, remarked that Mustafa Kemal was superior to the others because he had not engaged in imperialism. M. Jacques Benoist-Méchin also praises this political wisdom in Atatürk, this ability to discipline his aspirations.

Our author, while avoiding "parallels" of the type found in Plutarch's lives, draws together—as shown by the title of the work (but only in the introduction)—the "wolf," Mustafa Kemal, and the "leopard," Ibn Sa'ud. The use of the word "wolf"—totem of the Turks—is due to the influence of Armstrong's *Grey Wolf*, while the "leopard" is the hero of another work entitled *Ibn Séoud ou la naissance d'un royaume*, complementing, as can be seen, the title which concerns us here.

The writings on Atatürk represent two rather distinct categories: those by Turkish authors and those by Westerners. The first have the advantage of fuller and more precise information but are somewhat distorted in certain matters of detail by unbounded, if frequently merited, admiration, by a sort of filial piety or worship which the grateful nation has dedicated to its savior and liberator. Among the Western works one finds only a slow evolution in favor of the great man, who for long remained little known—the man whom people so ignorant of political geography as Clemenceau and

so rash as Lloyd George at first took for a common insurgent against the Allies and the Sultan. One can read in the work of a certain Paillarès, *Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés*, published in 1922, these indignant lines: "Whether the Mustafa Kemals . . . and other unionists be the damned souls of Germany, whether they be the accomplices of Lenin and of Trotzky . . . all this, it would seem, is of no importance!"

M. Benoist-Méchin does justice to Atatürk. Here is a fine passage devoted to him in the introduction (p. 17): "The work which he accomplished is without precedent in history. Imagine that at the most critical moment of the reign of Justinian in the fifth century of our era, a man arose, armed from head to foot, to raise an Italian nation from the debris of the Roman Empire; well, that is exactly what the conqueror of Sakarya did for Turkey. At the beginning of his career, this rough soldier used all his energies to avert the downfall of the Empire. In the west, the east, the south, and again in the east, he strove to smash the English, French, and Russian armies whose circle tightened day by day around his country. But when he understood that this was useless, that nothing would avert the fatal result—then, instead of holding on with exhausted forces, he himself eviscerated the Ottoman Empire and tore from it, bleeding but still alive, the young Turkish people which asked for nothing but to survive."

This said, it must be recognized that the author does not always make a happy choice in the predecessors which he utilized. Although he is justified in using von Bischoff (currently Austrian ambassador to the USSR) and Gentizon, he should have been on his guard against such mediocre writings as those of Dr. Stephen Ronart and Fairfax Downey. There are other well-written works from which he could have profited: von Mikush (of which there is a French translation), Zara, etc.

Some of the numerous errors must be attributed to the sources consulted; others may be simple printing errors. A number of the more serious ones are listed below:

The brother of Orkhan, Ala-eddin, be-



comes Etta-Eddine (p. 67). For the town of Kavsa (*idem* in Armstrong, French translation, p. 111), read Havza (p. 205). The town of Malatia becomes "Malatia, a mountainous region" (p. 222) because the corresponding passage in Armstrong concerns the "district of Malatia." The author speaks (p. 87, 359) of a small Macedonian village "a few kilometres from Salonica" where Atatürk did agricultural work as a young man. He calls it Lazasan. In Armstrong, from which this information was borrowed, we find it Lazaran, which would seem to be a better reading of the word, but I have found no trace of such a village.

Historical and linguistic errors likewise are frequent. The Hittites are Turks according to the author (p. 35). It is true that this was also Atatürk's opinion. The same thing is said of the Sumerians (p. 398). On pages 392-93, we find a map of the Pan-Turanian world on which Persia (Iran), Afghanistan, and Pakistan appear as "areas inhabited by peoples of the Turkish race." This map should not be shown to an Iranian, who would know that Iran (an Indo-European country) is the classic antithesis of Turan. It would also be in the interests of Atatürk's memory to suppress the passage on the "sun-language" (p. 395, last paragraph). Bursa was not taken by Osman (p. 37) but by his son, Orkhan. Osman did not have a right to the title of Sultan (p. 38), but only to the title of Bey. Chemsî Effendi (p. 87) further down on the same page becomes Semsî Efendi. Both of these refer to the same person; the capital S, which lacks the cedille of the regular orthography, corresponds to the French *ch*. Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (who was born in 1522) does not mention the Ottoman military parade of 1526. His name appears here as a result of confusion brought about by the fact that Ronart, in his survey of Ottoman history, devoted three pages to this ambassador of Charles V at the court of Suleiman the Magnificent.

The organization and emphasis of the book occasionally leave something to be desired. In the opening section, an historical account of the Ottoman Empire, which,

in all fairness, is no more than a summary, ten pages are given over to Tamerlane, whose short-lived invasion of Anatolia exercised no appreciable influence. This digression may be attributable to a delight in the picturesque, a tendency which sometimes has the disadvantage of leading to over-enthusiasm. The author shares this drawback with Léon Cahun. The second part of the book is called "S'agonie de l'Empire ottoman (1881-1918)," but it is more nearly the life of Mustafa Kemal from his birth (1881) to the beginning of his efforts to liberate the country. In contrast, the title of the fifth part, "La Turquie Kémaliennne: 1924-1938," is better chosen. The usual word *kémaliste* is sometimes taken in bad grace by his political opponents. The author also uses *kémalien* in his introduction; elsewhere he has continued to use the word *kémaliste*.

In conclusion, the book is written in a lively and attractive style. The author is talented; his work reads easily and agreeably. Although it contains errors, the overall impression is true to historical reality. To this extent, it can replace works that are out of print. It cannot, however, serve as a manual of reference, a use for which it doubtless was not designed.

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## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

### General

*After You, Marco Polo*, by Jean Bowie Shor. New York: McGraw Hill, 1955. 294 pages. \$4.50. The travels and adventures of a young couple retracing the journey of the earlier adventurer from Venice eastward through parts of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

*The Chronology of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt*, by P. van der Meer. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955. 95 pages; tables. Gld. 25. A revised second edition.

*Current Research on the Middle East, 1955*, ed. by Ann W. Noyes. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1956. 175 pages. \$2.50. A survey of research in the social sciences, linguistics, archaeology, art,



- law, and Islamics for the ancient, medieval, and modern Middle East in progress during the year ending Oct. 1, 1955.
- Documents on International Affairs, 1952*, ed. by Denise Folliot. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. xvii + 529 pages. 55s.
- Dynamite in the Middle East*, by Khalil Totah. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 240 pages. \$3.75. The author, former director of the Institute of Arab-American Affairs, describes a 1952 trip to 5 Middle Eastern countries, some of the leading government figures, and memories of his childhood in the area.
- The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. by H. A. R. Gibb, E. Levi-Provencal, and J. Schacht. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954—. 64 pages per fascicle. Gld. 10 per fascicle. Four of the 100 fascicles projected in this new and revised edition, covering Aaron—Ahdath, have appeared to date.
- Five Ventures: Iraq, Syria, Persia, Madagascar, Dodecanese*, by C. Buckley. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954. 257 pages. 10s. 6d. One of a series designed to furnish the general reader with a short military history of World War II.
- Foreign Affairs Bibliography: A Selected and Annotated List of Books on International Relations, 1942-1952*, ed. by Henry L. Roberts. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 727 pages. \$10.00. Listings for the Middle East are covered in general and country by country as well as under certain specialized topics, such as geography, population problems, World War II, biographies.
- Inside Africa*, by John Gunther. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 952 pages. \$6.00. Some 250 pages are devoted to North Africa, Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia. History, geography, cities, and the people are all discussed for each country; also contains comments on the current political situation, much of which are based on interviews with leading personalities.
- List of Scientific Papers Published in the Middle East*. Cairo: UNESCO Middle East Science Cooperation Office, 1955. 84 pages. No price indicated. Brief summaries of papers received from August 1953 to March 1954 in the fields of physics, chemistry, geology, biology, botany, zoology, medicine, engineering, agriculture, and pathology.
- List of Scientific Papers Published in the Middle East*. Cairo: UNESCO Middle East Science Cooperation Office, 1955. 199 pages. No price indicated. Listings for the period from April to November 1954 in the fields mentioned in the above item.
- Middle East Economic Papers, 1955*. Beirut: Dar el-Kitab, for the Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1955. 136 pages. \$2.00. A collection of 8 papers mostly on specific country problems, with one paper covering the entire region.
- The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*, by Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 445 pages; biblio., index to 500. \$7.00. A country-by-country analysis of the development and effects of the petroleum industry.
- Mohammed and Charlemagne*, by Henri Pirenne. Trans. from the French by Bernard Miall. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1955. 293 pages. \$4.00. A reprint of a work first published in 1937. It is an examination of Europe's break from Constantinople as manifested by the rise of Islam in the east and Charlemagne in the west.
- Moslems on the March*, by F. W. Fernau. London: Robert Hale, 1955. 294 pages; bibliography, appendices. 16s. An English edition of this survey of the Middle East, first published in German in 1953 and in English translation in the U. S. in 1954.
- Saladin (1132-1193)*, by Gertrude Slaughter. Drawings by Robert Hill Taylor. New York: Exposition Press, 1955. 304 pages. \$4.00.
- Survey of International Affairs, 1952*, by Peter Calvoressi. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. 473 pages. 45s. Chapters on the Middle East by George Kirk cover the Egyptian revolution, the Mosaddiq government in Iran, and events in North Africa.
- These Awakening Lands of the East*, by May Worthington Eells. New York: Vantage Press, 1955. 241 pages. \$3.50. An account of the author's travels through the Middle and Far East.
- The United States in World Affairs 1953*, by Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 512 pages. \$5.00.
- Who Knows Better Must Say So!*, by Rabbi Elmer Berger. New York: American Council for Judaism, 1955. 112 pages. 50¢. A collection of letters written during a two-month tour of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Morocco.

### Arab States

- The Arabs*, by Edward Atiyah. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955. 242 pages. 65¢. A survey history in which the first third covers the history up to 1800 and the remainder discusses in a more detailed manner events up into 1955.
- The Crescent in Crisis*, by N. A. Faris and M. T. Husayn. Lawrence, Kan.: The University of Kansas Press, 1955. 191 pages. \$4.00. A study of unifying and divisive forces in the modern Arab world.
- Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, 1382-1468 A.D.*, by William Popper. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955. 120 pages, 22 maps. \$1.50. Systematic notes on the author's *History of Egypt: A Translation from the Arabic Annals of Abu i-Muhasin ibn Taghri Birdi*. It includes a brief historical introduction on the Mamluk dynasty, explanations of various points in the earlier work, descriptions of the work of certain Mamluk officials, and detailed maps of Cairo, Damascus, and the surrounding country at that time.
- España y el Mundo Árabe*, by Rodolfo Gil Benumeya. Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1955. 287 pages. Ptas. 45.
- Iqtā'a wa nitham al-arathi fi 'Iraq* [Feudalism and

- the Organization of Land in Iraq*], by Salah al-Din al-Nahl. Baghdad: Matba'ah dar al-Mu'arifah, 1955. 67 pages. No price indicated.
- Mushkilah al-musul: Dirasah fi al-diblumatiyyah al-'iraqiyyah-al-inkiliziyyah al-turkiyyah wa fi al-ra'i al-'am* [*The Mosul Problem: A Study in Iraqi-Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy and in Public Opinion*], by Fadhil Hussain. Baghdad: Al-Rabitta Press, 1955. 336 pages. No price indicated. The author's doctoral thesis at Indiana University.
- One Man's Journey*, by Leonard Cottrell. London: Robert Hale, 1955. 263 pages, photos. 16s. Based on a journey in late 1953 through Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Libya. Combines a travelog approach with discussions of political developments and the work of UN agencies in the area.
- Le Penetration des Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam*, by R. Dussaud. Beirut: Institut Français d'Archéologie, 1955. 234 pages, illus. No price indicated.
- La Revolution de l'Industrie en Egypte et ses Conséquences Sociales au XIXe Siècle (1800-1850)*, by Moustafa Fahmy. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954. 143 pages. Gld. 10.
- Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1954*. Damascus: Government Press, 1955. 258 pages. No price indicated. Charts on population, health, education, foreign trade, prices, transportation, finance, and production in English and Arabic.
- The Tyrant of Baghdad*, by Glenn Pierce. Boston: Little, Brown, 1955. 395 pages. \$3.95. A novel about the adventures of Charlemagne's ambassador in Baghdad in the year 800.
- 'Urubiyyah auwalan [Arabism First]*, by Sati' al-Husri. Beirut: Dar al-ilm li al-malayin, n.d. 192 pages. No price indicated.
- Wingate of the Sudan*, by Ronald Wingate. London: John Murray, 1955. 274 pages. 21s. A biography of Sir Reginald Wingate by his son.
- Ethiopia**
- Prières Magiques Éthiopiennes pour Déliver les Charmes*, by Stefan Strelcyn. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955. 498 pages. No price indicated.
- India**
- Child Labour in India*. Delhi: Ministry of Labour, 1955. 48 pages. Rs. 1/4. A compilation of reports and statistics.
- The Classical Age*, ed. by R. C. Majumdar. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1954. 744 pages. Rs. 35. This third volume in the editor's *The History and Culture of the India People* covers the years from 320 to 740 A.D.
- The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740*, by Sukumar Bhattacharya. London: Luzac, 1954. 240 pages. 21s. The main source of this history is the daily records of the East India Company. The approach is more topical than chronological.
- Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, ed. by Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler. Durham: Duke University Press, 1955. 602 pages; index to 613. \$12.50. Comparative studies divided into 3 parts: Agricultural, Industrial, and Related Economic Trends; Demographic Factors and Economic Growth; Social Structure, the State, and Economic Growth.
- Economic Policy and Development*, by D. R. Gadgil. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. 248 pages. \$2.50. A miscellaneous collection of the author's papers on aspects of the Indian economy.
- The First Book of India*, by Emily Hahn. Illus. by Howard Baer. New York: F. Watts, 1955. 62 pages; illus., map. For older children.
- The Flame of the Forest*, by Sudhin N. Ghose. New York: Macmillan, 1955. 288 pages. \$3.75. A sequel to *The Vermillion Boat*, this is the fourth volume of the author's autobiography.
- Food Administration in India, 1939-1947*, by Sir Henry Knight. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. xii + 323 pages. \$7.50. "Describes the development of India's large-scale program of supplying food to its people. The author was adviser to the governor of Bombay during World War II and was the man responsible for much of the rationing program there."
- Golden Interlude: The Edens in India 1836-1842*, by Janted Dunbar. London: John Murray, 1955. xiii + 239 pages; illus., maps. 18s. An account of the 6-year visit of Emily and Fanny Eden to their brother Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India.
- India*, by Richard Lannoy. New York: Vanguard Press, 1955. 180 gravure illustrations. \$12.50. A photographic essay.
- India Today!*, by Jack Finegan. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1955. 208 pages; illus., map. \$4.25.
- Kumari*, by William Buchan. New York: William Morrow, 1955. 287 pages. \$3.50. A novel about English and Indian life in the India of 1945-46.
- Land Tenure Legislation in Uttar Pradesh*, by Frank J. Moore and Constance A. Freydis. Berkeley: South Asia Studies, University of California, 1955. 109 pages; glossary, biblio. to 124. \$1.00.
- Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, by A. R. Desai. Bombay: The Popular Book Depot, 1954. 407 pages. Rs. 12/8. A revised edition of a book which examines the many factors giving rise to modern Indian nationalism.
- Structure and Working of Village Panchayats: A Survey Based on Case Studies in Bombay and Madras*, by A. V. Raman Rao. Poona: D. R. Gadgil, 1954. xvi + 221 pages. 11s. A first-hand picture of the development, functions, and achievements of these village judicial organizations.
- Unemployment in India*, by C. B. Memoria. Agra: Ram Lal & Sons, 1954. 34 pages. 8 ans. Examines the causes of present unemployment and suggests means of reducing it.

*Waiting for the Mahatma*, by R. K. Narayan. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1955. 256 pages. \$3.50. A novel about two followers of Mahatma Gandhi.

*The Western-Educated Man in India*, by John and Ruth Hill Useem. New York: Dryden, 1955. 237 pages. \$3.00. "The results of a field investigation of the consequences of a Western education. Suggests possible improvements in organizing the exchange of persons between countries."

### Iran

*Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics*, by L. P. Elwell-Sutton. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955. 335 pages. 25s. Reviewed in this issue.

### Israel and Zionism

*The Clash of Cultures in Israel*, by Abraham Shumsky. New York: Bureau of Publications, 1955. 181 pages; biblio. \$3.75. "An analysis of moral and psychological problems posed in the Israeli schools and communities by the clash of cultures between the European and the Oriental Jews."

*Israel Economic Survey 1953-1954*, by Emanuel Levy. Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency, 1955. 165 pages. No price indicated.

*Mori Sa'id*, by Hayim Hazaz. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1955. 320 pages. \$4.00. A novel about Yemenite Jews who have settled in Israel.

*The Palestine Pound and the Israel Pound: Transition from a Colonial to an Independent Currency*, by Robert David Ottensooer. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955. 177 pages. No price indicated. Chapters on background, public finance, monetary policy, and banking systems under both the mandate and independent status.

*The Promised Land*, by Rose R. Zwisohn. Boston: Meador, 1955. 177 pages. \$2.50. "The story of a doctor and his wife who go to Palestine."

*The Second Generation in Palestine-Israel: Sociological and Economic Trends* [in Hebrew], by Bernard D. Weinryb. London: Ararat Publishing Society, 1954. 94 pages. No price indicated.

*The Secret Roads: The "Illegal" Migration of a People 1938-1948*, by Jon and David Kimche. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1955. 223 pages; illus., map. \$3.75. American edition of a book published in England earlier in the same year.

*Theodor Herzl, A Portrait for this Age*, ed. by Ludwig Lewisohn. Preface by David Ben-Gurion. New York: The World Publishing Co., 1955. 345 pages. \$4.00. A "Herzl reader" of selections from the 5 volumes of his works.

*A Village by the Jordan: The Study of Degania*, by Joseph Baratz. New York: Roy Publishers. 183 pages. \$3.00. "The story of the first kibbutz in Israel, told by the man who started the movement of the working communities."

### North Africa

*De l'Application des Lois Nationales au Maroc*, by Paul Decroux. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1955. 192 pages. No price indicated. A study of personal status law in Morocco, with special attention to its application to non-Moroccans.

*Cuentos populares marroquies*, by Mohammed ibn Azzuz. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios, 1955. 110 pages. Ptas. 25.

*The International City of Tangier*, by Graham H. Stuart. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. xvi + 285 pages. \$6.00. A revised edition, which includes sections on history, the machinery of government, and principal current problems.

*North African Powder Keg*, by Edmund Stevens. New York: Coward-McCann, 1955. 273 pages. \$3.75. An American correspondent's report on recent developments in French North Africa. About half of the book is on Morocco.

*Les Partis Politiques Marocains*, by Robert Rezette. Paris: Colin, 1955. 403 pages. Frs. 1300. The history, structure, and leadership of parties in French and Spanish Morocco and Tangier.

*The Pillar of Salt*, by Albert Memmi. Trans. from the French by Edouard Roditi. New York: Criterion Press, 1955. \$3.75. A semi-autobiographical novel of a young Jew in Tunis.

*The Prince and I*, by Marvine Howe. New York: John Day, 1955. 252 pages. \$3.50. The adventures and observations of an American girl who spent five years working for Radio Maroc in Rabat and had many contacts with both the nationalists and French.

*The Spider's House*, by Paul Bowles. New York: Random House, 1955. 406 pages. \$3.95. A novel about modern Morocco.

*La Tunisie et la France*, by Habib Bourguiba. Paris: René Julliard, 1954. 462 pages. 1,000 fr.

### Pakistan

*Crescent and Green*. London: Cassell, 1955. 170 pages; illus. 10s. A collection of 16 contemporary essays on Pakistan's history and culture by Pakistani and Western authors. Many appeared originally in the *Pakistan Quarterly*.

*The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan*, ed. by S. M. Ikram and Percival Spear. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. 204 pages; illus. 14s. Individual chapters on the historical development and present status of most of the major fine arts, with two chapters on general intellectual history.

*The Narrow Smile*, by Peter Mayne. London: John Murray, 1955. 254 pages; illus. 18s. A travel book about the North-West Frontier Province. Published in the U. S. as *Journey to the Pathans*.

*Waterless Moon*, by Elizabeth Balneaves. London: Lutterworth Press, 1955. 175 pages; photos, map. 15s. Travels through West Pakistan; about half of the book deals with the North-West Frontier Province.

*The Yellow Turban*, by Charlotte Jay. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 220 pages. \$2.75. A tale of murder and mystery in Karachi.

### Palestine

*Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*. New York: United Nations, 1955. 37 pages; 3 maps. No price indicated. Covers the period from July 1, 1954, to June 30, 1955.

*Eastern Easter in the Holy Land*, by Betty Busch. New York: Comet Press, 1955. 104 pages. \$2.75. An informal travel narrative about the Holy Land.

*Olive Trees in Storm*, by Morris S. Lazon. New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1955. 111 pages. \$2.75. An account of a 1954 visit to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel which focuses on the problem of a peaceful solution to the Palestine question.

*Tension, Terror and Blood in the Holy Land*, ed. by Musa Khuri. Damascus: The Palestine Arab Refugees Institution, 1955. 253 pages; illus. No price indicated. The background and present situation in Palestine from the Arab point of view.

### Persian Gulf

*The Wild Flowers of Kuwait and Bahrain*, by Violet Dickson. London: Allen & Unwin, 1955. 144 pages; maps, line drawings, photos. 25s.

### Somaliland

*Rapport de Gouvernement Italien à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur l'Administration de Tutelle de la Somalie 1954*. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato P. V., 1955. 367 pages. No price indicated. A report on all aspects of the trusteeship administration, including detailed economic and population maps and charts on economic development during 1954.

### Turkey and the Ottoman Empire

*Diplomatic Archive of Chios, 1577-1841*, ed. by Philip P. Argenti. 2 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. xlii + 1,062 pages; appendix, index to 1,117. \$37.50. A reconstruction of the greater part of the Ottoman period of Chian history by means of diplomatic dispatches in French, Italian, and English. The major chapter headings cover physical structure, topography, political history, economic history, social history, and religion.

*Milli Mücadele Hatıraları [Memoirs of the National Struggle]*, by General Ali Fuat Cebesoy. Istanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1953. 526 pages. TL 5. Contains,

among other things, information on Communism in Turkey during the 1920's.

*Moskova Hatıraları [Memoirs of Moscow]*, by General Ali Fuat Cebesoy. Istanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955. 348 pages. TL 5. Covers the period from Nov. 21, 1920, to June 2, 1922, with information on Russo-Turkish relations and the activities of Enver Pasha.

*My Thirty Years in Turkey*, by Lynn A. Scipio. Rindge, N. H.: Richard R. Smith, 1955. 346 pages. \$5.00. The autobiography of the former dean of the engineering school at Robert College.

*Turkey*, by Geoffrey Lewis. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 195 pages; appendix, biblio., map. \$5.50. A survey history from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire to the elections of 1954, with final chapters on geography, economy, people, and resources. One of the Nations of the Modern World Series.

*Zarys Dyplomatyki Osmansko-Turkeckiej [Outline of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomacy]*, by Ananiasz Zajackowski and Jan Reychman. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955. 166 pages. No price indicated.

### Art, Archaeology

*The Arabesque: The Abstract Art of Islam*, by Rom Landau. San Francisco: American Academy of Asian Studies, 1955. 28 pages. \$1.00. A monograph explaining why Islamic art has retained its abstract character through the centuries.

*The Art of Indian Asia*, by Heinrich Zimmer. Completed and edited by Joseph Campbell. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. 2 vols. 489 pages; 662 plates. \$22.50.

*The Building of Ancient Egypt*, by Helen and Richard V. B. Leacroft. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955. 32 pages. 50¢. "Large drawings in color show the home of an Egyptian nobleman, and the construction of an Egyptian pyramid and a temple."

*Discovering Buried Worlds*, by André Parrot. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 160 pages; illus. \$3.75. A general survey of Middle East archaeology.

*Excavations at New Testament Jericho and Khirbet en-Nitla*, ed. by W. F. Albright and Fred V. Winnett. James L. Kelso, Director. New Haven: American School of Oriental Research, 1955. 60 pages; illus, drawings. No price indicated. A report on a 1950 joint expedition of the Pittsburgh-Xenia Theological Seminary and the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem.

*Excavations at Nuzi*. Vol. 6: *The Administrative Archives*, compiled by Ernest Rene Lacheman. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. 193 pages; illus. \$7.50.

*The Madaba Mosaic Map*. Introduction and commentary by M. Avi-Yonah. Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1954. 80 pages; maps, plans, illus. No price indicated.



## Law, Philosophy, and Religion

*Complaint and Answer*, by Mohammed Iqbal. Trans. from the Urdu by A. J. Arberry. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, n.d. 79 pages. Rs. 2. A translation of two of Iqbal's religious poems.

*The Dead Sea Scrolls*, by Millar Burrows. New York: Viking, 1955. 435 pages. \$6.50. The discovery, content, and significance of these scrolls.

*Egyptian Religious Texts and Representations*. Vol. 2: *The Shrine of Tut-ankh-amon*, trans. with introductions by Alexandre Piankoff. Ed. by N. Rambova. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. 160 pages; 65 plates. \$17.50.

*The Essence of Islamic Teachings*, by Syed Nawab Ali. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1955. 54 pages. Rs. 1/8.

*Introducing Hinduism*, by Malcolm Pitt. New York: Friendship Press, 1955. 60 pages; photos. 60¢. Chapters cover the historical development of Hinduism, the Hindu renaissance, and the Christian church in its Hindu setting.

*The Jewish Sect of Qumran and the Essenes*, by André Dupont-Sommer. Trans. from the French by R. D. Barnett. New York: Macmillan, 1955. 195 pages; map, illus., biblio. \$2.50. "A theory of the origin, and much about the contents of the ancient Hebrew manuscripts, the Dead Sea Scrolls."

*Notes on Iqbal's Asrar-i Khudi*, ed. by A. J. Arberry. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1955. 48 pages. Rs. 1/8.

*Stand und Aufgaben der Iranischen Religionsgeschichte*, by George Widengren. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955. 158 pages. Gld. 10.

*War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, by Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. 360 pages. \$5.50. A study of the classical Muslim rules and principles related to various aspects of international affairs, with a concluding chapter on modern modifications of this system.

*Water Laws in Moslem Countries*, prepared by Dante A. Caponera. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1954. 195 pages; biblio. to 202. \$2.00. An introduction on Muslim law in general is followed by detailed coverage of water laws in four chapters: Canon Law, Custom Law in General, Applied Custom Law, and Codified Law. The last two of these approach the subject on a country-by-country basis.

## Linguistics

*Hindi Exercises and Readings*, by Gordon H. Fairbanks, John Gumperz, Walter Lehn, and Harsh Vardhan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955. 109 pages. \$3.50. A beginning college text with grammar, writing system, basic vocabulary, and reading selections.

*An Introduction to Modern Arabic*, by R. Bayly Winder and Farhat J. Ziadeh. Princeton: Princeton University Duplicating Bureau, 1955. 331 pages. \$5.00. A basic textbook.

*A New Hebrew Grammar*, by Fundaminsky Shlomo. London: Jewish Publication Committee, 1954. xxii + 361 pages. No price indicated.

*Stress Patterns in Arabic*, by Harris Birkeland. Oslo: I Kommissjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1954. 45 pages. Kr. 4-5.

*Study in Nubian Language*, by Mohammed Mitwalli Badr. Cairo: Dar Misr li al-taba'a, 1955. 195 pages. No price indicated.

## FORTHCOMING BOOKS

*Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, by W. Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

*Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940-1945*, by E. M. H. Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press. "The effect of war on food and agriculture, with a survey of general conditions before the war."

*Humor in Early Islam*, by Franz Rosenthal. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

*The Koran Interpreted*, by A. J. Arberry. New York: Macmillan. A new translation of the Qur'an with a preface analyzing previous translations.

*The Mountains of Pharaoh*, by Leonard Cottrell. London: Robert Hale. Tales about the explorers of Egypt's great monuments, from Greek times up to the present.

*Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Birdwood. London: Robert Hale. An examination of Indian-Pakistani relations on the question of Kashmir.

*We the Judges*, by Justice William O. Douglas. New York: Doubleday. A comparative study of the growth of Indian and American constitutional law.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress.

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Charles A. Ferguson, Harvey P. Hall, Sidney Glazer, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, Andreas Tietze.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of abbreviations, see page 116. For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 117.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel, exploration, natural history, geology)

- 8321 COUSTEAU, JACQUES-YVES. "Calypso explores for underwater oil." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 108 (Ag '55) 155-84. An illustrated account of a voyage through the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea. Main emphasis is on Trucial Oman.
- 8322 EILERS, W. "Der name Demawend." *Archiv Orientalni* 22, no. 2-3 (1954) 267-374. Historically, the earliest name of the mountain is Dunbávant, meaning "the mountain of many slopes."
- 8323 MARTÍNEZ RUIZ, JUAN. "Un capítulo de toponimia árabe-granadina en el siglo XVI." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 326-39. List of Spanish place names derived from Arabic, as drawn from *El libro de apeos de Güejar Sierra*, a ms. dealing with boundary disputes.
- 8324 PRITSACK, OMELJAN. "Eine altaische bezeichnung für Kiew." *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 1-13. This was *Man Kermen* (= "big town"); its second part is connected with the root of the Russian *kremel*.
- 8325 VORDERMAIER, KURT A. "In the valley of the almond blossom." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (Je '55) 351-83. Cyrenaican travelog, semi-poetic in its descriptive passages and often moving. Includes a long section on the Senussis and an account of the war with the Italians.

8326 WITTEK, P. "Additional notes to Idrisi's account of the British Isles." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 365-6. *Wādī snt* = Wethsand (Maghribi *wēd* = *wādī*), now Wissant; *Ifrānds*—France, both orally transmitted; but *rtaniza*—R. Tamisa comes from a map.

8327 YOUNG, GAVIN. "The marshes of southern Iraq." *Arab World* 24 (Jl '55) 11-7. Colorful sketch of the watery physical surroundings in which the Ma'dan, or marsh, Arabs live. They are likely to disappear as various irrigation and drainage projects get under way.

## HISTORY

(Ancient, modern)

- 8328 AHMADI, AHMAD. "Qaen," (in Persian) *Yaghma* (Tehran) 8 (Ag '55) 277-81. Miscellaneous information about the history and historic remains of this small eastern Iranian town.
- 8329 CAHEN, CLAUDE. "L'histoire économique et sociale de l'orient musulman médiéval." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 93-115. A strong plea for deeper and more systematic research on the hitherto comparatively neglected economic and social aspects of the medieval Islamic civilization which, although it had its spiritual side, was fundamentally the product of a materialistic society.
- 8330 CANARD, M. "Un vizir chrétien à l'époque

- fâtîmite: l'Arménien Bahrâm." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Études O.* 12 (1954) 84-113. Vicissitudes of this early 12th-cent. soldier who ended his life in a monastery.
- 8331 EHRENKREUTZ, A. S. "The place of Saladin in the naval history of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle Ages." *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 75 (Ap-Je '55) 100-16. A well written account, based largely on Arab sources, of how the famous sultan, owing to his grasp of the nature and significance of sea warfare, built up Egyptian fleets, which for a long time dominated the Eastern Mediterranean and played a vital role in determining the outcome of the Crusades. The failure of Saladin's successors to understand naval power resulted in the eventual decline of Egyptian prosperity that followed the appearance of the Portuguese in eastern waters.
- 8332 GARCÍA GÓMEZ, E. "Novedades sobre la crónica anónima titulada *Fath al-Andalus*." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Études O.* 12 (1954) 31-42. New edition promised. The text goes back to the lost work of 'Isá b. Aḥmad al-Rāzi, which was used also by Ibn Ḥayyān.
- 8333 GOITEIN, S. D. "The Cairo Genizah as a source for the history of Muslim civilization." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 75-91. Over 100,000 Arabic and Hebrew leaves dating back to the 11th and 12th centuries, largely personal or business correspondence and contracts, cast new light on familiar events and contain much information on the operation of Muslim administration and law as well as on economic matters of various kinds, family life, and medieval civilization in general. This provocative article is a basic interpretation of the significance of what is generally regarded as one of the greatest finds of source material in recent times.
- 8334 GOITEIN, S. D. "Letters from Palestine in Crusaders' times." (in Hebrew) *Yerushalayim* 5 (1954) 54-70. Three Genizah fragments in the Cambridge library contain interesting sidelights on the Crusaders' policy and military strategy.
- 8335 HODGSON, MARSHALL G. S. "How did the early Shī'a become sectarian?" *J. Amer. O. Soc.* 75 (Ja-Mr '55) 1-13. Closely reasoned discussion of how Shī'ism not only successfully avoided absorption into Sunnism, the fate of many other groups in early Islam, but deepened its characteristic differences. Two factors were the spiritual independence of the *ghulāt* and the advantages of the sectarian tendencies in the *imāmate* of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq.
- 8336 HUICI MIRANDA, AMBROSIO. "La batalla de Uclés y la muerte del Infante Don Sancho." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 259-86. The text of new Arabic source material (with Spanish translation) enables us to evaluate more accurately the battle of Zolaca in 1108 A.D. in which the armies of the Almoravides led by Tamīm b. Yūsuf inflicted a heavy defeat on the Christian forces commanded by Don Sancho, son of the ailing Alfonso VI.
- 8337 MÜLLER-WODARG, DIETER. "Die Landwirtschaft Ägyptens in der frühen Abbasidenzeit 750-969." *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 14-78.
- 8338 O'LEARY, DE LACY. "Early visitors in Islam." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (My '55) 295-302. Christians from the West frequently visited Palestine during the early Middle Ages and their observations on the Muslim countries through which they passed are interesting and valuable.
- 8339 SAMADI, S. B. "Slaves in Islam." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (Ag '55) 323-7. A biographical sketch of one of the Persian companions of Muḥammad, Salman Fārsī of Isfahan, who conceived the idea of digging a trench around Medina when the Muslims were besieging the city. This trench was adapted from the Sasanian technique of warfare with which Salman had had considerable personal experience.
- 8340 SANCHE DE SOPRANIS, HIPÓLITO. "Jerez y el reino de Granada a mediados del siglo XV." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 289-308. Details of relations between the Moors and Christians on the frontiers of Granada during the peaceful times between 1463-1483 A.D.
- 8341 VAJDA, G. "Problèmes et tâches de l'investigation du passé juif en Tunisie." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 2, no. 3-4 (1954) 309-13.
- 8342 WIET, GASTON. "Les marchands d'épices sous les sultans mamlouks." *Cahiers d'Hist. Égyptienne* 7 (My '55) 81-147. Maritime trade in the 14-15th century by the Karīmī guild.  
See also: 8398, 8440, 8441, 8447, 8466, 8468.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS

## (Modern)

- 8343 "The implications of 'Pakhtunistan'." *World Today* 11 (S '55) 390-8. Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan is accelerating the growth of Soviet trade and cultural relations with the former. The obvious dangers make the time appropriate for giving both Pakistan and Afghanistan guarantees against encroachment by either side over the Durand Line and for reappraising the Treaty of 1921 with a view to modernizing Anglo-Afghan relations.
- 8344 "Les lignes de forces du Maroc moderne." *Polit. Étrangère* 20 (Ag-S '55) 393-424. A penetrating analysis of the main factors characterizing Morocco today: the dynamism of the modern French sector of society, the estrangement of educated youth from the older generation, and the general confusion engendered by the "concert des voix incompetentes" drowning out the authentically experienced, French and Moroccan.
- 8345 "Où va l'Algérie?" *L'Afrique et l'Asie* no. 2 (1955) 31-8. While Algeria may be French, it is not true that Algeria is France, since the two countries are civilizations apart. On this realistic basis and within the legal framework provided by the Organic Statute, the author offers several

- suggestions for reducing the fever of the present Algerian malady.
- 8346 "The Sudan for the Sudanese" *World Today* 11 (O '55) 421-30. The time for Sudanese self-determination is approaching and everyone seems to be happy about it except the southern provinces and the Egyptians, the reason being that the Sudanese Constituent Assembly will choose independence rather than a link with Egypt. Southern politicians, abetted by the Egyptians, are pushing for a semi-autonomous status for their area. The mutiny of August 16, 1955, is likely to delay the development of self-determination.
- 8347 "The trial of Missak Torlian." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 80-93. Torlian was an Armenian tried by a British military court in 1921 for the murder of Behboud Khan Djivanshir, Russian Azerbaijan Minister of Interior and Musavatist leader who was charged by the attorney for the defense with having organized the Baku massacre of Armenians in which Torlian's family died. The court found Torlian guilty of unpremeditated murder, but shortly thereafter pardoned him.
- 8348 AHARONIAN, BARDGES. "On a recent work on Transcaucasia." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 39-51. A detailed review of *The struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921)* by Firuz Kazemzadeh. The latter is charged with flagrant anti-Armenian bias and with filling his book with "many historic inaccuracies, distortions and baseless assertions."
- 8349 ALEXANDER, EDWARD. "The plight of Soviet music and the Armenian composer." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 20-6. Armenia ranks high among the Soviet Union republics in cultural interests and achievement. For this reason the state-imposed clamps on free, creative expression do much to thwart the work of Aram Khatchaturian and other talented Armenian composers.
- 8350 ARRIBAS PALAU, MARIANO. "Una carta de la sultana Lalla Fāṭima de Maruecos a Maria Luisa de Parma princesa de Asturias." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 314-8. The rare case of a letter written by a woman. In answer to the Spanish princess who had asked her whether or not there still were any slaves in Morocco, the Sultana replied that they had all been set free. Arabic text, French translation, Spanish notes.
- 8351 ATYEO, HENRY C. "Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria before the United Nations." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (Ag-S '55) 229-48. In the struggle between the French and North African nationalists the United Nations has served principally as a liaison body, forum for airing the views of the advocates of independence, and instrument for sharpening France's awareness of the gravity of the situation.
- 8352 BADEAU, JOHN S. "A role in search of a hero: a brief study of the Egyptian revolution." *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 373-84. Domestic and foreign political problems, obstacles in the way of the government's reform program despite notable achievements, and the scarcity of qualified personnel make it touch and go whether the Revolutionary Command Council can keep things moving without constantly tightening its hold on Egyptian life.
- 8353 BJORKMAN, W. "Ein türkischer schenkungsbrief vom jahre 1587." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 144-54. Text and annotated translation.
- 8354 CHEVALIER, M. "La politique financière de l'expédition d'Egypte (1798-1801)." *Cahiers de l'Hist. Egyptienne* 7 (Je '55) 165-85.
- 8355 EFIMENCO, N. MARBURY. "An experiment with civilian dictatorship in Iran." *J. of Politics* 17 (Ag '55) 390-406. The need to balance opposing pressures arising out of the Iranian social structure and facing any leader in the country is what finally brought Mossadegh down, rather than any ideological factor.
- 8356 FALLS, CYRIL. "Communist arms for Egypt." *Illust. London News* 227 (O 15 '55) 652. Suggests that Western reaction to the announcement of Czech arms sale to Egypt was "too zealous." It should have taken a much less dramatic form than it did.
- 8357 GARCÍA FIGUERAS, TOMAS. "Intento de inutilización de la plaza y corto de Tanger (Agosto-Octubre 1790)." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954). The friendly relations between Spain and Morocco were changed drastically when al-Yāzid ascended the throne in 1790. The Spanish consul in Tangiers went to the Bay of Tangiers on a cruiser, where with the help of an engineer who was also on board a plan for attacking the city was drawn up. The plan and other relevant documents are here analyzed in considerable detail.
- 8358 GINIEWSKI, PAUL. "La paix israélo-arabe, est-elle possible?" *Polit. Étrangère* 20 (Jl '55) 355-68. The author thinks that peace will come not so much by virtue of any efforts by outsiders to mediate the quarrel but through the inexorable workings of the Turco-Iraqi pact, to which the other Arab states and Israel will eventually adhere. European history shows that an alliance among countries almost automatically results in the settlement of minor conflicts that have previously separated them (e.g., Trieste, the Sarre).
- 8359 GUASTAVINO GALLANT, GUILLERMO. "Los comienzos del sitio de Ceuta por Mawlāy Ismā'il (1694-1695)." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 215-58. As soon as the powerful ruler of Morocco and "paladin of Islam" had stabilized his internal position, he took advantage of the weakness of Spain and other European powers to drive them out of Africa. Following the abandonment of Tangiers by the English, he launched the struggle for Ceuta, the beginnings of which are here discussed on the basis of newly discovered documents. The resultant siege lasted until the Sultan's death in 1727.
- 8360 JAMĀLZĀDEH, SAYYED MOHAMMED 'ALI. "Two days with Nāser ad-Dīn Shāh, II." (in Persian) *Yaghma* (Tehran) 8 (Ag '55) 246-52.



- Some anecdotes concerning this 19th-cent. Persian monarch.
- 8361 JÄSCHKE, G. "The moral decline of the Ottoman dynasty." *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 10-4. "Kemal began his fight . . . hiding his real intentions behind a series of masks." This enabled him to lead his people, through cleverly contrived stages, from deep-seated royalist loyalties to the republic.
- 8362 JERREHIAN, RITA. "The outcome of the Congress of Berlin." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (O '55) 59-71. The Armenian question under Sultan Abdul Hamid II during the years 1879-1909 took a turn for the worse as the Turkish Sultan resorted to violence in an effort to allay general unrest in the empire and to eliminate the Armenians.
- 8363 KAZEMZADEH, FIRUZ. "Some neglected aspects of Armenian studies." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 73-5. Dr. Kazemzadeh urges that an attempt be made to locate and exploit Armenian language sources on the reigns of Shah Abbas and his successors, the Afghan invasion of Isfahan in 1722, the establishment of the Qajar dynasty, and other events in Iran of which the various Armenian communities were eyewitnesses.
- 8364 LEWIS, BERNARD. "The concept of an Islamic republic." *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 1-9. The terms for "republic" in the languages of Islamic peoples. Some rambling notes on how the caliphate is described in Islamic apologetics as an elective office, and on Pakistan's search for a new synthesis between republicanism and the non-republican political traditions of the Muslims.
- 8365 LOUCA, ANOUAR. "La renaissance égyptienne et les limites de l'oeuvre de Bonaparte." *Cahiers d'Hist. Égyptienne* 7 (F '55) 1-20. Collection of data on native reaction to the foreign impact.
- 8366 METZON, G. "Journal de captivité à Alger (1814-1816)." *Annales de l'Hist. d'Études O.* (Algiers) 12 (1954) 43-83. French translation by G.-W. Bousquet-Mirandolle of the scarce account of the imprisonment of the Dutchman Gerrit Metzon (1769-1845).
- 8367 NERSESIAN, GILBERT K. "The United States and the Armenian question." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 105-10. The Armenians' hope of an independent homeland secured by an American mandate was dashed by the same American politicians who rejected the League of Nations and by the resistance of the Turks who soon won many powerful friends in Europe as well as in America.
- 8368 PERLMANN, M. "The Middle East in the summer of 1955." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (Ag-S '55) 258-70. Tensions rose in one part of the area, subsided in another. "What the Middle East did not see were moods and forces favoring positive and humane solutions of its inter-state problems by efforts from within the area itself."
- 8369 PERSEN, WILLIAM. "The Russian occupations of Beirut, 1772-74." *R.C.A.J.* 42 (Jl-O '55) 275-86. These actions by the Russian fleet (a by-product, not the goal, of the Mediterranean campaign) was intended to promote the basic Tsarist objective of acquiring the Straits rather than occupying Palestine, Egypt, or Syria.
- 8370 RALEIGH, J. S. "The West and the defense of the Middle East." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (Je-Jl '55) 177-84. The Northern Tier-Iraqi concept seems so far to have achieved little more than increase of area tensions. The author proposes, as far as the interests of the free world are concerned: (1) greater effort to solve, if only in piecemeal fashion, the Arab-Israeli conflict; (2) more emphasis on economic aid and developmental projects; (3) permitting any Middle Eastern nation that may wish to join the West in its defense planning and efforts, since every prospective ally is an additional source of strength.
- 8371 RONDOT, PIERRE. "L'expérience britannique en Iraq (1920-1955)." *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, no. 2 (1955) 3-26. Much praise for the "supple realism" that has characterized British policy toward Iraq during the past 35 years. The French, in particular, claims the author, would benefit greatly from studying modern Anglo-Iraqi history, not because there are parallels elsewhere, but because such a study would tend to discourage dogmatism.
- 8372 SEAGER, B. W. "The Yemen." *R.C.A.J.* 42 (Jl-O '55) 214-30. Besides making some interesting observations on the trials of a British Aden-Yemen border agent, the author explains the deterioration in Anglo-Yemeni relations that set in in 1953. (The main reason is the Yemeni fear of the progressive measures instituted by the Aden Government for its people and the British fostering of federation among the Protectorate chieftains.)
- 8373 EL-TANAMLI, A. M. "L'exercice par l'Égypte du droit de visite, de recherches et de capture dans le Canal de Suez et le Golfe d'Akaba." *L'Égypte Contemp.* 46 (Ap '55) 1-40. A detailed juridical analysis of the two Israeli complaints made to the U.N. Security Council in 1951 and 1954 regarding Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping.
- 8374 TERTERIAN, HAMBARDZOUM. "The Levon Chanth mission to Moscow, II." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 94-102. The Kremlin aimed at conquering India through Iran. To gain the help of Kemalist Turkey an earlier policy of an independent Armenia was abruptly reversed in favor of permanent sovietization, thus snubbing the Levon Chanth group which had optimistically come to Moscow in order to secure Russian support for Armenian independence.
- 8375 TIBAWI, A. L. "Educational policy and Arab nationalism in mandatory Palestine." *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 15-29. Officials and teachers were active nationalists. Schoolboys were

used as nuisance value to embarrass the administration. Plans to transfer education to Arab hands failed, and as a result another area of grievances developed.

- 8376 WITTEK, P. "Devshirme and shari'a." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 271-8. The forced levy of Christian children was legally justified by a statement of Shafi'i denying *dhimmi* status to those who had become Christians after Mohammed's time; that this was so in the Balkans may have been revealed to the Sultans by the Greek clergy.

See also: 8325, 8407, 8414, 8471, 8483, 8484

## ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)

- 8377 "Budget estimates for 1955/56." *Econ. Bull.* (Cairo) 8, no. 2 (1955) 103-7.
- 8378 "Development of Egyptian joint stock companies." *Econ. Bull.* (Cairo) 8, no. 2 (1955) 100-2. "The capital position of the companies is . . . in general strong and not vulnerable."
- 8379 "Egyptian industry reviewed." *Econ. Bull.* (Cairo) 8, no. 1 (1955) 18-25. Summary based on the yearbook of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, plus additional data.
- 8380 "Egypt's balance of payments for 1954." *Econ. Bull.* (Cairo) 8, no. 2 (1955) 86-99. One learns *inter alia* that pilgrimage expenditure accounts for the largest item of disbursements to the Middle East region.
- 8381 "The Suez Canal in 1954." *Econ. Bull.* 8, no. 2 (1955) 128-32. The number of passages increased by 3.8%; net tonnage of ships passing through increased by 10.3%.
- 8382 ASFOUR, EDMUND Y. "Industrial development in Lebanon." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 1-16. "The narrowness of the market is probably the major obstacle."
- 8383 BADRE, A. Y. "The economy of the contemporary Arab world." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 17-26. "The Arab World is consciously embarking on a determined program of future development. . . . It will be unrealistic to conceive of the Arab economy as attaining, at any time, a stature of industrial power. . . . Foreign private capital [will be] necessary for many years to come. . . . It will be unrealistic to expect a very rapid pace of development."
- 8384 CHALLOT, J. P. "Quelques aspects marocains des problèmes de défense et de restauration des sols." *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, no. 2 (1955) 39-46. Urges a form of Pt. Four agricultural aid accompanied by an educational campaign to convince the French administrators of the need to understand and facilitate the introduction of new techniques of preventing soil erosion.
- 8385 DEGLIN, CHRISTIAN and POITRINEAU, ABEL. "Un terroir de la zone côtière du nord: el-Aousdja." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 2, no. 3-4 (1954) 254-64.
- 8386 ECONOMIDES, J. G. "Les sociétés d'investissement, leur rôle en Egypte." *L'Égypte Contemp.* 46 (Ap '55) 41-84. Examines the main characteristics of these financial institutions, the different types, functions, potentialities, and limitations.
- 8387 FAHMY, HUSSEIN. "Projects of economic construction and development in the Egyptian republic." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 8 (Mr '55) 12-25. A Beirut lecture by the chief of the Egyptian Council for Increasing National Production which describes various projects and cites the availability of numerous Egyptian experts.
- 8388 KHALLAF, HUSSEIN. "Financing economic development in Egypt." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 27-46. For a mobilization of internal resources; reliance on external financing only within the narrowest limits.
- 8389 KLAT, PAUL J. "Whither land tenure in the Arab world." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 47-61. Reform and industrialization are welcome. However, there remains the need for "better human relationships between landlords and tenants to ensure to the entire peasantry complete freedom from any type of economic exploitation and from political and social oppression."
- 8390 MEYER, A. J. "The Iran consortium: solution or stopgap?" *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 62-71. "The best the oil companies can hope to do is to encourage Iranian citizens to create examples of constructive productive enterprise."
- 8391 MOTAMEN, H. "Iran's experience with import quotas." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 72-87. Analyzes the experience of twenty years. Notes opposition and controversy in the press.
- 8392 PERETZ, DON. "Development of the Jordan valley waters." *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 397-412. The UNRWA, Arab, and Israeli plans described and contrasted; possible compromises put forward. Even if agreement is reached, serious economic and social problems remain before it can help solve the Arab refugee question.
- 8393 PISSALOUX, RENÉ. "Les cartes d'occupation du sol en Tunisie." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 2, no. 3-4 (1954) 265-306. Deals with Cap Bon.
- 8394 PORTER, R. S. "Statistical services in the Middle East." *Mid. East Econ. Papers* (Beirut) 2 (1955) 88-107. "It is thus by a combination of administrative reform, training, and improved public relations that the solid achievements in the field of statistics in the region can be maintained."
- 8395 AL-UZRI, ABDUL-KARIM. "The Council for Reconstruction: its activities and projects." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 8 (Mr '55) 26-69. How Iraq's development is planned and executed by

this body with the funds supplied by oil royalties.  
See also: 8329, 8402, 8407

## SOCIAL AFFAIRS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and health, religion, law)

- 8396 AHMAD, A. K. FAIZUDDIN. "State and individual in Islam." *The Islamic Lit.* 78 (My '55) 277-84. Some idealistic views on the relations between man and man and between man and the state, as enjoined by the Qur'an.
- 8397 BELLAMY, JAMES A. "Cairo University." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (Je-Jl '55) 185-90. Discusses admissions, curricula, degrees, faculty, examinations, student activities. This "invaluable and indispensable institution in Egyptian life" is creating a genuinely intellectual class rather than merely qualified job holders. At the same time that it promotes traditional Arab culture, it is trying to teach its students the most useful lessons from European civilization. The University has already done much to effect a synthesis between two dissimilar cultures.
- 8398 BRUNSCHVIG, ROBERT. "Considérations sociologiques sur le droit musulman ancien." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 61-73. An investigation of the divergences among the various law schools will not only provide a key to traditional Muslim law but result in deeper understanding, albeit in part, of the history of Muslim society and thought.
- 8399 AL-BUSTANY, FUAD A. "The university in the Arab world." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 8 (Je '55) 191-216. Historical sketch of universities in medieval times followed by a survey of modern institutions, concluding that the lack of tradition and deficient secondary school preparation are chiefly responsible for the existing inadequacies.
- 8400 CALLENS, M. "L'hébergement à Tunis." *IBLA* 18, no. 2 (1955) 257-71. Like so many other cities throughout the world, Tunis has had to cope with wave after wave of job-seeking migrants from the countryside. Suggestions for solving the acute housing shortage. Illust.
- 8401 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Tunisie, terre d'amitié." *IBLA* 18, no. 2 (1955) 169-86. Sentimental reflections on Tunisian life and social relations.
- 8402 FLAVIN, MARTIN. "Egypt's Liberation Province; the beginning of a beginning." *Reporter* (New York) 13 (N 3 '55) 23-9. Favorable report on the effort to develop an area of the desert between Cairo and Alexandria by and for the fellahin.
- 8403 FOTOS, EVAN. "An appreciation of Turkish university life." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (Ag-S '55) 248-58. Turkey's three universities have in general made impressive strides toward developing into superior institutions, even by Western standards. They are doing a good job of training people competent to serve the nation as it continues the program of modernization.
- 8404 FYZEE, ASAF A. A. "Le malaise du Proche-Orient." *Polit. Étrangère* 20 (Je-Jl '55) 277-82. Engrossed as they are in the economic and political problems of the Middle East, most Westerners fail to realize, let alone understand the depth of, the other difficulties facing the Middle Easterners which arise from a cultural and spiritual crisis. In particular, religion—what Islam means or should mean to its followers—constitutes perhaps the greatest social problem of the Orient. The author favors a fairly widespread reform of Islam and outlines six principles or directions in which "modernization" should slowly move.
- 8405 GOLVIN, L. "Notes sur deux procédés de divination en Afrique du Nord." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Études O.* 12 (1954) 114-21.
- 8406 GRÜTTER, IRENE. "Arabische bestattungsbräuche in frühislamischer Zeit." *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 79-104. The shroud; prayer over the dead; the funeral procession.
- 8407 HAY, SIR RUPERT. "The impact of the oil industry on the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms." *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 361-72. The oil industry so far has had a beneficial material effect and no demoralizing influence on the people at large. No strong current of anti-Western feeling has as yet developed. All of these are possibilities, however, and it behooves the oil companies to have them in mind when shaping their policies.
- 8408 HUSEIN, TAHA. "The future of the university in the Arab world." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 8 (Je '55) 239-53.
- 8409 KORNRUMPF, H. "The times of Salat in the Qur'an." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (Ag '55) 489-94. The five daily obligatory prayers for Muslims would seem to be a late invention, since the Qur'an mentions only three—morning, noon, and evening.
- 8410 LELONG, MICHEL. "Quelques problèmes de la jeunesse étudiante à travers les revues et périodiques Tunisiens." *IBLA* 18 no. 2 (1955) 273-8. Reviews a number of periodicals, Arabic and French, which reflect the cultural ferment now taking place among Tunisian students.
- 8411 LE TOURNEAU, R. "L'évolution des villes musulmanes d'Afrique du nord au contact de l'occident." *Annales de l'Inst. d'Études O.* 12 (1954) 199-222. The differences between Algeria on one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other; various types of coexistence of European quarters and native towns; very rapid growth; urbanization of tribesmen; rise of the proletariat and intelligentsia.
- 8412 LEWIN, BERNHARD. "La notion de *muhdath* dans le kalām et dans la philosophie." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 84-93. A Christian physician-philosopher's article is given in translation from an Istanbul ms.
- 8413 LIEBESNY, HERBERT J. "Administration and legal development in Arabia: Aden Colony



- and Protectorate." *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 385-96. In the Colony the British have introduced Western-type administration and courts; in the Protectorate they have preserved but systematized native institutions.
- 8414 MESSING, SIMON D. "Changing Ethiopia." *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 413-32. The Emperor is the major "change-agent." The impact of an industrial age, a cash economy, etc., have not yet been fully felt in the country.
- 8415 NALBANDIAN, LOUISE. "Armenians in the Near East." *Armenian Rev.* 8 (S '55) 76-8. Sketchy impressions of the communities in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine which the author found quite different in almost every respect from the Armenians she knows in the United States. While there are numerous exceptions, in general the Armenians in the Arab countries are culturally and economically less well off than their coreligionists elsewhere.
- 8416 NAVARRO, JOAQUINA ALBARRACIN. "El hayk en la zona atlántica del Marruecos español." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 309-14. *Hayk* is a veil and cloak worn by the Muslim women of Morocco. Although intended as a form of camouflage, the employment of subtle signs by the wearer reveals her identity when she so wishes. Illust.
- 8417 PROST, GÉRARD. "Habitat et habitation chez les Ouderna et les Matmata." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 2, no. 3-4 (1954) 239-53.
- 8418 RINGGREN, H. "Die gottesfurcht im Koran." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 118-34. Analyzes the Arabic terms and their possible Judeo-Christian prototypes.
- 8419 ROBSON, JAMES. "The transmission of Tirmidhi Jami'." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (My '55) 303-15. A critical analysis of the collection of *ḥadīth* by Tirmidhi known as *al-Jāmi'* and the various narrators.
- 8420 SIDDIQUI, MAZHERUDDIN. "Speech and logos." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (My '55) 269-76. Comparison of Muslim views on the speech of God with the Christian doctrine of *logos*.
- 8421 TAESCHNER, FRANZ. "Ein beitrag zur frage des islamischen verbotes der abbildung lebender wesen, insbesondere im sakralen bereich." *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 47-50. On the studies of Bishr Fāris dealing with Islamic painting.
- 8422 TAGHER, JEANETTE. "Les cabarets du Caire dans la seconde moitié du XIX siècle." *Cahiers d'Hist. Égyptienne* 7 (Je '55) 186-95.
- 8423 TORRES BALBAS, LEOPOLDO. "Extension y demografía de las ciudades hispanomusulmanas." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 35-59. Pirenne and others who devoted much attention to Muslim cities ignored the Iberian peninsula. This study of the development of several important Spanish cities partially rectifies the omission and through use of primary source material sheds light on the entire problem.
- 8424 ZAEHNER, R. C. "Postscript to *Zurván*." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 232-49. Further evidence that *Zandiks*=*Dahris*; more material on Mithraism; a note on an extract from Murtaḍā Rāzī's *Tabṣirat al-awāmm*.
- 8425 ZAFER, M. J. "Polygamy." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (Jl '55) 423-9. A defense of polygamy on sociological and national grounds.
- 8426 ZIADEH, NICOLA. "The effect of the university on the life of the Arab world." (in Arabic) *al-Abḥāth* 8 (Je '55) 217-38. Most of the institutions are government-sponsored and subject to close controls. Too many study law, too few science and technology. The transition from study to research is slow.
- See also: 8325, 8327, 8329, 8344, 8364, 8372, 8375.

## ART

(*Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics and philately, painting and music*)

- 8427 "Syria's new Museum of National Traditions." *Arab World* 24 (Jl '55) 16-7. Brief sketch of the exhibits of this museum—furniture, clothing, ornaments—which help to reconstruct in vivid form life in Syria over a century ago.
- 8428 ASHTOR, E. "Arabic manuscripts written in Palestine." (in Hebrew) *Kirjath Sepher* 30 (Jl '55) 434-9. Most of the Arabic mss. in the Hebrew University Library that were written or copied by Palestinians, some here listed, show a very narrow range of intellectual interests. This provincialism was due to the fact that Palestine did not get the stimulation provided by art- and poetry-loving caliphs, to its never having been an important political center, etc. Hence, history, belles-lettres, and other categories of non-theological literature were rarely written by the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.
- 8429 FRYE, R. N. "An early Arabic script in eastern Iran." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 67-74. 11th cent. mss. seem to indicate that, apart from Kufic and local variations, two scripts developed in western Iran and eastern Iran respectively. The former, a transition from Kufic to *nashkī* which displays unusual ligatures, spread to the north, to the Volga Bulgars.
- 8430 FRYE, R. N. "The manuscript of the *Andarz Nāme* in new Persian." *J.A.O.S.* 75 (Ja-Mr '55) 24-6. This ms. dated 1090 A.D. possesses exceptional importance because of its 109 illustrations (the oldest Persian miniature extant), a form of script which is a valuable new source for the history of Arabic writing, and linguistic data. Illust.
- 8431 ḤASAN, ZAKI MUḤAMMAD. "The Baghdad school of Islamic painting." *Sumer* 40, no. 1 (1955) 15-46. History, characteristics, etc. of this great school of Islamic art known variously as the Mesopotamian, Abbasid, Seljuq, as well as the Baghdad School of Painting, which flourished



- from the 12-14th centuries A.D. and influenced the entire Islamic world. Fully annotated study; 16 pl.
- 8432 JAMME, A. "A Qatabanian dedicatory inscription from Hajar bin Humeid." *J.A.O.S.* 75 (Ap-Je '55) 97-9. Plate.
- 8433 KATZ, KARL. "A South Arabian carving of alabaster." *J. Walters Art Gallery* 27 (1954) 77-86. Discusses an inlaid sculptural head of a calf made of alabaster, possibly originally attached to the arm of a couch or another piece of furniture. The unique piece is in keeping with pre-Islamic sculpture from the Yemen, but the crescent and star motif on it induces the writer to think that it is from the early Ottoman period.
- 8434 LISSE, P. and LOUIS, A. "Les potiers de Nabeul." *IBLA* 18, no. 2 (1955) 223-55. Step-by-step description, with diagrams and photographs, of the methods used by these Tunisian craftsmen for baking and glazing pottery.
- 8435 MILLAS VALLICROSA, JOSÉ M. "Nuevos datos manuscritos de las obras geopónicas de Ibn Wāfid." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 339-44. Description of two hitherto unidentified mss. on agriculture in the Bibliothèque Nationale.
- 8436 NAKHJAVĀNĪ, HOSEIN. "Introducing an important unknown manuscript." (in Persian) *Rev. de la Faculté des Lettres de Tabriz* 7 (Je '55) 61-6. Description of an Arabic ms. *Rawḍat al-jannān*, a work containing biographic material on some 300 saints, poets, and scholars buried in or near the city of Tabriz, together with an account of the life and other writings of its author, Darvish Hosein Kerbalā'ī.
- 8437 RICE, D. S. "Studies in Islamic metal work, V." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 206-31. (1) A Seljuq lamp (between 1266 and 1285 A.D.). (2) The oldest mosque lamp in metal (9th-10th cent.), at the Art Institute of Chicago. (3) An early lamp found at Qayrawan (early 11th cent., Bardo Museum, Tunis). (4) Lamp dated 1090 A.D. from Omayyad Mosque, Damascus. (5) Ancient lamp fragments from Rayy. (6) Metal lamps of 13th-14th cent.
- 8438 ROES, ANNE. "The trefoil as a sacred emblem." *Artibus Asiae* 17, no. 1 (1954) 61-8. Starting with an analysis of two stone finials in the form of calf's heads from Mesopotamia and Iran, the author gives a history of the trefoil motif found on the forehead of one of the sculptures. It is a sacred symbol, possibly standing for fire or the holy soma plant, and derives from Iran. It is the ultimate origin of the fleur-de-lys so widely used in Western art and heraldry.
- 8439 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. "From Arabic books and manuscripts. V: a one-volume library of Arabic philosophical and scientific texts in Istanbul." *J.A.O.S.* 75 (Ja-Mr '55) 14-23. No. 1279 of the Jarullah manuscript collection in the Millet Library in Istanbul is a *majmū'ah* containing copies of known as well as of hitherto unknown works. Prof. Rosenthal here gives a brief description of 26 items in order of their appearance in this 410 folio ms.
- 8440 SHUKRI, SĀJIDAH and AL-NAQSHA-BANDI, NĀṢIR. "The Islamic dinar." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 40, no. 1 (1955) 62-84. A report on the coins of the Mongol Ilkhanid and Jalairid dynasties unearthed in Wasit and now kept in the Iraq Museum. Plate.
- 8441 TERRASSE, H. "L'art de l'empire almoraide: ses sources et son évolution." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 25-34. The founders of the first great Hispano-African empire were Berber nomads alien to the centers of Muslim civilization. Yet they managed to inspire the development of a significant art, as this illustrated study shows.
- 8442 VALDERRAMA MARTINEZ, FERNANDO. "Las zāwiyas de Tetuan." *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 358-60. Text and translation of the inscriptions on the 'Abbāsiyah and Nāsiriyyah zāwiyas. See also: 8328, 8332, 8421, 8470.

## LANGUAGE

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- 8444 DENY, J. "Une locution gérondive populaire en turc d'Anatolie." *J.A.* 242, no. 3-4 (1954) 397-410.
- 8445 FRAYHA, ANIS. "On the necessity of re-writing Arabic grammar on a descriptive basis." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 8 (Mr '55) 26-69.
- 8446 LITTMANN, ENNO. "Biliterale verba im Tigrē." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 94-101.
- 8447 MINORSKY, V. "Addenda to the *Hudūd al-'ālam*." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 250-70. Remarks on the language, including a vocabulary, and on the text.
- 8448 MORTAḌAVI, MANŪCHEHR. "Some suffixes." (in Persian) *Rev. de la Fac. des Lettres de Tabriz* 7 (Je '55) 45-60. An extended discussion on a comparative linguistic basis of the Persian suffix *-var*. Beginning of a series of articles on a subject that has hitherto been almost completely neglected.
- 8449 MUNDY, C. S. "Turkish syntax as a system of qualification." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 279-305. The sentence in Old Ottoman and the modern colloquial is a verbal base amplified by preceding qualifiers; there is no hierarchy of elements.
- 8450 NAVĀBĪ, MĀHYĀR. "Chokestānī mapsandime." (in Persian) *Rev. de la Faculté des Lettres de Tabriz* 7 (Jl '55) 41-4. Interpretation of this Azeri phrase as found in a 9th-10th cent. Persian ms. *Mazārat-e Tabriz*. It was used by the well known Tabrizi saint, Māmā Eṣmat.

- 8451 PETRÁČEK, K. "Material zum altarabischen dialekt von al-Madina." *Archiv Orientalni* 22, no. 2-3 (1954) 400-6. Summary, with full bibliography.
- 8452 RUNDGREN, FRITHIOF. "Sillagdan = al-ahāmira = al-Rūm nebst einigen bemerkungen zu Ibn al-Sirāfi's *Ṣarḥ abyāt iṣlāḥ al-manṭiq*." *Orientalia Suecana* 3, no. 2-4 (1954) 135-43.
- 8453 TÖSI, ADIB. "The dialect of ancient Kazerun." (in Persian) *Rev. de la Faculté des Lettres de Tabriz* 7 (Je '55) 26-40. The *Ferdaws el-morshidiyeh* of Maḥmūd b. 'Othmān Kāzerūnī (d. 728 A.D.) and the *Maṣḥad al-aḥrār* of Moḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Kāzerūnī (d. 830 A.D.) contain words and phrases in the local Kazeruni dialect (s.w. Iran) as taken from a 5th-cent. Arabic work. With the help of the Persian translations of the phrases and by comparing them with their modern Kazeruni counterparts, the author has sought to reconcile the differences in the two Persian texts. See also: 8322, 8324, 8326, 8482.

## LITERATURE

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- 8456 ARAFAT, W. "A controversial incident and the related poem in the life of Ḥassan b. Thābit." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 197-205. Reconstruction of the story behind the famous lampoon against the Meccan emigrants, of which Arafat considers only lines 1, 4-7 genuine, the rest having been added for the sake of the story.
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- 8460 LANG, D. M. "St. Euthymius the Georgian and the Barlaam and Ioasaph romance." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 306-25.
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- 8464 SPIES, OTTO. "Der türkische bauer in der erzählungsliteratur." *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 40-6. Translation of two long passages from the stories written in *Uncle Sam* (1952) by Samim Kocagöz.
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- 8467 VON GRUNEBaum, G. E. "Idéologie musulmane et esthétique arabe." *Studia Islamica* 3 (1955) 5-23. Seeks to answer the question: "Où est-ce que l'islamisme, doctrine et pratique, offre un point de départ naturel pour le développement de l'un des grands genres littéraires." See also: 8439, 8450.

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- 8475 DENY, J. "Lucien Bouvat." *J.A.* 242, no. 2

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- 8540 PAREJA, FÉLIX M. *Islamología*. *Tamuda* 2, no. 2 (1954) 369-70. (Fernando Valderrama Martínez).
- 8541 PELLAT, C. *Le milieu basrien et la formation de Gahiz*. *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 108-9. (B. Spuler).
- 8542 PELLAT, C. *L'arabe vivant*. *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 397-8. (D. Cowan).
- 8543 PENZL, HERBERT. *A grammar of Pashto*. *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 464-5. (Charles A. Ferguson).
- 8544 PHILBY, H. ST. JOHN. *Saudi Arabia*. *Internat. Aff.* 31 (O '55) 530. (H. Ingrams); *R.C.A.J.* 42 (Jl-O '55) 287-8. (H. Ingrams). "In this book the man who has many claims to be regarded as the greatest Arabian [scholar] of all times chronicles a period of Arabic history which has recently ended with the death of a man universally recognized as the greatest Arab of at least modern times . . . in a unique way an indispensable primary source for the future historian."
- 8545 PHILLIPS, WENDELL. *Qataban and Sheba*. *Amer. J. of Archeol.* 59 (O '55) 330-1. (Joan Lines). "A vivid and colorful . . . narrative of adventure and archaeology in South Arabia. The text now and then reads like advertising copy, but it was obviously the author's intent to give *quid pro quo* to the large corporations which provided both money and equipment;" *Geogr. Rev.* 45 (O '55) 599-601. (George C. Miles).
- 8546 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *The Middle East. Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 65-6. (G. Jäschke).
- 8547 RUNCIMAN, S. A. *History of the Crusades, III*. *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 400-1. (B. Lewis). "Little use is made of Arabic sources"; *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 450-2. (Jean Richard). "A very precise synthesis, very controlled, very lively."
- 8548 SANGER, R. H. *The Arabian peninsula*. *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 118-9. (B. Spuler); *Welt des Islams* 4, no. 1 (1955) 64-5. (E. Klingmüller).
- 8549 SCHROEDER, ERIC. *Muhammad's people*. *R.C.A.J.* 42 (Jl-O '55) 298. (J. C. Curry). "The author's main purpose is to let the Muslim documents set forth the story of a Muslim civilization."
- 8550 SINOR, D., ed. *Orientalism and history*. *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 119-21. (W. Lentz).
- 8551 SPULER, BERTOLD and FORRER, L. *Der vordere Orient in islamischer zeit*. *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 399-400. (B. Lewis). Scanty coverage of modern Arabic and Persian publications, excellent for Turkish works, good for works in Russian and other Slavic languages.
- 8552 STARK, FREYA. *Ionia*. *Mid. East J.* 9 (Autumn '55) 458. (G. G. Arnakis). Explorations and interpretations of ancient sites along the Aegean coast of Turkey.
- 8553 STRAUSS, A. *History of the Jews in Egypt and Syria under the Mamlooks, II*. *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 378-9. (J. B. Segal). The "outer", economic and political, aspect of Jewish life is ably and convincingly examined; the inner aspect, social and cultural, is less completely treated.
- 8554 STRAUSS, LEO. *Persecution and the art of writing*. *Jew. Soc. Stud.* 17 (Ap '55) 150-1. (M. Perlmann). Brilliant studies on al-Fārābī and other philosophers in the medieval Islamic world. Effective analysis of the differentiation between the material and written style intended for the ordinary reader and that for the élite.
- 8555 STRELCYN, S. *Catalogue des manuscrits éthiopiens B (collection Griaule), t. IV*. *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 17, no. 2 (1955) 379-80. (E. Ollendorff).

The reviewer provides details on the structure of the Paris Ethiopic collections.

- 8556 WATIN, LOUIS. *Recueil de textes marocains*. J.A.O.S. 75 (Ap-Je '55) 130-1. (Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz). "A useful, practical textbook for anyone whose knowledge of Arabic is advanced enough to tackle the intricacies of the specific style of Moroccan administrative documents."
- 8557 WATT, W. MONTGOMERY. *Muhammad at Mecca*. *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 106-8. (R. Paret).

8558 WEISS, GUNTHER. *Die internationale Stellung Jerusalems*. *Internat. Aff.* 31 (O '55) 532. (Emile Marmorstein).

8559 AL-YASIN, IZZ AL-DIN. *The lexical relation between Ugaritic and Arabic*. *Archiv Orientalni* 22, no. 2-3 (1954) 486-8. (S. Segert).

8560 ZBINDEN, E. *Die djinn des Islams und der altorientalische geisterglaube*. *Islam* 32 (Je '55) 105. (J. W. Fück).

See also: 8348.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique  
 Acad., Academy  
 Aff., Affairs, affaires  
 Afr., African, Afrique, etc.  
 Amer., American  
 Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique  
 B., Bulletin  
 C., Central  
 Cent., Century  
 Contemp., Contemporary, etc.  
 Cult., Culture  
 D., Deutsch  
 Dept., Department  
 East., Eastern  
 Econ., Economic, économique  
 For., Foreign  
 G., Gesellschaft  
 Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.  
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain  
 Hist., Historical, historique, etc.  
 Illust., Illustrated  
 Inst., Institute  
 Internat., International  
 J., Journal  
 L., Literature, etc.  
 M., Morgenländisch, etc.

Mag., Magazine  
 Mid., Middle  
 Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.  
 Mus., Museum, musée  
 Natl., National  
 Nr., Near  
 Numis., Numismatic, numismatique  
 O., Oriental, oriente, etc.  
 Pal., Palestine  
 Phil., Philosophical  
 Philol., Philological, Philologie  
 Polit., Political, Politique  
 Proceed., Proceedings  
 Quart., Quarterly  
 R., Royal  
 Res., Research  
 Rev., Review, revue  
 Riv., Rivista  
 S., School  
 Soc., Society, société  
 Stud., Studies  
 Trans., Transactions  
 U. S., United States  
 USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
 Univ., University, université  
 Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung

### Arabic

K., Kitab, etc.  
 Maj., Majallah, etc.

### Russian, Polish, etc.

Akad., Adakemii  
 Fil., Filosophi  
 Inst., Institut  
 Ist., Istori  
 Izvest., Izvestia  
 Lit., Literaturi  
 Orient., Orientalni  
 Ser., Seriya  
 Sov., Sovetskoye  
 Uchon., Uchoniye  
 Vostok., Vostokovedenia  
 Yaz., Yazika  
 Zap., Zapiski

### Turkish

Coğ., Coğrafya  
 Fak., Fakülte  
 Univ., Üniversite

# LIST OF PERIODICALS REVIEWED

- al-Abhath.** Lebanon and Syria, LL9; foreign, £1; single issue LL2.50, 6s. *q* American Univ. of Beirut; agent: Dar al-Kitab, POB 1284, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Acta Orientalia.** 60 forint. *irreg* Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Orientalisztikai Közleményei, 2 V. Alkotmány-utca 21, Budapest, Hungary.
- Acta Orientalia.** Kr. 30; single issue kr. 10. *irreg* Associates Orientales Batava Danica Norvegica, c/o Ejnar Munksgaard, Ltd., Nørregade 6, Copenhagen K, Denmark.
- al-Adib.** Single issue LL1. *m* al-Adib, B.P. 878, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Africa.** UK, £1 15s; foreign, \$5.25, fr. 1720. *q* International African Institute, St. Dunstan's Chambers, 10/11 Fetter Lane, London, E.C.4.
- African Affairs.** £1 4s; single issue 5s. *q* Royal African Society, 18 Northumberland Ave., London, W.C.2.
- African Studies.** £1; single issue 5s. *q* Dept. of Bantu Studies, Univ. of the Witwatersrand, Milner Park, Johannesburg, S. Africa; agent: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., 43 Gr. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- L'Afrique et l'Asie.** 800 fr. *q* I.A.C. 8, rue de Furstenberg, Paris 6e.
- American Anthropologist.** Institutions, \$9.00; individuals, \$8.50; single issue \$2.25. *bi-m* Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
- American Historical Review.** \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Historical Association, Study Room 274, Library of Congress Annex, Washington 25, D. C.; single issues available from The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.
- American Journal of Archaeology.** \$7.50; foreign \$8; single issue \$2. *q* Archaeological Institute of America, 608 Univ. of Cincinnati Library, Cincinnati, Ohio.
- Anadolu.** E. de Boccard, 1, rue de Medici, Paris.
- Anatolian Studies.** UK, £1 10s; foreign, \$4.50; single issue £1 12s 6d. *ann* British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, 56 Queen Anne St., London, W.1.
- al-Andalus.** 60 pes.; single issue 30 pes. *semi-ann* Secretaria, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cambio Internacional Serrano 117, Madrid, Spain.
- Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesinin Dergisi.** 4 parts per ann Univ. of Ankara, Turkey.
- Annales Archéologiques de Syrie.** Syria, LS 20; foreign, £2 10s or equiv.; single issue LS 10, £1 5s. *semi-ann* Direction Générale des Antiquités de Syrie, Damascus, Syria.
- Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger.** No fixed price. Institut d'Études Orientales, Faculté des Lettres, Algiers, Algeria.
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.** Membership, U. S., \$5; Can., \$4.50; elsewhere, \$4; subscription, libraries and other institutions, \$6; single issue, mbrs. \$1.25, non-mbrs. \$2. *bi-m* American Academy of Political and Social Science, 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia 4, Pa.
- Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan.** Jordan, JD 1; foreign, £1 plus postage. *ann* Dept. of Antiquities, POB 88, Amman, Jordan.
- Anthropos.** Sw. fr. 60. 3 issues per ann P. Fritz Bornemann SVD, Posieux, Freiburg, Switzerland; agent: Stechert-Hafner, 31 E. 10th St., New York 3, N. Y.
- Arab World.** Town mbrs. £1 1s; country & overseas mbrs. 10s 6d. *q* Anglo-Arab Assn., 27 Eaton Place, London, S.W.1.
- Arabica.** Fl. 26; fr. 2400. 3 issues per ann E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; Librairie Orientale et Americaine G.P. Maisonneuve, 198, Blvd. St.-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Archiv Orientalní.** Kčs.100; single issue Kčs.25. *q* Československá akademie věd Orientální ústav, Lázeňská 4, Praha III, Czechoslovakia.
- Armenian Review.** \$6; single issue \$1.75. *q* Hairenik Association, Inc., 212 Stuart St., Boston 16, Mass.
- Ars Orientalis** (formerly *Ars Islamica*). *irreg* Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington 25, D. C.
- Art Institute of Chicago Quarterly.** \$1. *q* The Art Institute, Adams St. at Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Artibus Asiae.** Sw.fr.50, \$12; single issue \$3.50. *q* Prof. Alfred Salmony, Institute of Fine Arts, New York Univ., 17 E. 80th St., New York, N. Y.
- Asian Review.** £1; single issue 5s. *q* East & West Ltd., 3 Victoria St., London, S.W.1.
- Asiatische Studien.** Sw.fr. 18. *q* A. Francke, A. G. Verlag, Bern, Switzerland.
- Belleten.** *q* Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey.
- Biblioteca Orientalis.** \$9.50; single issue \$2. *bi-m* Dr. A. A. Kampman, ed., Noordeindeplein 4a, Leiden, The Netherlands.
- British Museum Quarterly.** £1; single issue 5s 3d. *q* Trustees of the British Museum, Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- Bulletin of the City Art Museum of St. Louis.** \$2, \$3 for two years; single issue 40¢, foreign, 75¢. *q* City Art Museum of St. Louis, Forest Park, St. Louis 5, Mo.
- Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art.** \$3;

- single issue 35¢. *m* (10 issues per ann) Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio.
- Bulletin of the Detroit Institute of Arts.** 80¢; single issue 25¢. *q* Detroit Institute of Arts, 5200 Woodward Ave., Detroit, Mich.
- Bulletin des Études Arabes.** *bi-m* 175 Chemin du Telemly, Algiers, Algeria.
- Bulletin of Faculty of Arts.** Univ. of Cairo, Egypt.
- Bulletin de l'Institut du Desert Égyptien.** By exchange or request. *semi-ann* M. Mitwally, Sec. Gen. de l'Institut du Desert Égyptien, Blvd. Sultan Hussein, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.** £1 11s; single issue 15s 6d. *semi-ann* University Press, 316-324 Oxford Road, Manchester 13, England.
- Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts.** \$1; single issue 25¢. *q* Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 15, Mass.
- Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.** £1 10s. 3 issues per year School of Oriental & African Studies, Univ. of London, London, W.C.1; agent: Luzac & Co., 46 Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- Bulletin of the Walters Art Gallery.** \$1; single issue at Museum 10¢. *m* (Oct-May) Walters Art Gallery, Charles & Centre Sts., Baltimore 1, Md.
- Burlington Magazine.** UK, £3; foreign, \$10; single issue 5s, \$1. *m* Burlington Magazine, Lt., 12 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.
- Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne.** Egypt, £E 1; U. S., \$3.50; elsewhere, \$3.50 plus postage. *q* Mme. Jacques Tagher, Sec. Gen., 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale.** \$6. *q* Lucien LeFebvre, ed., A.218, UNESCO, 19 Ave. Kléber, Paris 16e; agent: Librairie des Meridiens, 119 Blvd. Saint-Germain, Paris 6e.
- Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain.** France, 1500 fr; foreign, 1800 fr; single issue 800 fr, 1000 fr. *semi-ann* Institut d'Études Islamiques, Univ. de Paris; Librairie G.P. Maisonneuve, 198 Blvd. St-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Cahiers de Tunisie** (formerly Revue Tunisienne). 1000 fr; foreign, 1200 fr; single issue 400 fr. *q* L'Institut des Hautes Études de Tunisie, 2 rue de Souk-Ahras, Tunis, Tunisia.
- Commentary.** U.S., \$5; foreign, \$6; single issue 50¢. *m* American Jewish Committee, 34 W. 33rd St., New York 1, N. Y.
- Contemporary Review.** £2 5s; single issue 3s 6d. *m* British Periodicals, Ltd., 46-7 Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2.
- Current History.** U.S., \$6; Can., \$6.25; elsewhere, \$6.50; single issue 50¢. *m* Events Publ. Co., 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa.
- L'Égypte Contemporaine.** Egypt, £E1.50; foreign, £1 14s; single issue £E .40, 9s. *q* Boite Postale 732, Cairo.
- L'Égypte Industrielle.** Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue £E .15, 15s. *m* La Fédération Égyptienne de l'Industrie, Mahmoud Bayram, ed., 26a rue Cherif Pacha, Cairo.
- Ethnos.** Swed. cr. 15; single issue Swed. cr. 4. *q* Statens Etnografiska Museum, Stockholm O, Sweden.
- Faenza.** Italy, lire 1000; foreign, lire 1500; single issue lire 200, lire 300. *semi-ann* Direzione del Museo Internazionale delle Ceramiche, Faenza, Italy.
- Foreign Affairs.** \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Council on Foreign Relations, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21, N. Y.
- Fortune.** \$12.50; single issue \$1.50. *m* Time-Life-Fortune, Inc., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.
- Geographical Journal.** £1 16s; single issue 8s 6d. *q* Royal Geographical Society, 1 Kensington Gore, London, S.W.7; agent: John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1.
- Geographical Review.** \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Geographical Society, Broadway at 156th St., New York 32, N. Y.
- Hamizrah Hehadash.** Israel, £I 4; foreign \$6; single issue £1, \$1.25. *q* Israel Oriental Society, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.
- Héspéris.** 2600 fr; single issue 1300 fr. *semi-ann* Secrétariat des Publications, Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines, Rabat, Morocco; agent: Librairie Larose, 11 rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.
- IBLA.** Tunisia and France, 850 fr; foreign, 1000 fr; single issue 215 fr, 250 fr. *q* Institut des Belles-Lettres, 12 rue Jamaa el Haoua, Tunis, Tunisia.
- Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi.** Faculty of Divinity, Ankara Univ., Cebeçi, Ankara, Turkey.
- Illustrated London News.** UK, £5 18s 6d; U. S., (British Edition) \$18, (American Edition) \$16.50; single issue 3s, 35¢. *w* 1 New Oxford St., London, W.C.1; agent: International News Company, 131 Varick St., New York 13, N. Y.
- International Affairs.** UK, £1 5s; U. S., \$5; single issue 6s 6d, \$1.25. *q* Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James's Square, London, S.W.1; 345 East 46th St., New York 17, N. Y.
- International Social Science Bulletin.** \$3.50; single issue, \$1. *q* UNESCO, 19 avenue Kleber, Paris 16e; U. S. agent: Columbia Univ. Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27.
- Iraq.** £1 11s; single issue 18s. *semi-ann* British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 20 Wilton St., London, S.W.1.
- Isis.** \$7.50; single issue \$1.90. *q* History of Science Society, I. Bernard Cohen, ed., Widener Library 189, Cambridge 38, Mass.
- Der Islam.** DM (West) 28; single issue DM (West) 10. 3 issues per year Schriftleitung des Islams,



- Prof. Dr. R. Strothmann & Prof. Dr. B. Spuler, ed., Bornplatz 2, Hamburg 13, Germany; agent: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Genthiner Str. 13, Berlin W5 (U. S. Sector).
- Islamic Culture.** Sterling area, £1 10s; elsewhere, \$6; single issue 7s 6d, \$1.50. *q* Islamic Culture Board, POB 171, Hyderabad, India.
- Islamic Literature.** Pakistan, P.Rs. 10/-; foreign, \$3.50; single issue Pakistan, P.R. 1/-; foreign 30¢. *m* Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore, Pakistan; agent: Orientalia, Inc., 11 E. 12th St., New York 3, N. Y.
- Islamic Quarterly.** 30s; single issue, 7s 6d. *q* The Islamic Cultural Centre, Regent's Lodge, 146 Park Rd., London, NW 8.
- Islamic Review.** UK, £1 5s; U. S., \$3.75; single issue 2s 6d, 37¢. *m* Woking Muslim Mission & Literary Trust, Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, England; Moslem Society of USA, 870 Castro St., San Francisco, Calif.; The International Muslim Society, Inc., POB 37, Manhattanville, Station J, New York 27, N. Y.
- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk—Otdeleniye Literaturi i Yazyka.\*** \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk—Seriya Geofizicheskaya.\*** \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
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- Izvestiya Vsesoiuznogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva.\*** \$5 or £1 15s; single issue 85¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen.** DM 24. *ann* Publ.: Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co. Verlag, Fontenay 4, Hamburg 36, Germany.
- Jewish Quarterly Review.** \$6. *q* The Dropsie College, Broad & York Sts., Philadelphia 32, Pa.
- Journal of the American Oriental Society.** \$8; libraries, \$7; single issue \$2. *q* American Oriental Society, 329 Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, Conn.
- Journal Asiatique.** *q* Société Asiatique, 1, rue de Seine, Paris 6c.
- Journal of Modern History.** \$7.50; single issue \$2.25. *q* Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
- Journal of Near Eastern Studies.** \$6 in U. S. and Pan American Postal Union; postage added outside PanAm Postal Union; single issue \$1.75. *q* Dept. of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Univ. of Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
- \* Agents in the U. S. for Russian publications: Four Continent Book Corporation, 38 W. 58th St., New York 19, N. Y.; Universal Distributors, 52-54 W. 13th St., New York 11, N. Y.
- Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society.** Rs. 10/- (Pakistani); single issue Rs. 3/- (Pakistani). *q* Pakistan Historical Society, 2/45 Jacob Lines, Karachi, Pakistan.
- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.** £2 8s; single issue £1 10s. *semi-ann* Royal Asiatic Society, 56 Queene Anne St., London, W.1.
- Journal of World History.** See Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale.
- Kirjath Sepher.** \$5; single issue \$1.25. *q* Jewish National and Univ. Library, POB 503, Jerusalem, Israel.
- al-Kulliyya.** £E .20; single issue £E .10. *semi-ann* Khartoum Univ. College, Khartoum, Sudan.
- al-Kulliyah.** Lebanon and Syria, LL 10; Egypt £E 1.25; other Middle East countries, LL 11 or equivalent; elsewhere, \$5 or equivalent. *m* Alumni Office, American University of Beirut, Lebanon; U. S. agent: Helen Braun, Rm. 521, 40 Worth St., New York.
- Levante.** Italy, lire 1800; foreign, \$3.50; single issue lire 500, \$1. *q* Società Editrice "Levante," 6 Via di Villa Ruffo, Rome.
- Libia.** Libya, £L 1; foreign, £1 4s; single issue, £L .250. *q* Via Michelangelo 41, Tripoli, Libya.
- al-Machriq.** Lebanon and Syria, LL25; foreign, \$9; single issue LL4.50, \$2. *bi-m* Fr. I-Abdo Khalifé, S.J., Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi.** LS10. *q* Damascus, Syria.
- Man.** £1 10s; single issue 2s 6d. *m* Royal Anthropological Institute, 21 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.
- Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph.** *irreg* Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon; agent: Librairie Orientale, Place de l'Étoile, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$5; single issue 50¢. *m* (Oct-June) *q* (July-Sept) Metropolitan Museum of Art, 5th Ave. at 82nd St., New York 28, N. Y.
- Middle East Journal.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Middle East Institute, 1761 N St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
- Middle Eastern Affairs.** \$2; foreign, \$2.50; single issue 20¢, 25¢. *m* (10 issues per ann) Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 11 W. 42nd St., New York 36, N. Y.
- Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos.** No price listed. *ann* Escuela de Estudios Arabes (Universidad de Granada), Casa del Chapiz, Granada, Spain.
- Le Muséon.** 300 Belg. fr. 2 double vols. per year Le Muséon, 9 Ave. des Hêtres, Héverlé-Louvain, Belgium.
- Muslim World.** \$3; single issue 75¢. *q* Dr. Kenneth Cragg, ed., Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford 5, Conn.

- National Geographic Magazine.** \$6.50; foreign, \$7.75; single issue 65¢, 75¢. *m* National Geographic Society, 16th & M Sts. N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
- New Times.\*** \$3.50 or 14s; single issue 10¢, 4d plus postage. *w* Moscow, USSR.
- Numismatic Chronicle & Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society.** £2 2s. *q* B. Quaritch, Ltd., 11 Grafton St., London, W.1.
- Oriens.** TL15; \$5. *semi-ann* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, c/o E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; agent for U. S. & Can.: Prof. Dr. Eberhard, 604 Panoramic Way, Berkeley, Calif.
- Oriens Christianus.** \$4.26. *ann* Harrossowitz, Wiesbaden, Germany.
- Orientalia.** Italy, lire 7300; foreign, \$13.50; single issue lire 2400, \$4. *q* Pontificum Istituto Biblico, Amministr. Pubblicazione, Piazza Pilotta 35, Rome 204.
- Orientalia Christiana Periodica.** Italy, lire 3500; foreign, \$3; single issue lire 1750, \$3. *semi-ann* Pontificum Istituto Orientale; Piazza Santa Maria Maggiore 7, Rome.
- Orientalische Literatur Zeitung.** *q* J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, Scherlstr. 2, (10B) Leipzig, C1, Germany.
- Oriente Moderno.** \$8. *m* Istituto per l'Oriente, Viale Davide Lubin 2, Rome.
- Palestine Exploration Quarterly.** £1 1s. *semi-ann* Palestine Exploration Fund, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.
- Politica Estera.** Italy, lire 100; foreign, lire 3000; single issue lire 25. *w* Giuseppe d'Amico, Dir., Via Lucrezio Caro 67, Rome.
- Politique Étrangère.** 1800 fr; foreign, 2250 fr; single issue 330 fr. *bi-m* Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 54 rue de Varenne, Paris 7e.
- Political Quarterly.** £1 10s; single issue 7s 6d. *q* Turnstile Press, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1.
- Political Science Quarterly.** Membership \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
- Proceedings Royal Society of Historical Studies.** *irreg* 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Quarterly Review.** £1 15s 6d; single issue 8s 6d. *q* John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1; International News Co., 131 Varick St., New York 13, N. Y.
- Relazioni Internazionali.** Italy, lire 4000; foreign, lire 6000; single issue lire 100. *w* Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionali, Via Clerici 5, Milan, Italy.
- Revue du Caire.** Egypt, £E 2.25; foreign, 2000 fr; single issue £E.20, 200 fr. *m* 3 rue Dr. Ahmed Hamid Said, Cairo; Les Éditions des Cahiers du Sud, 28 rue du Four, Paris 6e.
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## Readers' Commentary

*The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.*

Dear Sir:

The article by John Badeau on Egypt's Revolution published in your Autumn 1955 issue ("In Search of a Hero: A Brief Study of the Egyptian Revolution") contains certain assertions which appear to be in conflict with factual evidence available in Washington.

(1) On page 382 the statement is made that the reduction in Egyptian cotton exports, particularly to Western Europe, is due to U. S. cotton price policies in foreign markets which are presumed to have given U. S. cotton an edge over the Egyptian variety. This connection is not borne out by the facts.

First, as to the figures of Egyptian and U. S. cotton exports: according to data available at the Cotton Division of the Department of Agriculture, the volume of Egyptian cotton exports rose by nearly 100 percent in the first year of the Revolution. After that, exports suffered severely and in 1954/55 (year ending on July 30) were only 19 percent over 1951/52. The losses were global, not concentrated in one area, except perhaps for those suffered in 1954/55, when the losses in Western Europe overshadowed the trend in other markets.

Cotton exports from the U. S. to the same countries show no consistent pattern, such as the author implies. In the last year before the Revolution (1951/52), U. S. exports to Western Europe dropped sharply, while Egypt's rose by almost 50 percent. In 1952/53 both rose in about the same degree (14 and 18 percent, respectively). In 1954/55 both dropped, but the U. S. lost only 5 percent, while Egypt lost 44 percent of the previous year's sales to Europe.

Because the U. S. in 1954/55 suffered such a small reduction in its Western European markets in comparison with Egypt, the question may be raised whether the U. S., through its price policy, has been able to hold a relative advantage over Egypt. The answer must be negative. In the first place, price competition between U. S. and Egyptian fibers is confined to the Upland middle-length U. S. variety (1 1/16 inch to 1 2/16 inch), which is the only match for the Egyptian Ashmouni variety (1 2/16 to 1 3/16 inches). Half of Egypt's crop is Ashmouni, the other half Karnak, a still longer staple fiber. In the second place, U. S. prices have stayed close to Egyptian prices. In fact, in the early part of 1954 and again in the early months of 1955, the U. S. price was higher than the Egyptian price. The

reason for this is clear: there are no subsidies of U. S. private cotton sales (the last one was paid in 1950), and since the U. S. market price is supported by the government there could have been no profit in private dumping in overseas markets.

Secondly, as to U. S. price policy: U. S. government sales abroad have been priced at not less than the higher of the domestic prices, or 105 percent of the government-support price plus reasonable carrying charges. As a result, export prices have been steady. How do they compare with the Egyptian prices for equivalent grades? During half of the last 18 months, the Egyptian price was above the U. S. price by one cent (on the average). During the remainder, the U. S. price was higher. (In U. S. government circles, one has the impression that the Egyptian price policy actually supports the U. S. export price.)

It may still be argued that if price competition is not the answer to the relative strength of U. S. cotton in Western Europe vis-à-vis Egyptian cotton, perhaps U. S. government financial aid is at the bottom of it. And it may be tempting to ascribe the retention of the Western European markets for U. S. cotton during the last year to the Mutual Security and Surplus Commodity Program financed by aid allocations.

According to *The Cotton Situation* (No. 158, May 27, 1955; No. 159, Nov. 25, 1955), the number of bales shipped under aid programs increased by over 10 percent between 1951/52 and 1954/55. But closer analysis of the programs shows that during this period only 150,000 bales were "given away." For all other cotton, the foreign private buyers had to pay the commercial price discussed above, because the aided governments still have had to collect local money ("soft currency" in prevailing lingo; the previous appellation was "counterpart fund"). While it cannot be denied that this saving of dollar exchange has been of advantage to the foreign governments, foreign mills have resisted pressure to buy U. S. cotton so long as U. S. prices in foreign markets were not more attractive than official policy permitted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the operation of the foreign aid program on cotton helped to push U. S. cotton sales beyond the level they would have reached otherwise. The program's main contribution was, and is, to save the importing countries dollar exchange so that they can spend it on goods other than cotton.



(2) On page 383 the statement is made, first, that Egypt consummated an external loan of £E 100 million to be secured by using British Treasury notes and gold reserve as collateral; and second, that £E 200 million is to be raised internally, with Treasury Certificates issued by the National Bank of Egypt as cover. These statements are then linked with the inference that the practical result of the two loans would be to increase the amount of money in circulation by about one-third, thus inducing a dangerous rise in prices. On the basis of all available evidence, these factual statements are incorrect and the inference is misleading.

The first statement refers to Law No. 243 of 1955, which permits the Minister of Finance to borrow from the National Bank of Egypt an amount of sterling up to the equivalent of £E 100 million and to present, in turn, Egyptian Treasury Bonds bearing an interest of 3 percent and maturing in 15 years. This is not an external loan from a foreign institution; it merely provides the government with foreign exchange from the Central Bank's accumulated reserves without requiring cash outlays. (An external loan of this amount, now under discussion with the International Bank in Washington, would cost the government  $4\frac{1}{2}$  percent per annum.) Up to the middle of 1955 the government had not yet used this law. And it is expected that the government will not use it so long as its cash accounts permit it to buy the sterling it needs. The use of the proceeds of this loan is limited to financing foreign equipment and services for various production development projects. Since payments on such deliveries will not fall due in a lump sum, but will be staggered in accordance with the progress of the projects, the issuance of the bonds to the Bank will be gradual. At no time will they add to the local currency in circulation in Egypt. Hence they cannot contribute to inflation there. (However, under certain conditions, they could contribute to inflationary pressures in those sterling countries in which Egypt buys the equipment.)

The second statement refers to Law No. 242, passed early in 1955, under which the government may borrow from the National Bank of Egypt up to £E 200 million (the last £E 50 million only after prior approval by the Council of Ministers) against

the issuance of Treasury Notes. But the purpose of the Law is to replace older Treasury bills (issued since 1946). The Law's authority was first invoked in May 1955 when £E 18 million worth of Treasury bills were issued. But simultaneously, £E 15 million issued under Law No. 232 (of 1954) were withdrawn. Hence the net addition to money was £E 3 million, and total Treasury Bills outstanding as of May 31, 1955, were £E 54 million. This represented a 40 percent increase over December 1954, but barely 10 percent over the end of 1952. In relation to total money (Bank notes, coins, and check money), the £E 54 million is a small amount indeed—less than 4 percent of the money outstanding on December 31, 1954.

This moderate increase in the media of payments is nevertheless significant inasmuch as it signifies the first increase since 1952 and the definite end of a deflationary trend. However, it should be noted that the increase did not take place in the circulating notes, but in bank deposits. Government deposits with banks increased by £E 30 million in the 12-month period ending in April 1955. In turn, banks offered larger credits, mostly related to financing cotton transactions. Loans for purposes other than cotton also increased. The value of bills and loans discounted by banks increased by £E 26 million in the same 12-month period. To accommodate the increased demand for funds, the banks drew on their deposits with the National Bank and, in order to help them, the latter reduced the minimum reserve ratio from 15 to 12.5 percent of total deposits.

Yet, this cheap money policy has not led to price inflation. Largely owing to the import deficit (£E 18 million in the first 6 months of 1955) and some increase in production, the supply of goods has matched the supply of money. There is no denying that the business community is faced with the large financial burden of the current cotton crop. And in part the rise in the prices of industrial and commercial stocks is a sign of uncertainty. But at the same time, government securities have sold above par since early 1954, a fact which must be attributed to a spirit of confidence.

PETER G. FRANK  
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Political Attitudes of German Business .....	GABRIEL A. ALMOND
Changing Political Attitudes in Totalitarian Society: A Case Study of the Role of the Family .....	KENT GEIGER
Some Thoughts on the Social Structure after a Bombing Disaster .....	JACK HIRSHLEIFER
Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence .....	REAR ADMIRAL SIR ANTHONY BUZZARD Royal Navy (Retired)
Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization .....	ERNST B. HAAS
The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal .....	HENRY A. KISSINGER
<i>Review Articles</i>	
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